<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><?xml-stylesheet href="http://www.blogger.com/styles/atom.css" type="text/css"?><feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom' xmlns:openSearch='http://a9.com/-/spec/opensearchrss/1.0/' xmlns:georss='http://www.georss.org/georss' xmlns:gd='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005' xmlns:thr='http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0'><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6041305650038531172</id><updated>2011-08-18T08:01:32.211-07:00</updated><category term='artikel'/><title type='text'>Anomali Semesta</title><subtitle type='html'></subtitle><link rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#feed' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/feeds/posts/default'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default?max-results=100'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/'/><link rel='hub' href='http://pubsubhubbub.appspot.com/'/><author><name>muchamad ali safa'at</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07348715720341930804</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><generator version='7.00' uri='http://www.blogger.com'>Blogger</generator><openSearch:totalResults>30</openSearch:totalResults><openSearch:startIndex>1</openSearch:startIndex><openSearch:itemsPerPage>100</openSearch:itemsPerPage><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6041305650038531172.post-6376807017969016032</id><published>2009-02-25T19:29:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2009-02-25T19:34:02.863-08:00</updated><title type='text'>PERPU PERPANJANGAN SUNSET POLICY; ADAKAH KEGENTINGAN MEMAKSA?</title><content type='html'>Oleh: Muchamad Ali safa’at&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Salah satu perkembangan hukum yang marak akhir-akhir ini adalah pembentukan Perpu, baik sudah dilaksanakan maupun baru berupa gagasan. Perpu tersebut antara lain adalah Perpu Perpanjangan Sunset Policy Pajak dan Perpu mengenai Tata Cara Pencontrengan dalam Pemillu mendatang. Perpu tersebut diterbitkan untuk menggantikan ketentuan dalam Undang-undang yang belum lama dibuat, yaitu UU Nomor 28 Tahun 2007 tentang KUP dan UU Nomor 10 Tahun 2008 tentang Pemilu.&lt;br /&gt;Perpu merupakan bentuk hukum yang bersifat khusus karena wewenang pembentukannya diberikan hanya kepada Presiden, dibandingkan wewenang legislasi utama dalam UUD 1945 yang diberikan kepada DPR dan Presiden bersama-sama. Sifat khusus tersebut dapat dilihat dari bentuk hukum, yaitu Peraturan Pemerintah tetapi berkedudukan sejajar dengan UU yang dalam keadaan normal seharusnya berada di bawah UU. Kedudukan Perpu yang sejajar dengan UU merupakan konsekuensi dari keberadaan Perpu untuk menggantikan ketentuan UU.&lt;br /&gt;Sebagai bentuk hukum yang khusus, tentu Perpu tidak dapat dibuat dalam keadaan normal. Dengan kata lain, Perpu hanya dapat dibuat jika ada kondisi yang luar biasa. UUD 1945 merumuskan kondisi yang membenarkan dibuatnya Perpu adalah hal ihwal kegentingan yang memaksa sehingga ketentuan dalam suatu UU tidak dapat dijalankan dan harus diganti. Walaupun telah diberlakukan, Perpu tersebut nantinya harus mendapat persetujuan DPR pada masa sidang berikutnya.&lt;br /&gt;Apakah yang dimaksud dengan hal ihwal kegentingan memaksa? Mengingat ketentuan ini merupakan ketentuan yang tidak mengalami perubahan pada saat terjadi Perubahan UUD 1945, maka sebagai bahan untuk memahami frasa tersebut dapat dilihat Penjelasan Pasal 22 UUD 1945. Penjelasan tersebut menyatakan “Pasal ini mengenai noodverordeningsrecht Presiden. Aturan sebagai ini memang perlu diadakan agar supaya keselamatan negara dapat dijamin oleh pemerintah dalam keadaan yang genting, yang memaksa pemerintah untuk bertindak lekas dan tepat. Meskipun demikian, pemerintah tidak akan terlepas dari pengawasan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat. Oleh karena itu, peraturan pemerintah dalam pasal ini, yang kekuatannya sama dengan undang-undang harus disahkan pula oleh Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat”.&lt;br /&gt;Berdasarkan penjelasan tersebut dapat diketahui bahwa kegentingan yang memaksa adalah “keadaan genting” yang terkait dengan tugas pemerintah menjamin “keselamatan negara”. Oleh karena itu Perpu hanya dapat dikeluarkan pada saat keselamatan negara terancam. Ancaman dapat datang baik dari dalam maupun dari luar. Ancaman tersebut juga dapat terjadi dalam berbagai bentuk, seperti penyerangan dari luar, pemberontakan, kerusuhan, bencana alam, serta peristiwa lain yang dapat mengganggu jalannya pemerintahan sehingga tidak dapat menjamin keselamatan negara.&lt;br /&gt;Selain itu patut pula diingat bahwa penggantian ketentuan dalam UU melalui Perpu adalah karena ketentuan dalam UU dimaksud tidak dapat dijalankan karena dua kemungkinan alasan. Pertama, jika ketentuan tersebut dijalankan, justru keselamatan negara pada saat itu akan terancam. Kedua, ketentuan dimaksud tidak cukup memberikan landasan hukum kepada pemerintah untuk menjamin keselamatan negara.  Perpu tidak dapat dikeluarkan hanya karena pemerintah tidak berhasil menjalankan ketentuan UU yang sesungguhnya telah cukup baik dan dapat menjamin keselamatan negara.&lt;br /&gt;***&lt;br /&gt;Unsur kegentingan memaksa dapat dilihat pada dikeluarkannya Perpu tentang tata cara pencontrengan untuk Pemilu 2009. Ketentuan UU Nomor 10 Tahun 2008 menentukan bahwa pencontrengan dilakukan sekali pada kertas suara, padahal pada kertas suara terdapat gambar partai dan nama calon legislatif. Terdapat kemungkinan pemilih mencontreng gambar partai dan salah satu caleg dalam partai tersebut, atau dua kali mencontreng pada nomor dan naman calon yang sama. Hal itu sangat mungkin karena cara pencontrengan merupakan hal baru pada Pemilu di Indonesia.&lt;br /&gt;Jika ketentuan sekali mencontreng tidak diubah, terdapat dua dampak yang membahayakan. Pertama, suara pemilih akan hilang karena dianggap tidak sah, yang hal itu menentukan terpilih tidaknya seorang calon. Seorang pemilih yang mencontreng Partai A dan untuk calegnya adalah nomor X akan kehilangan suaranya, padahal sangat jelas bahwa itulah kehendak pemilih tersebut. Demikian pula pada saat pemilih mencontreng dua kali pada satu kolom caleg yang jelas menunjukkan bahwa kehendak pemilih adalah pada caleg tersebut. &lt;br /&gt;Hal itu akan mengakibatkan hasil Pemilu tidak dapat merepresentasikan kehendak rakyat yang sesungguhnya. Calon yang terpilih dan partai pemenang Pemilu belum tentu merupakan calon dan partai yang benar-benar dikehendaki rakyat, melainkan karena banyak pilihan rakyat yang dianggap tidak sah. Dampak selanjutnya adalah banyaknya suara yang tidak sah sehingga akan menurunkan legitimasi wakil rakyat dan hal ini mempengaruhi produk yang dihasilkan dan pemerintahan yang akan dijalankan. Pada titik ini keselamatan negara demokrasi terancam karena wakil rakyat dan pemerintahan tidak benar-benar terbentuk dan berjalan berdasarkan kehendak rakyat.&lt;br /&gt;***&lt;br /&gt;Apakah unsur “kegentingan memaksa” dapat dilihat pada Perpu mengenai perpanjangan sunset policy? Perpu tersebut dibuat untuk mengganti ketentuan Pasal 37A UU KUP yang membatasi kebijakan pengurangan atau penghapusan bunga bagi wajib pajak yang menyampaikan pembetulan SPT serta kebijakan penghapusan sanksi administrasi bagi wajib pajak orang pribadi yang secara suka rela mendaftarkan diri untuk mendapatkan NPWP masing-masing selama 1 tahun setelah UU tersebut berlaku. Perpu perpanjangan sunset policy diperuntukkan bagi wajib pajak yang telah memiliki NPWP sebelum 2008 yang akan melakukan pembetulan SPT dan masa pembayaran pajak.&lt;br /&gt;Alasan penerbitan Perpu tersebut menurut Dirjen Pajak, Darmin Nasution, adalah besarnya antusiasme masyarakat dalam memanfaatkan kebijakan sunset policy yang mengakibatkan Dirjen pajak kewalahan memberikan pelayanan (Bisnis Indonesia Online, 31/12/2008). Alasan tersebut jelas menunjukkan bahwa tidak ada persoalan pada ketentuan Pasal 37A UU KUP. Persoalannya adalah pada kapasitas dan pelayanan yang diberikan oleh Dirjen Pajak, serta budaya masyarakat yang melakukan pembetulan SPT serta pembayaran menjelang ambang batas waktu yang diberikan.&lt;br /&gt;UU KUP telah memberikan waktu selama 1 tahun kepada wajib pajak untuk melakukan pembetulan dan pembayaran pajak. Pemberian waktu kepada wajib pajak tersebut tentu menjadi tugas pemerintah, khususnya Dirjen Pajak, untuk membuat mekanisme dan standar pelayanan mengantisipasi antusiasme masyarakat. Jika pada akhirnya kewalahan, hal itu adalah tanggung jawab pelaksana UU, bukan karena norma itu sendiri. Oleh karena itu alasan tersebut tidak dapat dikategorikan sebagai “kegentingan memaksa”.&lt;br /&gt;Di sisi lain ada atau tidak kebijakan sunset policy, membayar pajak adalah kewajiban warga negara. Apabila telah diberikan kebijakan sunset policy wajib pajak tetap tidak melaksanakan kewajiban membayar pajak, maka sudah seharusnya dikenakan sanksi. Adalah kewajiban negara, dalam hal ini Dirjen Pajak, untuk melaksanakan ketentuan tersebut, termasuk mengenakan sanksi. Pajak tersebut dan bunga sebagai sanksi tetap harus dipungut.&lt;br /&gt;Dirjen Pajak telah berhasil meningkatkan pemasukan negara dari sektor pajak, antara lain melalui kebijakan sunset policy. Apabila kebijakan tersebut tidak diperpanjang, wajib pajak tetap harus membayar pajaknya disertai dengan sanksi bunga. Adalah kewajiban aparatur pajak untuk memungutnya. Dengan demikian, apabila kebijakan tersebut tidak diperpanjang, tidak ada aspek keselamatan negara yang terancam dan pemerintah tetap dapat menjalankan tugasnya menjamin keselamatan itu. Tidak adalah alasan kegentingan yang memaksa dalam penerbitan Perpu perpanjangan sunset policy itu.&lt;br /&gt;***&lt;br /&gt;Hukum dibuat untuk dipatuhi. Dalam penyelenggaraan pemerintahan, aturan hukum merupakan dasar dan pedoman bagi pemerintah untuk menjalankan tugas-tugasnya. Hukum tidak boleh hanya dijadikan sebagai pembenar apa yang dilakukan dan dikehendaki pemerintah. Jika hukum diposisikan sebagai alat pembenar, maka itu adalah awal kesewenang-wenangan.&lt;br /&gt;Perpu sebagai produk hukum yang hanya dibuat oleh pemerintah sendiri memiliki potensi digunakan sebagai legitimasi, seperti kecenderungan penggunaan Keppres pada masa Soeharto. Sudah saatnya aturan hukum dipatuhi dan dengan seoptimal mungkin dilaksanakan, bukan disimpangi dan dilanggar, lalu membuat aturan hukum sebagai legitimasi pelanggaran atau ketidakberhasilan pelaksanaannya. (***)&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/6041305650038531172-6376807017969016032?l=anomalisemesta.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/feeds/6376807017969016032/comments/default' title='Poskan Komentar'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=6041305650038531172&amp;postID=6376807017969016032' title='0 Komentar'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/6376807017969016032'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/6376807017969016032'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/2009/02/perpu-perpanjangan-sunset-policy-adakah.html' title='PERPU PERPANJANGAN SUNSET POLICY; ADAKAH KEGENTINGAN MEMAKSA?'/><author><name>muchamad ali safa'at</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07348715720341930804</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6041305650038531172.post-2210603328449729681</id><published>2009-02-25T19:21:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2009-02-25T19:29:12.241-08:00</updated><title type='text'>KEKUATAN MENGIKAT DAN PELAKSANAAN PUTUSAN MK</title><content type='html'>Oleh: Muchamad Ali Safa’at&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK) yang dibentuk sejak tahun 2003 telah mewarnai perkembangan hukum dan ketatanegaraan di Indonesia. Putusan-putusan MK mengejutkan banyak pihak dan mendorong kehidupan berbangsa dan bernegara lebih dinamis.&lt;br /&gt;Salah satu putusan yang mendapat perhatian publik adalah putusan yang membatalkan Pasal 214 UU 10 Tahun 2008 baik dari sisi substansi maupun dari sisi kekuatan hukum. Salah satunya adalah tulisan Ramlan Surbakti dengan tajuk “Perlu Perpu Atur Suara Terbanyak” (Kompas, 11/02/2009) yang menjadi rujukan bagi KPU yang mengemukakan alternatif memberlakukan Pasal  214 jika tidak ada Perpu yang mengaturnya.&lt;br /&gt;Tulisan ini tidak hendak membahas perlu tidaknya Putusan MK itu diatur lebih lanjut dengan Perpu, tetapi akan membahas dasar argumentasi bahwa Putusan MK baru mengikat jika sudah ada peraturan, baik perubahan UU maupun Perpu, yang memperbaiki ketentuan yang telah dibatalkan oleh MK. Terkait dengan putusan suara terbanyak, dinyatakan bahwa KPU baru terikat melaksanakan putusan MK jika putusan itu sudah menjadi bagian dari undang-undang. Argumentasi yang dikemukakan hendak menunjukkan bahwa kedudukan Putusan MK tidak sama dengan UU. Suatu UU yang berlaku mengikat adalah hasil dari proses politik oleh lembaga yang dipilih oleh rakyat.&lt;br /&gt;Masalah mendasar dari tulisan Ramlan Surbakti adalah tidak membedakan antara persoalan kekuatan mengikat putusan MK dan pelaksanaannya. &lt;br /&gt;***&lt;br /&gt;Untuk menentukan produk suatu lembaga negara adalah produk hukum yang mengikat tidak semata-mata ditentukan oleh logika politik keterwakilan. Yang mengikat sebagai norma hukum tidak harus selalu lahir dari proses politik. Yang lebih menentukan adalah apakah produk itu memang ditempatkan sebagai hukum yang mengikat menurut ketentuan yang lebih tinggi dan dibuat sesuai dengan mekanisme hukum yang berlaku. Untuk mengetahui apa saja produk hukum dalam sistem hukum nasional, tentu saja rujukannya adalah UUD 1945 sebagai hukum tertinggi.&lt;br /&gt;Pasal 24C ayat (1) UUD 1945 menyatakan bahwa Putusan MK bersifat final. Hal itu berarti Putusan MK telah memiliki kekuatan hukum tetap sejak dibacakan dalam persidangan MK. Putusan pengadilan yang telah memiliki kekuatan hukum tetap memilki kekuatan hukum mengikat untuk dilaksanakan.&lt;br /&gt;Berbeda dengan putusan pengadilan biasa yang hanya mengikat para pihak, Putusan MK dalam perkara pengujian UU mengikat semua komponen bangsa, baik penyelenggara negara maupun warga negara. Dalam perkara pengujian UU, yang diuji adalah norma UU yang bersifat abstrak dan mengikat umum. Walaupun dasar permohonan pengujian adalah adanya hak konstitusional pemohon yang dirugikan, namun sesungguhnya tindakan tersebut adalah mewakili kepentingan hukum seluruh masyarakat, yaitu tegaknya konstitusi.&lt;br /&gt;Kedudukan pembentuk UU, DPR dan Presiden, bukan sebagai tergugat atau termohon yang harus bertanggungjawab atas kesalahan yang dilakukan. Pembentuk UU hanya sebagai pihak terkait yang memberikan keterangan tentang latar belakang dan maksud dari ketentuan UU yang dimohonkan. Hal itu dimaksudkan agar ketentuan yang diuji tidak ditafsirkan menurut pandangan pemohon atau MK saja, tetapi juga menurut pembentuk UU, sehingga diperoleh keyakinan hukum apakah bertentangan atau tidak dengan konstitusi.&lt;br /&gt;Oleh karena itu yang terikat melaksanakan Putusan MK tidak hanya dan tidak harus selalu pembentuk UU, tetapi semua pihak yang terkait dengan ketentuan yang diputus oleh MK. Dalam Putusan suara terbanyak, tidak hanya KPU ataupun pemerintah dan DPR yang terikat oleh Putusan MK, tetapi juga partai politik peserta Pemilu sejak putusan itu dibacakan. &lt;br /&gt;***&lt;br /&gt;Karena putusan MK mengikat umum, pihak-pihak yang terkait dengan pelaksanaan ketentuan UU yang telah diputus MK harus melaksanakan putusan itu. Namun demikian, mengingat norma dalam UU adalah satu kesatuan sistem ada pelaksanaan putusan yang harus melalui tahapan-tahapan tertentu, bergantung pada substansi putusan. Ada putusan yang dapat dilaksanakan langsung tanpa harus dibuat peraturan baru atau perubahan, ada pula yang memerlukan pengaturan lebih lanjut terlebih dahulu.&lt;br /&gt;Putusan yang langsung dapat dilaksanakan adalah putusan membatalkan norma tertentu yang tidak menganggu sistem norma yang ada dan tidak memerlukan pengaturan lebih lanjut. Misalnya, putusan yang mengembalikan hak pilih mantan anggota PKI dengan membatalkan ketentuan Pasal 60 huruf g UU Nomor 12 Tahun 2003. Sejak putusan itu diucapkan, yaitu tanggal 24 Februari 2004, hak pilih mantan anggota PKI telah dipulihkan. &lt;br /&gt;Putusan lain yang langsung dapat dilaksanakan  adalah Putusan MK yang membatalkan pasal-pasal tentang penghinaan Presiden dalam KUHP, yaitu Pasal 134, 136 bis, dan 137. Sejak putusan ini diucapkan dalam sidang MK tidak seorang pun dapat dipidana berdasarkan pasal-pasal itu. Kepolisian tidak dapat menjadikan pasal-pasal itu sebagai dasar penyelidikan dan penyidikan. Demikian pula penuntutan oleh kejaksaan. Putusan MK berlaku serta merta, meskipun belum ada perubahan terhadap KUHP.&lt;br /&gt;Di sisi lain, terdapat putusan yang untuk pelaksanaannya membutuhkan aturan lebih lanjut, yaitu putusan membatalkan suatu norma yang mempengaruhi norma-norma lain, atau untuk melaksanakannya diperlukan aturan yang lebih operasional. Putusan MK mengenai calon perseorangan dalam Pemilukada dan putusan mengenai suara terbanyak adalah contoh jenis putusan ini. &lt;br /&gt;Namun demikian, belum adanya peraturan yang menindaklanjuti putusan MK tidak mengurangi kekuatan mengikat yang telah melekat sejak dibacakan. Setiap pihak yang terkait harus melaksanakan putusan itu. Apabila ada peraturan yang dilaksanakan ternyata bertentangan dengan putusan MK, maka yang menjadi dasar hukum adalah putusan MK. &lt;br /&gt;Mekanisme itu sama halnya dengan pembentukan UU baru. Suatu UU mempunyai kekuatan hukum mengikat sejak diundangkan. Namun demikian ada ketentuan yang dapat langsung dilaksanakan, tetapi ada pula yang memerlukan peraturan pelaksana. Apabila aturan pelaksana belum dibuat atau disesuaikan, hal itu tidak mengurangi sifat mengikat UU itu sendiri. Bahkan, dalam setiap ketentuan penutup UU selalu menyatakan bahwa semua peraturan pelaksana tetap berlaku sepanjang tidak bertentangan dengan UU itu sendiri. &lt;br /&gt;***&lt;br /&gt;Sebagai akhiran perlu ditegaskan bahwa memang untuk melaksanakan putusan MK terkait “suara terbanyak” sebaiknya dibuat pengaturan lebih lanjut. Namun hal itu bukan karena putusan MK belum memiliki kekuatan mengikat, tetapi karena kompleksitas persoalan dalam pelaksanaanya. Pengaturan lebih lanjut tentu sebaiknya dilakukan dengan peraturan setingkat, yaitu perubahan UU atau Perpu. Tetapi, kalaupun peraturan itu tidak dibuat, KPU tetap terikat melaksanakan putusan MK. Tiada cara lain kecuali dengan membuat Peraturan KPU.&lt;br /&gt;Kemungkinan pengujian Peraturan KPU tentu saja ada dan merupakan wewenang MA untuk memutus. Sebagai satu kesatuan sistem hukum, MA tentu saja akan menjadikan putusan MK sebagai dasar dalam memeriksa dan memutus perkara, karena Peraturan yang diuji memang dibuat untuk menindaklanjuti putusan MK.  Hakim tentu paham benar kedudukan putusan MK sebagai negative legislation. Hal itu telah terbukti dengan dikabulkannya gugatan 4 partai politik oleh PTUN berdasarkan putusan MK yang membatalkan Pasal 316 huruf d UU Nomor 10 Tahun 2008.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/6041305650038531172-2210603328449729681?l=anomalisemesta.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/feeds/2210603328449729681/comments/default' title='Poskan Komentar'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=6041305650038531172&amp;postID=2210603328449729681' title='0 Komentar'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/2210603328449729681'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/2210603328449729681'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/2009/02/kekuatan-mengikat-dan-pelaksanaan.html' title='KEKUATAN MENGIKAT DAN PELAKSANAAN PUTUSAN MK'/><author><name>muchamad ali safa'at</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07348715720341930804</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6041305650038531172.post-8033087226871335292</id><published>2008-08-27T05:38:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2008-08-27T05:44:01.809-07:00</updated><title type='text'>EKSEKUSI HUKUMAN MATI</title><content type='html'>Oleh: Muchamad Ali Safa’at&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Setahun yang lalu, perdebatan konstitusionalitas hukuman mati mengemuka pada saat dilakukan pengujian ketentuan hukuman mati dalam UU Narkotika oleh MK. Hukuman mati terkait dengan hak hidup sebagai hak asasi manusia yang mendasar. Pasal 28I Ayat (1) UUD 1945 dinyatakan bahwa hak untuk hidup adalah salah satu hak asasi manusia yang tidak dapat dikurangi dalam keadaan apapun. Salah satu isu konstitusi yang krusial adalah apakah non-derogable rights dalam Pasal 28I Ayat (1) tunduk pada pembatasan dalam Pasal 28J Ayat (2) UUD 1945.&lt;br /&gt;Perdebatan tersebut diakhiri dengan Putusan MK yang menyatakan bahwa hukuman mati tidak bertentangan dengan UUD 1945. Namun MK dalam Putusan Nomor 2-3/PUU-V/2007 tersebut juga menyatakan bahwa  di masa yang akan datang perumusan, penerapan, maupun pelaksanaan pidana mati hendaklah memperhatikan empat hal penting. Pertama, pidana mati bukan lagi merupakan pidana pokok, melainkan sebagai pidana yang bersifat khusus dan alternatif. Kedua, pidana mati dapat dijatuhkan dengan masa percobaan selama sepuluh tahun yang apabila terpidana berkelakuan terpuji dapat diubah dengan pidana penjara seumur hidup atau selama 20 tahun. Ketiga, pidana mati tidak dapat dijatuhkan terhadap anak-anak yang belum dewasa. Keempat, eksekusi pidana mati terhadap perempuan hamil dan seseorang yang sakit jiwa ditangguhkan sampai perempuan hamil tersebut melahirkan dan terpidana yang sakit jiwa tersebut sembuh. Selain itu MK juga menyarankan agar semua putusan pidana mati yang telah mempunyai kekuatan hukum tetap segera dilaksanakan sebagaimana mestinya.&lt;br /&gt;Pasca putusan tersebut, telah terdapat beberapa terpidana mati yang dieksekusi oleh regu tembak berdasarkan UU No. 02/Pnps/1964 tentang Tata Cara Pelaksanaan Hukuman Mati. Beberapa bulan terakhir, media massa dengan gencar memberitakan pelaksanaan eksekusi beberapa terpidana mati antara lain Sumiyarsih dan Sugeng, Maulana Yusuf, serta Rio Martil.&lt;br /&gt;Hukuman mati kembali akan memasuki perdebatan konstitusional terkait dengan pelaksanaannya, yaitu tata cara eksekusi hukuman mati. Hal itu terkait pengajuan permohonan pengujian UU No. 02/Pnps/1964 oleh terpidana mati kasus bom bali, Amrozi, melalui kuasanya dari Tim Pembela Muslim. Substansi yang diajukan permohonan adalah hukuman mati dengan cara ditembak sampai mati yang dipandang menimbulkan kerugian berupa nestapa fisik yang tidak perlu terjadi dalam proses menuju kematian. Hal itu didalilkan bertentangan dengan hak konstitusional untuk tidak disiksa yang dijamin dalam UUD 1945.&lt;br /&gt;***&lt;span class="fullpost"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Hukuman mati merupakan salah satu bentuk hukuman yang telah ada dan dipraktikkan, terutama sejak abad pertengahan, terhadap berbagai macam kejahatan. Terdapat beberapa cara pelaksanaan hukuman mati yang pernah diterapkan sesuai dengan perkembangan masyarakat dan sistem hukum yang dianut suatu negara. Cara pelaksanaan hukuman mati tersebut antara lain adalah salib, bakar, penggal, gantung, tembak, kamar gas, kursi listrik, dan injeksi. Hukuman mati dengan cara disalib merupakan cara pelaksanaan hukuman mati yang telah dikenal sejak masa sebelum Kristus hingga saat ini di beberapa negara. &lt;br /&gt;Hukuman mati dengan cara dibakar pernah diterapkan terutama untuk kejahatan bid’ah, sihir, dan terhadap perempuan yang dipandang tidak bermoral. Cara pelaksanaan hukuman mati ini dinyatakan terlarang oleh Paus pada tahun 643. Namun demikian praktik pelaksanaan hukuman mati dengan cara dibakar baru berakhir pada tahun 1834.&lt;br /&gt;Hukuman mati dengan dipenggal dapat dilakukan melalui dua cara, yaitu yang dilakukan oleh algojo menggunakan kapak. Cara ini dilakukan pada abad ke-16 dan ke-17, terakhir kali digunakan pada tahun 1747 di Inggris. Cara lain adalah dengan menggunakan alat yang disebut dengan guillotine, yang diajukan oleh Dr. Joseph Guillotine untuk mengurangi penyiksaan. Alat itu untuk pertama kalinya digunakan pada 1789 di Perancis dan terakhir digunakan pada 1977 di negara yang sama.&lt;br /&gt;Hukuman gantung merupakan cara yang paling umum dipakai dari berbagai cara yang ada. Terpidana mati digantung dengan seutas tali hingga meninggal karena lehernya patah. Suatu cara yang sederhana. Pada masa lalu, hukuman gantung juga diikuti dengan penyiksaan. Sebelum digantung, terpidana mati diseret, digores, bahkan bagian tubuhnya dipotong beramai-ramai. Hukuman gantung hingga saat ini masih dipraktikkan di beberapa negara, bahkan beberapa negara bagian Amerika Serikat.&lt;br /&gt;Cara pelaksanaan hukuman mati selanjutnya adalah dengan ditembak hingga mati oleh satu regu tembak. Di beberapa negara, hanya sedikit senapan yang berisi peluru tajam, sedangkan senapan yang lain berisi peluru kosong, sehingga eksekutor sesungguhnya tidak diketahui. Beberapa pemimpin Jerman yang diputus hukuman mati oleh pengadilan Nuremberg dengan cara digantung meminta dihukum mati oleh regu tembak karena dianggap lebih bermartabat.&lt;br /&gt;Hukuman mati juga dapat dilakukan dengan cara memasukkan terpidana ke dalam kamar gas. Ke dalam kamar tersebut dialirkan asam hydrochloric, dan beberapa saat kemudian ditambahkan potasium sianida atau sodium sianida yang menghasilkan gas hidrosianik. Gas inilah yang merusak kemampuan hemoglobin darah dan terpidana akan segera tidak sadar jika bernafas dalam-dalam. Namun jika terpidana menahan nafas akan menimbulkan reaksi yang liar, dan kematian baru akan terjadi antara sepuluh hingga delapan belas menit. Eksekusi dengan kamar gas dilakukan pertama kali pada 1924 di Amerika Serikat yang hingga saat ini masih digunakan di beberapa negara bagian.&lt;br /&gt;Metode pelaksanaan hukuman mati yang dapat dikatakan sebagai temua era modern adalah kursi listrik dan injeksi. Kursi listrik menjadi penghantar arus listrik dengan terpidana melalui elektroda yang dirancang khusus. Biasanya eksekusi dilakukan oleh tiga orang yang menekan tombol namun hanya satu di antaranya yang terhubung dengan sumber listrik. Arus yang digunakan disesuaikan dengan berat tubuh terpidana. Hukuman dengan kursi listrik mengakibatkan kerusakan tubuh terpidana dan organ internal terbakar. &lt;br /&gt;Cara pelaksanaan hukuman mati selanjutnya adalah injeksi yang mematikan, yaitu dengan menyuntikkan beberapa macam zat mulai dari yang menghilangkan kesadaran hingga yang mematikan. Zat pertama yang disuntikkan adalah Sodium Thiopental yang mengakibatkan terpidana tertidur pulas. Selanjutnya adalah injeksi Pancuronium Bromide yang merelaksasi otot hingga pernafasan diafragma dan paru-paru berhenti. Zat terakhir yang disuntikkan adalah Potassium Chlorida yang menghentikan kerja jantung.&lt;br /&gt;***&lt;br /&gt;Eksekusi hukuman mati mengalami pergeseran dari yang sifatnya disertai dengan maksud penyiksaan menuju pada cara yang dipandang lebih manusia tanpa melibatkan unsur penyiksaan. Hal itu sesuai dengan perkembangan teori penghukuman yang telah meninggalkan konsep hukuman sebagai pembalasan. Konvenan ECOSOC menegaskan perlunya standar pelaksanaan hukuman mati dengan meminimalisasi penderitaan terpidana. &lt;br /&gt;Terdapat beberapa kriteria cara pelaksanaan hukuman mati yang dipandang sesuai dengan ciri masyarakat beradab. Pertama, harus secepat dan sesederhana mungkin serta bebas dari hal-hal yang meningkatkan ketakutan dan penderitaan terpidana. Kedua, cara tersebut harus secepat mungkin menimbulkan ketidaksadaran terpidana dan secepat mungkin pula mengalami kematian. Ketiga, cara tersebut harus layak dan patut dalam masyarakat yang beradab. Keempat, harus dihindari perusakan anggota tubuh.&lt;br /&gt;Bagi bangsa Indonesia, kriteria cara pelaksanaan hukuman mati tersebut tentu sesuai dengan prinsip kemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab serta jaminan bebas dari penyiksaan. Namun, untuk menentukan cara mana yang lebih sesuai dengan prinsip-prinsip konstitusi tentu bukan hal yang mudah. Apakah hukuman mati oleh regu penembak bertentangan dengan konstitusi atau tidak, hakim konstitusi yang akan memutuskan. Di sisi lain, dapat pula ditentukan bahwa terpidana mati memiliki hak untuk memilih cara pelaksanaan hukumannya. (***)&lt;span class="fullpost"&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/6041305650038531172-8033087226871335292?l=anomalisemesta.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/feeds/8033087226871335292/comments/default' title='Poskan Komentar'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=6041305650038531172&amp;postID=8033087226871335292' title='0 Komentar'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/8033087226871335292'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/8033087226871335292'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/2008/08/eksekusi-hukuman-mati.html' title='EKSEKUSI HUKUMAN MATI'/><author><name>muchamad ali safa'at</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07348715720341930804</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6041305650038531172.post-3127993741995715559</id><published>2008-06-29T08:36:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2008-06-29T08:40:04.156-07:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='artikel'/><title type='text'></title><content type='html'>Sumber:  Kompas, 27 Juni 2008&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Pembatasan Kebebasan Beragama&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Oleh Salahuddin Wahid&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Hubungan agama dengan negara merupakan masalah klasik dalam kehidupan negara Indonesia.&lt;br /&gt;Dalam BPUPKI dan Majelis Konstituante, terjadi perdebatan tentang dasar negara, Islam atau Pancasila. Dekrit Presiden 5 Juli 1959 menegaskan, Pancasila menjadi dasar negara.&lt;br /&gt;RUU Perkawinan (1973) memicu kembali perdebatan itu, juga saat membahas RUU Peradilan Agama (1989), RUU Sisdiknas (2003), RUU APP (2005), dan dalam kaitan Ahmadiyah. Pendapat MUI soal Ahmadiyah—dari kacamata agama—perlu dihormati. Namun, saat membahasnya dari sudut pandang negara, perlu disampaikan pendapat berbeda.&lt;br /&gt;Kovenan internasional&lt;br /&gt;Indonesia telah meratifikasi dua instrumen HAM, Kovenan Internasional tentang Hak-hak Ekosob (UU No 11/2005) dan Kovenan Internasional tentang Hak-hak Sipol (UU No 12/2005). Dalam pertimbangan hukum kedua UU itu ditegaskan, HAM merupakan hak dasar yang melekat pada diri manusia, universal dan langgeng.&lt;span class="fullpost"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Maka, HAM harus dilindungi, dihormati, dipertahankan, dan tidak boleh diabaikan, dikurangi, atau dirampas siapa pun. Juga diakui, instrumen internasional yang diatur dalam ICESCR dan ICCPR tidak bertentangan dengan Pancasila dan UUD.&lt;br /&gt;Hal itu sesuai keberadaan negara hukum Indonesia yang menjunjung tinggi harkat dan martabat manusia, menjamin persamaan kedudukan semua warga negara dalam hukum, dan keinginan untuk memajukan dan melindungi HAM dalam kehidupan berbangsa dan bernegara.&lt;br /&gt;Kedua UU itu menjelaskan, ratifikasi dilakukan sesuai UUD yang mengamanatkan pemajuan dan perlindungan HAM dalam kehidupan bermasyarakat, berbangsa, dan bernegara. Konsekuensinya, negara wajib menghormati dan menjamin hak-hak yang diakui kovenan tanpa diskriminasi, termasuk mengambil tindakan legislatif atau lainnya, guna mengefektifkan perlindungan hak-hak itu.&lt;br /&gt;Bahkan, untuk ICCPR, negara yang telah meratifikasi harus segera melaksanakan. Karena itu, salah satu hal penting dalam ICCPR adalah instrumen yang dapat menjamin kepatuhan negara berupa mekanisme pelaporan dan pemantauan yang dilakukan komite dalam Dewan HAM PBB.&lt;br /&gt;Hak dasar&lt;br /&gt;Salah satu hak dan kebebasan dasar yang diatur ICCPR adalah hak atas kebebasan berkeyakinan dan beragama, mencakup kebebasan menganut atau menetapkan agama atau kepercayaan atas pilihan sendiri, dan kebebasan, baik secara individu maupun bersama, di tempat umum maupun tertutup, untuk menjalankan agama atau kepercayaan dalam kegiatan ibadah, ketaatan, dan pengajaran. Tidak seorang pun dapat dipaksa sehingga mengurangi kebebasan untuk menganut atau menetapkan agama atau kepercayaan sesuai pilihannya.&lt;br /&gt;Ketentuan itu sesuai Pasal 28E UUD: tiap orang bebas memeluk agama dan beribadat menurut agamanya, dan setiap orang berhak atas kebebasan meyakini kepercayaan, menyatakan pikiran dan sikap, sesuai nuraninya. Bahkan, hak kemerdekaan pikiran, nurani, dan hak beragama merupakan salah satu hak yang tidak dapat dikurangi dalam keadaan apa pun, seperti ketentuan Pasal 28I Ayat 1 UUD.&lt;br /&gt;Terhadap hak yang terkait kebebasan beragama memang berlaku pembatasan. ICCRP menyatakan, kebebasan untuk menjalankan agama atau kepercayaan seseorang hanya dapat dibatasi oleh ketentuan hukum, yang diperlukan guna melindungi keamanan, ketertiban, kesehatan atau moral masyarakat, atau hak mendasar dan kebebasan orang lain. Pembatasan senada diatur Pasal 28J Ayat 2 UUD. Pembatasan itu adalah terhadap tindakan sebagai pelaksanaan beragama, bukan keyakinan beragama, karena kebebasan atas keyakinan agama tidak dapat dibatasi oleh siapa pun.&lt;br /&gt;Akan berulang?&lt;br /&gt;SKB tentang Ahmadiyah berisi peringatan sebagai pelaksanaan UU No 1/PNPS/1965 tentang Pencegahan Penyalahgunaan dan/atau Penodaan Agama. SKB itu tidak dapat dimaknai sebagai pembubaran atau pembekuan, hanya peringatan karena aparat berwenang menilai JAI melanggar ketentuan UU di atas.&lt;br /&gt;Menurut UU No 1/PNPS/1965, penyalahgunaan dan/atau penodaan adalah melakukan penafsiran tentang sesuatu agama yang dianut di Indonesia atau melakukan kegiatan keagamaan yang menyerupai kegiatan keagamaan dari agama itu, yang menyimpang dari pokok-pokok ajaran agama itu. Pelanggaran terhadap larangan itu diancam pidana dan organisasinya dapat dibubarkan oleh Presiden. Ketentuan itu merupakan pembatasan terhadap hak atas kebebasan beragama yang dijamin UUD dan ICCPR.&lt;br /&gt;Karena itu, persoalan yang harus dipecahkan adalah apakah pembatasan itu memenuhi kriteria sesuai Pasal 28J Ayat 2 UUD dan ICCPR? Apakah suatu aliran agama dapat dilarang dan dibubarkan karena memiliki penafsiran berbeda dengan aliran lain? Apakah keresahan sekelompok penganut agama dapat dijadikan ukuran untuk menyatakan, suatu aliran agama telah mengganggu ketenteraman dan ketertiban umum? Siapa yang berhak menilai suatu penafsiran atau kegiatan keagamaan telah menyimpang dari pokok ajaran agama itu? Dapatkah Presiden membatasi, melarang, dan membubarkan, padahal dalam proses itu harus dilakukan pembuktian pelanggaran yang dilakukan?&lt;br /&gt;Kekerasan dan perpecahan terkait kasus Ahmadiyah dan semacamnya akan berulang di masa depan jika berbagai pertanyaan itu belum terjawab. Maka, langkah hukum yang tepat adalah meninjau konstitusionalitas (bertentangan dengan UUD atau tidak) UU No 1/PNPS/1965 sehingga ada pedoman sesuai norma konstitusi dalam menyikapi perbedaan.&lt;br /&gt;Salahuddin Wahid Pengasuh Pesantren Tebuireng&lt;span class="fullpost"&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/6041305650038531172-3127993741995715559?l=anomalisemesta.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/feeds/3127993741995715559/comments/default' title='Poskan Komentar'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=6041305650038531172&amp;postID=3127993741995715559' title='0 Komentar'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/3127993741995715559'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/3127993741995715559'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/2008/06/sumber-kompas-27-juni-2008-pembatasan.html' title=''/><author><name>muchamad ali safa'at</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07348715720341930804</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6041305650038531172.post-2561687663148184970</id><published>2008-06-08T12:49:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2008-06-08T12:51:16.417-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Turkey: Constitutional Court Ruling Upholds Headscarf Ban</title><content type='html'>Religion and Expression Rights Denied, Broader Reform Agenda Endangered&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/06/06/turkey19050.htm&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;(Istanbul, June 7, 2008) – The decision by Turkey’s Constitutional Court to cancel constitutional amendments that would have opened the way for women to wear a headscarf in universities is a blow to freedom of religion and other fundamental rights, Human Rights Watch said today. The court ruled on June 5 that the Turkish parliament had violated the constitutionally enshrined principle of secularism when it passed amendments to lift the headscarf ban on university campuses. The amendments were adopted by an overwhelming majority of parliament.&lt;span class="fullpost"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;“This decision means that women who choose to wear a headscarf in Turkey will be forced to choose between their religion and their education,” said Holly Cartner, Europe and Central Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “This is a truly disappointing decision and does not bode well for the reform process.”  &lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;In early February 2008, the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP), supported by the opposition Nationalist Action Party (MHP), passed changes to the constitution concerning the principle of equality and the right to education. The headscarf is not specifically mentioned in either of these amendments, but the parliament’s intention was to end its ban in universities.  &lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;The Constitutional Court’s decision to annul these amendments will have a dire impact on women university students who wish to wear a headscarf for reasons of conscience and as an expression of their Muslim faith. Human Rights Watch has long supported lifting the current restrictions on headscarves in university on the grounds that the prohibition is an unwarranted infringement on the right to religious practice. Moreover, this restriction of dress, which only applies to women, is discriminatory and violates their right to education, freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and privacy.  &lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;In a 2004 report, “Memorandum to the Turkish Government on Human Rights Watch’s Concerns with Regard to Academic Freedom in Higher Education, and Access to Higher Education for Women who Wear the Headscarf ”, Human Rights Watch urged the government to lift the headscarf ban as part of a broader strategy for remedying shortcomings in the protection of women and improving their access to education and employment. A similar approach was suggested by the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women.  &lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;“The failed attempt by the AKP government to change the constitution on the headscarf issue only highlights its failure to redraft the constitution in its entirety, despite having promised to do so when it was re-elected,” Cartner said. “The 1982 constitution fails to protect human rights and should have been done away with already.”  &lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;The current constitution was drawn up in 1982 under the then-military regime brought to power by the September 12, 1980 military coup. This constitution severely restricts the fundamental freedoms and human rights enshrined in Turkey’s international human rights obligations, including limitations on freedom of expression, which have had a particularly negative impact on Turkey’s minorities.  &lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;After being re-elected with 47 percent of the vote in the July 2007 general election, the government promised to revise the 1982 Constitution entirely. However, instead of producing a new draft constitution that would address the broad range of rights concerns, the government controversially promoted only the amendments to lift the headscarf ban that prompted the June 5 Constitutional Court decision.  &lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Background  &lt;br /&gt;The constitutional changes were drawn up by the government with the support of the opposition MHP on January 29, 2008 and passed by the Turkish Parliament on February 6 and 9. On February 22, President Abdullah Gül approved the changes. In response, the opposition CHP (Republican People’s Party) and the DSP (Democratic Left Party) applied to the Constitutional Court for the annulment of these changes on the grounds that they violated the principle of secularism in Article 2 of the Constitution.  &lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;On May 17, Osman Can, the rapporteur appointed by the Constitutional Court, submitted a report to the court advising that the case should be dismissed on the grounds that the court’s authority could not extend to monitoring substantive constitutional changes introduced by a parliament. Osman Can’s report, which had no binding power on the court, focused on the limitations on the court’s powers and argued on the basis of the court’s previous decisions and the 1982 Constitution that its focus should be on monitoring constitutional reforms on a procedural basis.&lt;span class="fullpost"&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/6041305650038531172-2561687663148184970?l=anomalisemesta.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/feeds/2561687663148184970/comments/default' title='Poskan Komentar'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=6041305650038531172&amp;postID=2561687663148184970' title='0 Komentar'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/2561687663148184970'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/2561687663148184970'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/2008/06/turkey-constitutional-court-ruling.html' title='Turkey: Constitutional Court Ruling Upholds Headscarf Ban'/><author><name>muchamad ali safa'at</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07348715720341930804</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6041305650038531172.post-6288580860292874324</id><published>2008-05-28T12:02:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2008-05-28T12:05:20.869-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Toetsingsrecht – Judicial Review – Constitutional Review</title><content type='html'>&lt;em&gt;Muchamad Ali Safaat&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Istilah “toetsingsrecht”, “judicial review”, dan “constitutional review” sering dicampuradukkan penggunaannya satu sama lain. Ketiga istilah tersebut sesungguhnya berasal dari dua sistem yang berbeda dengan makna yang berbeda pula. Toetsingsrecht berasal dari Belanda yang sesungguhnya lebih berdasarkan pada supremasi parlemen sehingga tidak mengenal konsep judicial review apalagi constitutional review. Sedangkan konsep judicial review dan constitutional review berasal dari negara-negara yang menganut prinsip supremasi konstitusi.&lt;span class="fullpost"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Toetsingsrecht secara harfiah adalah hak uji. Istilah ini digunakan pada saat membicarakan hak atau kewenangan untuk menguji peraturan perundang-undangan. Hak atau kewenangan tersebut dapat saja dimiliki oleh hakim, pemerintah, atau legislatif. Hak atau kewenangan yang dimiliki oleh lembaga tertentu tersebut juga dapat meliputi keseluruhan jenis peraturan perundang-undangan dalam hirarki tata urutan peraturan perundang-undangan, atau tertentu saja.&lt;br /&gt;Judicial review adalah pengujian peraturan perundang-undangan tertentu oleh hakim (yudikatif). Hal ini berarti hak atau kewenangan menguji (toetsingsrecht) dimiliki oleh hakim. Pengujian tersebut dilakukan atas suatu ketentuan peraturan perundang-undangan terhadap peraturan perundang-undangan yang lebih tinggi atau terhadap konstitusi sebagai hukum tertinggi. Kewenangan judicial review dapat dimiliki oleh hakim di semua tingkat, atau diberikan secara terpusat kepada Mahkamah Agung atau Mahkamah Konstitusi. Jika hak atau kewenangan tersebut ada pada hakim pengadilan biasa, kewenangan tersebut biasanya terbatas pada mengesampingkan ketentuan peraturan perundang-undangan, tidak sampai membatalkan atau menyatakan tidak mempunyai kekuatan hukum mengikat seperti yang dilakukan oleh Mahkamah Agung atau Mahkamah Konstitusi.&lt;br /&gt;Constitutional review merupakan pengujian suatu ketentuan perundang-undangan terhadap konstitusi. Parameter pengujian dalam hal ini adalah konstitusi sebagai hukum tertinggi. Hal ini berbeda dengan judicial review yang dari lingkup materinya lebih luas karena menguji suatu peraturan perundang-undangan terhadap peraturan perundang-undangan yang lebih tinggi, jadi tidak terbatas pada konstitusi sebagai parameter pengujian. Namun dari sisi lembaga yang dapat melakukan pengujian, istilah constitutional review karena dapat dimiliki oleh yudikatif, eksekutif, atau legislatif.&lt;span class="fullpost"&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/6041305650038531172-6288580860292874324?l=anomalisemesta.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/feeds/6288580860292874324/comments/default' title='Poskan Komentar'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=6041305650038531172&amp;postID=6288580860292874324' title='0 Komentar'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/6288580860292874324'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/6288580860292874324'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/2008/05/toetsingsrecht-judicial-review.html' title='Toetsingsrecht – Judicial Review – Constitutional Review'/><author><name>muchamad ali safa'at</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07348715720341930804</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6041305650038531172.post-1879012464308927763</id><published>2008-05-14T03:02:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2008-05-14T03:03:40.069-07:00</updated><title type='text'>JAMINAN PERLINDUNGAN HAM UNTUK KEBEBASAN BERAGAMA</title><content type='html'>PRINSIP KEBEBASAN BERAGAMA&lt;br /&gt;Beragama adalah menjadikan suatu ajaran agama sebagai jalan dan pedoman hidup berdasarkan keyakinan bahwa jalan tersebut adalah jalan yang benar. Karena bersumber dari keyakinan diri, maka yang paling menentukan keberagamaan seseorang adalah hati nurani. Oleh karena itu agama adalah urusan paling pribadi. Apakah seseorang meyakini dan menjalankan ajaran suatu agama atau tidak, ditentukan oleh keyakinan dan motivasi pribadi dan konsekuensinya pun ditanggung secara pribadi. Keberagamaan seseorang menjadi tidak bermakna sama sekali jika dilakukan tanpa keyakinan dan semata-mata ditentukan oleh faktor di luar diri sendiri. Islam secara tegas dinyatakan bahwa tidak ada paksaan dalam agama. Beragama dengan keterpaksaan adalah sebuah kemunafikan.&lt;span class="fullpost"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Oleh karena itu beragama adalah hak asasi manusia yang masuk dalam kategori hak dasar yang tidak dapat dikurangi dalam kondisi apapun. Konsekuensinya, siapapun harus menghormati, menghargai, dan tidak melanggar hak orang lain dalam beragama.  Bahkan negara tidak memiliki otoritas untuk menentukan mana agama yang benar dan mana agama yang salah. Keyakinan saya bahwa agama Islam adalah agama yang benar dan diridloi Allah SWT bukan karena Islam diakui sebagai agama yang “sah” oleh negara. Sebaliknya, saya tidak memilih agama yang lain juga bukan karena agama tersebut tidak diakui secara “sah” oleh negara. Yang menentukan adalah keyakinan saya sendiri. Jika saya memeluk Islam sebagai agama saya dan beribadah menurut ajaran seperti mayoritas yang dilakukan oleh umat Islam yang lain semata-mata karena pengakuan yang diberikan oleh pemerintah, maka saya telah menjadi munafik, dan keberagamaan saya tidak bermakna sama sekali dihadapan Allah. &lt;br /&gt;Sebaliknya, tujuan pembentukan negara adalah untuk melindungi hak warga negara dan memenuhi kepentingan seluruh rakyatnya. Dalam konteks ke-Indonesia-an, salah satu tujuan nasional adalah melindungi segenap bangsa Indonesia, tentu saja tanpa diskriminasi baik berdasarkan suku, bahasa, maupun agama. Oleh karena itu, menjadi salah satu tugas negara untuk melindungi hak kebebasan setiap orang dalam beragama dan beribadat.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;JAMINAN DALAM UUD 1945&lt;br /&gt;UUD 1945 setelah perubahan mengatur lebih rinci masalah hak asasi manusia. Pasal 28E Ayat (1) menegaskan bahwa setiap orang bebas memeluk agama dan beribadat menurut agamanya. Hak kebebasan beragama juga dijamin dalam Pasal 29 Ayat (2) UUD 1945 yang menyatakan “Negara menjamin kemerdekaan tiap-tiap penduduk untuk memeluk agamanya masing-masing dan untuk beribadat menurut agamanya dan kepercayaannya itu.&lt;br /&gt;Sepeti telah diungkapkan pada bagian awal, seseorang memeluk agama dan beribadat tentu berdasarkan kepercayaan yang diyakininya. Keyakinan terhadap suatu agama, dan keyakinan atas perintah agama yang harus dilaksanakan juga mendapatkan jaminan dalam Pasal 28E Ayat (2) yang menyatakan bahwa setiap orang berhak atas kebebasan meyakini kepercayaan, menyatakan pikiran dan sikap, sesuai dengan hati nuraninya. Bahkan, hak beragama juga diakui sebagai hak yang tidak dapat dikurangi dalam keadaan apapun berdasarkan Pasal 28I Ayat (1) UUD 1945. &lt;br /&gt;Konsekuensi dari adanya jaminan tersebut, setiap orang wajib menghormati kebebasan beragama orang lain (Pasal 28J Ayat (1) UUD 1945). Di sisi lain, negara bertanggungjawab untuk melindungi, memajukan, dan memenuhi kebebasan beragama sebagai hak asasi manusia (Pasal 28I Ayat (4) UUD 1945). Negara juga harus menjamin bahwa seseorang tidak diperlakukan secara diskriminatif atas dasar agama yang diyakini dan ibadat yang dijalankannya (Pasal 28I Ayat (2) UUD 1945).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;PROBLEM KEBEBASAN BERAGAMA&lt;br /&gt;Pada tataran normatif, telah jelas bahwa kebebasan beragam merupakan hak asasi yang bahkan digolongkan sebagai non derogable right. Namun dalam tataran praktik selalu menimbulkan masalah. Pada masa lalu, perdebatan ada pada persoalan apakah kebebasan beragama juga termasuk kebebasan untuk tidak beragama. Namun masalah tersebut terselesaikan dengan adanya pelarangan PKI serta ajaran Komunisme/Marxisme-Leninisme yang salah satu ideologi dasarnya adalah atheisme. &lt;br /&gt;Salah satu masalah yang akhir-akhir ini muncul adalah kekerasan terhadap aliran minoritas dari suatu agama, yang dipandang oleh aliran mayoritas sudah menyimpang dari ajaran prinsip agama tersebut, misalnya kasus Ahmadiyah Qadiyan dan beberapa aliran lainnya. Munculnya aliran-aliran baru di dalam suatu agama, baik yang berbeda dalam hal prinsip maupun berbeda hanya dalam hal detil-detil tertentu, telah terjadi sepanjang perkembangan agama itu sendiri. Oleh karena itu muncul dan berkembangnya aliran baru tersebut, seperti Ahmadiyah, akan terus ada di masa yang akan datang. &lt;br /&gt;Kemunculan aliran-aliran baru dilatarbelakangi oleh berbagai faktor. Perkembangan masyarakat dan problem manusia membentuk sudut pandang baru dalam memahami suatu agama. Apalagi jika pemahaman dan cara pandang lama dipandang dan dirasakan tidak dapat memberikan kepuasan batin, serta dinilai tidak dapat menyelesaikan masalah-masalah baru yang dihadapi oleh masyarakat dan manusiannya.&lt;br /&gt;Perkembangan aliran-aliran baru senantiasa menimbulkan gesekan dan ketegangan dalam masyarakat. Hal itu tidak terlepas dari perkembangan permasalahan yang dihadapi oleh masyarakat di satu sisi, dan di sisi lain adanya kecenderungan sosial yang resistensi terhadap perubahan dan hal-hal baru yang belum dikenal dengan baik. Oleh karena itu, gesekan yang terjadi dalam masyarakat mendahului terjadinya perubahan dan pergeseran merupakan kewajaran. Gesekan menjadi permasalahan pada saat terjadi kekerasan yang tidak saja melanggar hak kebebasan beragama, tetapi juga telah melanggar hak rasa aman dan pada akhirnya merugikan masyarakat luas.&lt;br /&gt;Bangsa Indonesia, khususnya umat Islam sesungguhnya telah memiliki pengalaman panjang menerima masuknya hal-hal baru yang kemudian dapat hidup berdampingan walaupun pada awalnya terjadi gesekan-gesekan. Awal pembentukan dan perkembangan Muhammadiyah misalnya, juga melahirkan gesekan dengan kelompok muslim tradisional, walaupun perbedaan keduannya tidak dalam hal yang bersifat prinsipil. Namun bersamaan dengan berjalannya waktu serta peran para ulama, ketegangan antara keduanya lambat laun mencair dan dapat hidup berdampingan. Tidak lagi saling menyerang tetapi sama-sama membangun demi kemaslahatan umat.&lt;br /&gt;Aliran Ahmadiyah sesungguhnya juga telah masuk ke Indonesia sebelum kemerdekaan. Bahkan Ahmadiyah pernah diterima sebagai sesama saudara  muslim. Namun, karena dalam perkembangannya dipandang terdapat perbedaan prinsip, terutama karena pengakuan Mirza Ghulam Ahmad sebagai nabi, umat Islam mayoritas, yang diwakili oleh NU dan Muhammadiyah, sejak lama telah menyatakan bahwa Ahmadiyah Qadiyan berada di luar Islam. Pernyataan tersebut tidak disertai dengan kekerasan namun telah terbukti mampu mencegah perkembangan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;AGAMA: ANTARA WILAYAH PRIBADI, MASYARAKAT, DAN NEGARA&lt;br /&gt;Beragama secara mendasar adalah wilayah pribadi setiap insan manusia, karena yang paling esensi dalam beragama adalah keyakinan dan kepercayaan individual. Namun demikian, karena agama tidak hanya mengajarkan kehidupan pribadi manusia dengan Tuhan, tetapi juga mengatur kehidupan bermasyarakat, agama juga menjadi wilayah masyarakat. Apalagi, jika agama tersebut telah berkembang luas dan menjadi salah satu identitas yang menonjol dari suatu masyarakat.&lt;br /&gt;Konsekuensi perkembangan agama sebagai identitas dan wilayah kemasyarakatan adalah munculnya peran masyarakat mayoritas yang menentukan keberagamaan seseorang, serta justifikasi sosial apakah aliran agama tertentu benar atau salah, paling tidak dapat diterima atau tidak. Peran tersebut bagaimanapun juga telah mengurangi hakikat agama sebagai hak asasi yang mendasar berdasarkan keyakinan dan kepercayaan individual. &lt;br /&gt;Hal itu tidak dapat dihindari karena masyarakat membutuhkan kepastian dan pegangan dalam beragama. Bagi masyarakat awam, adalah tugas para pemimpin agama untuk memberikan kepastian tentang keberagamaan yang dipandang benar diantara berbagai aliran yang ada. Namun tentu juga merupakan tugas para pemimpin agama untuk senantiasa memberikan pemahaman bahwa tidak ada paksaan dalam agama, membangun ukhuwah dalam keberagaman. Oleh karena itu, adanya kekerasan terhadap kelompok aliran agama minoritas juga menjadi tanggungjawab para pemuka agama.&lt;br /&gt;Mengingat kebebasan beragama adalah bagian dari hak asasi, dan negara memiliki tanggungjawab untuk memberikan perlindungan, penghormatan, dan pemajuan hak asasi, maka dalam hal tertentu kehidupan beragama juga menjadi wilayah negara. Pada posisi inilah harus terdapat pembeda yang dapat dijadikan pegangan sehingga peran negara tidak terlalu jauh memasuki urusan individu, serta tidak pula memasuki ranah masyarakat. Jika negara telah memasuki urusan individu, maka hakikat beragama sebagai wujud keyakinan hati nurani dan kepercayaan individual akan hilang. Di sisi lain, jika negara terlalu jauh memasuki wilayah masyarakat, maka negara dapat tergelincir menjadi alat mayoritas yang menindas minoritas.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;PERAN NEGARA&lt;br /&gt;Untuk menentukan bagaimana seharusnya negara berperan dalam kehidupan beragama, harus terdapat prinsip-prinsip yang dijadikan sebagai pegangan. Pertama, pengakuan hak kebebasan beragama sebagai hak asasi. Pengakuan tersebut mengharuskan negara tidak dapat melarang agama apapun atau aliran apapun yang masuk dan berkembang di Indonesia, sepanjang sesuai dengan prinsip Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa. Persoalan apakah agama atau aliran tersebut akan diterima oleh masyarakat dan berkembang atau tidak, itu adalah wilayah masyarakat.&lt;br /&gt;Negara tidak dapat menentukan mana agama yang benar dan mana agama yang salah. Negara juga tidak dapat menentukan cara beribadah mana yang benar dan mana yang salah. Konsekuensinya, negara tidak dapat melarang cara beribadah tertentu walaupun oleh mayoritas masyarakat hal itu dipandang menyimpang. Hingga saat inipun tidak ada larangan hukum terhadap cara ibadat tertentu, walaupun terhadap suatu aliran yang dinyatakan menyimpang.&lt;br /&gt;Jika negara memasuki wilayah pribadi, maka negara telah membatasi hak kebebasan beragama dan beribadat. Di sisi lain, keberagamaan dan ibadah yang dilakukan berdasarkan paksaan akan menghilangkan makna keberagamaan seseorang karena dilakukan tanpa keyakinan dan kepercayaan, tetapi karena paksaan semata. Jika berharap terjadi perubahan, maka biarlah perubahan tersebut juga didasari oleh perubahan keyakinan. Perubahan keyakinan hanya dapat dilakukan melalui proses dialog dan penyadaran yang menjadi wilayah masyarakat, bukan oleh paksaan negara.&lt;br /&gt;Oleh karena itu, sikap yang menyatakan suatu agama atau aliran tersebut menyimpang atau tidak, termasuk cara beribadahnya adalah wilayah masyarakat. Negara baru dapat masuk wilayah agama dalam dua kondisi. Pertama, jika agama atau aliran yang dipandang menyimpang tersebut bertentangan dengan dasar-dasar perikemanusiaan dan kemasyarakatan. Intervensi negara tersebut sah adanya karena pada prinsipnya setiap agama mengajarkan penghargaan dan penghormatan terhadap prinsip-prinsip kemanusiaan dan kemasyarakatan. Jika suatu agama atau aliran menghalalkan pembunuhan, pencurian, memutus hubungan kekeluargaan, maka negara harus bertindak. Tindakan negara tersebut tidak hanya terhadap tindakan-tindakan berdasarkan ajaran agama yang merupakan tindak pidana, tetapi juga dapat melarang perkembangan agama tersebut. Pelarangan itu memiliki legitimasi karena agama atau aliran agama dimaksud nyata-nyata bertentangan dengan hakikat ajaran agama dan merugikan kemanusiaan dan kemasyarakatan.&lt;br /&gt;Kondisi kedua di mana dibutuhkan peran negara adalah pada saat masyarakat, atau sekelompok orang melakukan tindakan yang melanggar hak kebebasan beragama orang lain, padahal keyakinan dan kepercayaan orang yang dilanggar itu tidak bertentangan dengan prinsip kemanusiaan dan kemasyarakatan. Walaupun agama atau aliran agama itu dinyatakan menyimpang dan atau telah berada di luar suatu agama, sekelompok orang tidak dapat melanggar hak kebebasan keyakinan dan beribadat para pemeluk agama atau aliran agama tersebut. JIka hal itu terjadi, negara harus melindungi. Bahkan jika terjadi kekerasan terhadap para penganut agama atau aliran agama yang dipandang menyimpang, maka negara harus menindak para pelakunya. Tindakan tersebut adalah terhadap tindakan kekerasan yang dilakukan, bukan terhadap keyakinan bahwa agama atau aliran agama tertentu adalah menyimpang.&lt;br /&gt;Masyarakat atau organisasi keagamaan seperti NU, Muhammadiyah, atau bahkan MUI memiliki hak untuk menentukan suatu aliran tertentu masih dapat diakui sebagai Islam atau tidak. Penentuan itupun tentu dilakukan melalui mekanisme pengkajian dan pengambilan keputusan yang diatur oleh masing-masing organisasi. Namun dalam kehidupan tertib bermasyarakat, berbangsa dan bernegara, tentu organisasi-organisasi tersebut dan masyarakat secara umum tidak dapat melakukan kekerasan terhadap aliran yang dipandang tidak sesuai lagi dengan pinsip ajaran Islam. Sebaliknya, organisasi-organisasi itu tentu memiliki kewajiban untuk mencegah terjadinya kekerasan. Oleh karena itu setiap fatwa harus diikuti dengan “petunjuk” bagaimana menyikapi fatwa tersebut sebagai bentuk pertanggungjawaban agar tidak terjadi kekerasan dan paksaan terhadap minoritas. Kekerasan dan paksaan itu tidak saja bertentangan dengan hukum negara, tetapi juga bertentangan dengan hukum agama.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/6041305650038531172-1879012464308927763?l=anomalisemesta.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/feeds/1879012464308927763/comments/default' title='Poskan Komentar'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=6041305650038531172&amp;postID=1879012464308927763' title='0 Komentar'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/1879012464308927763'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/1879012464308927763'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/2008/05/jaminan-perlindungan-ham-untuk.html' title='&lt;strong&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;strong&gt;JAMINAN PERLINDUNGAN HAM UNTUK KEBEBASAN BERAGAMA&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;'/><author><name>muchamad ali safa'at</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07348715720341930804</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6041305650038531172.post-4605287708884562399</id><published>2008-04-18T03:58:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2008-04-18T04:16:02.130-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Pemerintahan Lokal Belanda</title><content type='html'>muchamad ali safaat&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;A. Umum&lt;br /&gt;Belanda adalah sebuah negara monarkhi konstitusional. Ratu merupakan Kepala Negara yang melambangkan persatuan Belanda. Ratu terikat pada konstitusi dan fungsinya lebih banyak bersifat seremonial, namun juga memiliki beberapa kewenangan yang merupakan kelanjutan dari tradisi the House of Orange. Ratu dalam hal ini menunjuk formatur yang akan membentuk Dewan Menteri (&lt;em&gt;Council of Ministers&lt;/em&gt;) setelah dilakukan pemilihan umum. Pemerintah negara pada dasarnya terdiri dari tiga institusi utama, yaitu; Ratu, Dewan Menteri, dan Parlemen (&lt;em&gt;States General&lt;/em&gt;).&lt;span class="fullpost"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Dewan menteri merencanakan dan melaksanakan kebijakan pemerintahan. Ratu bersama-sama dengan Dewan Menteri disebut dengan &lt;em&gt;the Crown&lt;/em&gt;. Hampir semua menteri juga merupakan kepala departemen, meskipun ada juga menteri-menteri tanpa portofolio. Menteri-menteri baik secara kolektif maupun individual bertanggungjawab kepada parlemen. Menteri-menteri tidak dapat merangkap menjadi anggota parlemen.&lt;br /&gt;Lembaga lainnya adalah the Council of State yang dibentuk berdasarkan konstitusi sebagai lembaga penasehat pemerintah yang anggotanya terdiri dari keluarga bangsawan dan kerajaan, serta anggota yang ditunjuk dari kalangan ahli politik, ekonomi, diplomatik, atau militer. Suatu rancangan undang-undang yang akan diajukan oleh kabiner kepada parlemen harus terlebih dahulu dikonsultasikan kepada Council of State. Lembaga ini juga melayani pengajuan banding dari masyarakat atas putusan yang dibuat oleh eksekutif.&lt;br /&gt;Parlemen Belanda terdiri dari dua kamar, Kamar Pertama &lt;em&gt;(First Chamber, Eerste Kamer)&lt;/em&gt; dan Kamar Kedua &lt;em&gt;(Second Chamber, Tweede Kamer). Second Chamber&lt;/em&gt; memiliki peran yang lebih penting karena memiliki hak untuk mengusulkan rancangan undang-undang dan mengamandemen rancangan yang diajukan pemerintah, serta memilih anggota Ombudsman Nasional. Sedangkan &lt;em&gt;First Chamber&lt;/em&gt; hanya memiliki hak untuk menyetujui atau menolak, tidak bisa mengubah. Keduanya memiliki hak untuk menyelidiki dan mengajukan pertanyaan kepada menteri-menteri dan sekretaris negara. Sebuah rancangan undang-undang bisa diajukan baik oleh &lt;em&gt;Second Chamber&lt;/em&gt; maupun pemerintah, meskipun nyatanya semua rancangan diajukan oleh pemerintah. Suatu rancangan menjadi undang-undang setelah disahkan oleh Ratu di bawah tanggung jawab politik Perdana Menteri.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em&gt;Second Chamber&lt;/em&gt; terdiri dari 150 anggota, dipilih secara langsung untuk masa jabatan 4 tahun, kecuali jika kabinetnya jatuh lebih awal. Sistem pemilu yang digunakan adalah sistem proporsional Tidak ada batasan perolehan suara bagi partai untuk dapat mengikuti Pemilu. Sistem ini membuat pemerintahan yang terbentuk selalu pemerintahan koalisi. Koalisi besar biasanya terdiri dari dua macam, yaitu koalisi Kristen dan Koalisi Partai-partai kiri. &lt;em&gt;First Chamber&lt;/em&gt; terdiri dari 75 anggota yang dipilih oleh &lt;em&gt;provincial council&lt;/em&gt; untuk waktu 4 tahun. &lt;em&gt;First Chamber&lt;/em&gt; umumnya hanya bertemu sekali dalam seminggu dan biasanya para anggotanya memiliki profesi lain.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;B. Pemerintah Lokal&lt;br /&gt;Seperti halnya dengan Indonesia, Belanda berdasarkan konstitusi sejak tahun 1814 adalah sebuah negara kesatuan. Namun Belanda memiliki sejarah yang panjang sebagai negara konfederasi dan federasi mulai dari terbentuknya “Union of Uthech” 1579 yang melepaskan diri dari kekuasaan Raja Philip Spanyol, hingga tahun 1795 saat invansi Perancis ke Belanda. Propinsi-propinsi semula memiliki kedaulatan dan otonomi baik dibidang eksekutif, legislatif, maupun yudikatif. Saat ini yang sangat berperan dalam pemerintahan adalah prinsip desentralisasi.&lt;br /&gt;Desentralisasi dibagi menjadi dua, yaitu desentralisasi teritorial dan desentralisasi fungsional. Desentralisasi teritorial yaitu kekuasaan di propinsi dan lokal (&lt;em&gt;municipal&lt;/em&gt;). Baik propinsi maupun municipal bisa dibentuk atau dirubah berdasarkan undang-undang Parlemen. Di Belanda terdapat. Sedangkan desentralisasi fungsional diberikan kepada suatu badan tertentu untuk menjalankan urusan tertentu, seperti Badan Pengawasan Air (&lt;em&gt;waterschappen, water control boards&lt;/em&gt;), Badan Komoditi, Badan Industri, dll. Semua bentuk desentralisasi mendapatkan kekuasaan dari konstitusi dan aturan hukum lain yang lebih rendah.&lt;br /&gt;Indonesia, meskipun juga mengenal adanya suatu macam badan khusus yang menangani urusan tertentu, tetapi tidak terlihat adanya penerapan prinsip desentralisasi. Lembaga-lembaga negara non departemen (seperti BPS) tidak bisa dikatakan merupakan desentralisasi fungsional, karena keberadaan lembaga ini sepenuhnya di bawah pemerintahan pusat untuk menjalankan fungsi khusus pemerintah pusat dan meliputi seluruh wilayah negara.&lt;br /&gt;Hal ini berbeda dengan desentralisai fungsional di Belanda yang cakupan wilayah kerjanya biasanya di satu wilayah tertentu. Badan Pengawas Air misalnya, berada di tingkat propinsi yang terpisah dengan pemerintah propinsi dan bukan merupakan perusahaan daerah seperti di Indonesia. Jadi di Indonesia sepenuhnya merupakan desentralisasi territorial.&lt;br /&gt;Desentralisasi kekuasaan di Belanda yang berwujud pemisahan dan pembagian kekuasaan adalah untuk membantu pemerintah pusat melaksanakan satu atau lebih urusan. Bahkan pada prinsipnya terdapat keseragaman diantara perbagai propini dan municipal yang ada di Belanda walaupun masing-masing populasinya berbeda, mulai dari yang hanya ribuan sampai yang setengah juta penduduk. Desentralisasi dilakukan dengan pengawasan oleh lembaga yang lebih tinggi. Pemerintah propinsi dan pemerintah pusat mengawasi pemerintah lokal. Sedangkan pemerintah propinsi berada di bawah pengawasan pemerintah pusat.&lt;br /&gt;Keputusan dari lembaga yang lebih bawah bisa ditunda atau dianulir. Dalam beberapa hal, keputusan lembaga di bawah harus mendapatkan persetujuan dari lembaga yang lebih tinggi sebelum dapat diberlakukan. Peraturan yang harus mendapatkan persetujuan ini memang secara limitatif disebutkan dalam undang-undang, misalnya tentang pengaturan pajak dan belanja pemerintah lokal.&lt;br /&gt;Di Belanda terdapat dana khusus bagi propinsi dan municipal yang diatur oleh hukum, terdapat pembagian dari perolehan pajak nasional, dan dari pajak penggunaan dan kepemilikan realestat. Di Indonesia, sebagian besar pendapatan daerah juga diperoleh dari Dana Alokasi Umum (DAU) dan Dana Alokasi Khusus (DAK), pembagian pendapatan pajak, serta pajak dan retribusi yang dikelola oleh daerah.&lt;br /&gt;Penyerahan urusan dari pemerintah pusat ke pemerintah lokal di Belanda tindak dilakukan secara langsung, tetapi berdasarkan penilaian yang dilakukan oleh parlemen. Hal ini seiring dengan kemampuan propinsi atau municipal dan perkembangan teritori tersebut. Sejak tahun 1984 pemerintah pusat mengirimkan penilaian berkala tentang desentralisasi kepada parlemen kepada parlemen untuk menentukan ukuran diserahkan atau tidaknya suatu urusan kepada otoritas lokal. Bahkan, untuk memastikan penilaian itu diserahkan dulu kewenangan yang terbatas sebagai percobaan sebelum diserahkan suatu kewenangan tertentu dari pemerintah pusat kepada pemerintah lokal. Tentu saja hal ini berbeda dengan pola desentralisasi di Indonesia yang menyerahkan sejumlah urusan yang sama banyaknya kepada semua daerah tanpa melihat kemampuan dan potensi daerah baik dari sisi potensi kekayaan, finansial maupun sumber daya manusianya.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;1. Propinsi&lt;br /&gt;Belanda memiliki 12 propinsi, yaitu Noord-Brabant, Limburg, Gelderland, Zuich-Holland, Noord-Holland, Zeeland, Utrech, Friesland, Overijssel, Groningen, Drenthe, dan Flevoland. Propinsi diatur dalam Provinciewet (Stb. 1992, 550). Pemerintah lokal di Belanda, baik propinsi maupun municipal, bersifat monistik, yaitu pemerintahan tunggal eksekutif yang merupakan kepanjangan tangan dari pemerintah pusat.&lt;br /&gt;Administrasi tingkat propinsi di Belanda terdiri dari provinciale staten, gedeputeerde state, dan commissaris van de Koning. Provinciale staten menurut konstitusi Belanda merupakan perwakilan rakyat propinsi, tetapi sekaligus juga merupakan Kepala Propinsi. Eksekutif dipegang oleh &lt;em&gt;gedeputeerde staten&lt;/em&gt; (&lt;em&gt;provincial executive&lt;/em&gt;). Tugas utama &lt;em&gt;Provinciale staten&lt;/em&gt; adalah mengawasi dan mengesahkan peraturan yang rancangannya biasanya selalu dibuat oleh &lt;em&gt;gedeputeerde staten&lt;/em&gt;. Provinciale staten memiliki kedudukan yang lebih tinggi, meskipun akhir-akhir ini juga terjadi dualisme.&lt;br /&gt;Commissaris van de Koning bertindak selaku pimpinan dari &lt;em&gt;provinciale staten&lt;/em&gt; dan &lt;em&gt;gedeputeerde staten&lt;/em&gt;. Commissaris van de Koning tidak bisa digantikan kecuali oleh pemerintah pusat. Commissaris van de Koning bertindak dengan kekuasaan khusus berdasarkan petunjuk dari Menteri Dalam Negeri. Commissaris van de Koning juga memberikan pendapat kepada menteri tentang penunjukkan &lt;em&gt;burgomaster &lt;/em&gt;(walikota).&lt;br /&gt;Provinciale staten dipilih langsung oleh warga negara penduduk propinsi setempat. Anggotaya bervariasi antara 39 sampai 83 orang tergantung jumlah penduduknya dengan menggunakan sistem proporsional. Provinciale staten juga berfungsi sebagai &lt;em&gt;electoral college&lt;/em&gt; untuk memilih anggota First Chamber.&lt;br /&gt;Provinciale staten memilih dari anggotanya untuk menjadi &lt;em&gt;gedeputeerde staten&lt;/em&gt; yang membentuk eksekutif propinsi. Gedeputeerde staten bekerja secara kolegial, kewenangan dibagi antar anggotanya, dan secara individu bisa melakukan tindakan pemerintah. Mereka harus menjawab pertanyaan yang diajukan oleh Provinciale staten, dan jika menolak bisa digantikan. Gedeputeerde memiliki peran dan kekuasaan penting atas pemerintah lokal (&lt;em&gt;municipal&lt;/em&gt;) dan &lt;em&gt;waterschappen&lt;/em&gt;. Mereka juga berfungsi sebagai pembuat keputusan banding dalam perkara antara warga negara dan pemerintah municipal yang berada dalam kekuasaannya. Beberapa tugas yang dijalankan oleh propinsi adalah:&lt;br /&gt;a. mengawasi pemerintah lokal dan waterschappen;&lt;br /&gt;b. pekerjaan publik, pemeliharaan dan konstruksi saluran air, jalan, kanal, dan pembuangan sampah;&lt;br /&gt;c. perencanaan kota dan wilayah propinsi&lt;br /&gt;d. perencanaan, pengorganisasian, dan pemberian subsidi kepada aktivitas kesejahteraan, misalnya mengawasi perumahan orang-orang tua.&lt;br /&gt;e. Fungsi pemegang otoritas banding.&lt;br /&gt;Pemerintah propinsi memiliki kedudukan kuat dalam perencanaan kota dan wilayah propinsi. Provinciale staten membuat perencanaan regional yang menunjukkan masa depan pengembangan area tertentu. Perencanaan lokal tentang pemanfaatan tanah harus mendapatkan persetujuan pemerintah propinsi.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;2. Municipal (&lt;em&gt;Gemeente&lt;/em&gt;)&lt;br /&gt;Antara abad ke-16 sampi abad ke-18 kota-kota seperti Amsterdam telah memiliki peran yang penting. Namun status kebebasan dan otoritas penuh berdasarkan gemeentwet 1851 diganti dengan status baru berdasarkan Gemeentwet 1992.&lt;br /&gt;Organisasi pemerintahan municipal paralel dengan pemerintahan di propinsi. Terdapat municipal council yang dipilih untuk waktu empat tahun oleh warga negara Belanda penduduk municipal setempat. Warga negara asing, dalam kondisi tertentu juga bisa ikut melakukan pemilihan. Eksekutif dibentuk oleh The Board of Burgomaster dan Aldermen. Burgomaster ditunjuk dengan Keputusan Ratu, ini berbeda sekali dengan Walikota atau Bupati di Indonesia yang dipilih, dan tidak memiliki hubungan hirarki dengan Gubernur maupun pemerintah pusat.&lt;br /&gt;Anggota Munipal council terdiri dari 9 sampai 45 orang tergantung kepada jumlah penduduknya. Dewan ini bekerja secara kolektif dan memegang kekuasaan yang sebagian diberikan kepada burgomaster dan Aldermen. Melihat jumlah penduduk yang tinggal di satu municipal, maka kurang sesuai apabila membandingkannya dengan kota atau kabupaten di Indonesia. Jumlah penduduk di satu municipal hanya sama dengan jumlah penduduk satu desa atau kelurahan yang besar, atau paling tidak sama dengan satu kecamatan yang kecil. Perbedaan ini juga mendasari perbedaan pemerintahan antara kota atau kabupaten dengan municipal.&lt;br /&gt;Board of Burgomaster and Aldermen terdiri dari antara 2 sampai 9 orang, tergantung jumlah penduduknya. Mereka selalu bekerja secara kolektif dan bertanggungjawab kepada Municipal Council. Burgomaster juga bisa bertindak sebagai Kepala Kepolisian setempat. Apabila demi menyelamatkan ketertiban publik, maka bisa bertindak atas tanggungjawabnya sendiri tanpa persetujuan Municipal Council.&lt;br /&gt;Burgomaster harus memberitahukan keputusan yang dibuat oleh lembaga-lembaga municipal kepada pemerintah provinsi, apabila menurut pandangannya bertentangan dengan kepentingan umum. Tugas dari pemerintahan municipal adalah:&lt;br /&gt;a. melindungi kepentingan dan ketertiban umum;&lt;br /&gt;b. perumahan, bangunan, masalah lingkungan’&lt;br /&gt;c. menetapkan subsidi untuk pendidikan, perawatan monumen dan memajukan seni;&lt;br /&gt;d. urusan-urusan lain atas inisiatis sendiri.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;3. Waterschappen&lt;br /&gt;Waterschappen merupakan badan publik yang bertanggungjawab terhadap masalah air di area tertentu. Mengingat Belanda yang berada di bawah permukaan air laut, maka tugas ini sangat penting, termasuk pemeliharaan galian dan drainase. Waterschappen dibentuk atau dibubarkan oleh provinsiale staten. Waterschappen merupakan lembaga yang telah ada sejah abad pertengahan. Peraturan tentang Waterschappen dibuat oleh provinsiale staten. Kekuasaan yang dimiliki Waterschappen tidak sama disetiaap propinsi.&lt;br /&gt;Lembaga ini merupakan lembaga khusus yang ada di Belanda karena kewenangannya yang meliputi semua masalah air (apakah termasuk air bersih?) dan kedudukannya di propinsi. Sangat berbeda jika dibanding dengan Perusahaan Air Minum (PAM) milik daerah-daerah kota atau kabupaten dan hanya menangani masalah penyediaan air bersih. Tidak pula bisa dibandingkan dengan Dinas-dinas yang menangani masalah drainase dan penanggulangan banjir di daerah kota atau kabupaten di Indonesia.&lt;br /&gt;4. Public Bodies for the Professions and Trades and Other Public Bodies&lt;br /&gt;Konstitusi Belanda memberikan kekuasaan kepada lembaga legislatif untuk membuat atau mendelegasikan badan publik bagi para profesional, perdagangan dan industri, dan badan publik lainnya. Badan-badan tersebut mungkin memiliki kekuasaan untuk membuat peraturan. Badan Perdagangan dan Industri diatur dalam Wet op bedriffsorganisatie (stb. 1950, K 22). Organisasi tertinggi untuk perdagangan dan industri adalah Sociaal-Economische Raad yang memiliki dua fungsi, yaitu sebagai lembaga pemberi nasehat kepada pemerintah dan merupakan struktur puncak dari organisasi perdagangan dan industri. Dewannya terdiri dari perwakilan pengusaha, pekerja, dan pemerintah. Lembaga ini juga mengawasi organisasi lain dibawahnya seperti &lt;em&gt;productschappen&lt;/em&gt; dan &lt;em&gt;bedrifschappen&lt;/em&gt;. Jika yang dimaksud badan publik adalah badan dengan fungsi seperti diuraikan di atas, maka padanan yang sesuai dengan lembaga-lembaga tersebut adalah Kamar Dagang dan Industri (KADIN). Namun pertanyaannya kemudian adalah apakah kadin memperoleh limpahan wewenang dari pemerintah pusat sebagai pelaksanaan desentralisasi? Apakah kadin juga merupakan badan publik?&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Daftar Pustaka&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Basah, Sjahran. Hukum Tata Negara Perbandingan. Cetakan V. Bandung: PT. Alumni, 1994.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Chorus, J.M.J., et.al. Introduction To Dutch Law. Third, revised edition. The Hague-London-Boston: Kluwer Law International,……&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Hadjon, Philipus M., dkk. Pengantar Hukum Administrasi Indonesia. Cetakan ketujuh. Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 2001.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Marbun, ST., Mahfud MD, Moh. Pokok-Pokok Hukum Administrasi Negara. Edisi Pertama. Cetakan kedua. Yogyakarta: Liberty, 2000.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Zweigert, Konrad, and Hein Kotz. Introduction To Comparative Law. Third Revised Edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Netherland Constitution. Adopted on: 17 February 1983. Docomen Status: 1989. ICL Document. http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/world/netherlands.htm - Top&lt;/span&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/6041305650038531172-4605287708884562399?l=anomalisemesta.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/feeds/4605287708884562399/comments/default' title='Poskan Komentar'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=6041305650038531172&amp;postID=4605287708884562399' title='0 Komentar'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/4605287708884562399'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/4605287708884562399'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/2008/04/pemerintahan-lokal-belanda.html' title='Pemerintahan Lokal Belanda'/><author><name>muchamad ali safa'at</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07348715720341930804</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6041305650038531172.post-7798169591440543198</id><published>2008-04-13T11:23:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2008-04-13T11:27:29.710-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Easy Shopping for Terrorists?</title><content type='html'>&lt;strong&gt;An undercover investigation found that it's easy for anyone to buy sensitive U.S. military equipment on the Web, prompting renewed congressional scrutiny.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;By Joe Contreras and Ed Caram | Newsweek Web Exclusive&lt;br /&gt;Apr 11, 2008 | Updated: 7:43  p.m. ET Apr 11, 2008&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The items read like a laundry list of sensitive military equipment coveted by America's enemies big and small. An antenna waveguide for U.S.-made F-14A Tomcat fighter jets--which Iran's military still flies. U.S. Army combat uniforms with infrared patches for nighttime identification that could be used by Iraqi insurgents seeking to pose as friendly forces under cover of darkness. Night-vision goggles that could be employed by Taliban rebels to spot U.S. soldiers on patrol in eastern Afghanistan.&lt;span class="fullpost"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;These items and others were purchased by employees of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) at Web sites like eBay and Craigslist during a 14-month-long undercover investigation that began in January 2007. The GAO disclosed its findings at a hearing on Capitol Hill on Thursday, and some of the lawmakers in attendance expressed deep concern about the revelations. In some instances, the merchandise in question was stolen, and in two specific instances the vendors were an active-duty U.S. Army staff sergeant and a U.S. Air Force reservist trying to make an extra buck on the side at the taxpayers' expense.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;"To me, that's basically treason," observed Rep. Christopher Shays, the ranking Republican member on the U.S. House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs. "We still need to focus on the actions [required] to prevent sensitive military equipment from being sold to the public."&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This week's proceedings marked the fourth time the subcommittee has examined the general topic of the disposal and resale of equipment no longer needed by the Pentagon. The subject acquired a new urgency early last year after up to a dozen gunmen dressed in American military combat fatigues and armed with U.S. weapons penetrated a government security compound in the Iraqi city of Karbala and killed five U.S. Army troops. Yet five months after that incident occurred, NEWSWEEK reporters purchased several infrared uniform patches used in Iraq at military-supply stores in North Carolina and California without ever being asked to produce Department of Defense identification. And as the GAO probe showed, the rather lax controls over the online sale of military equipment and supplies represent a genuine threat to national security. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Time and time again, GAO investigators posing as members of the general public obtained merchandise originally manufactured for military purposes that was never intended for acquisition by civilians. A dozen such items were purchased over the Internet and shipped to the GAO on a no-questioned-asked basis. Two of the vendors were civilian store owners who allegedly "acted as conduits for defense-related property that was likely stolen from the military," said chief GAO investigator Gregory Kutz. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The GAO also managed to buy night-vision goggles and infrared uniform tabs from a retired Marine colonel and Army captain, respectively. (The latter vendor, Mark Ciaglia of The Supply Captain store in Marlboro, N.Y., denied all wrongdoing and told NEWSWEEK he only recalls selling GAO agents silver glint tape that is commonly found on the lettering of stop signs and police vehicles. Ciaglia has not been charged with any crime, though Kutz told Congress he has referred the case to the Pentagon's Defense Criminal Investigative Service.) Used body-armor vests were sold by an Army staff sergeant stationed at Fort Bragg, N.C., and a senior airman with the Air Force Reserve in North Dakota, despite Pentagon regulations that forbid military personnel from selling such items. "Individual theft is a hard thing to stop," said Alan Estevez, principal assistant deputy undersecretary of Defense, at the Thursday hearing. "The [Defense] Department obviously deplores criminal activity especially when committed by a few members, and it supports law-enforcement efforts to prosecute them." &lt;br /&gt;The main venues for these online transactions came in for some criticism in the GAO report. Although both eBay and Craigslist have taken steps to regulate their users and identify items whose sale is prohibited, "there are few safeguards to prevent sensitive and stolen defense-related items from being sold to either domestic or foreign users of these sites," Kutz said. His agents purchased a used helicopter antenna from an eBay seller in Texas who had previously done business with winning bidders based in Cyprus, Malaysia and the Czech Republic, and that particular item could be a useful spare part for Tehran's aging CH-47D Chinook helicopters, according to the GAO. To prevent such potentially compromising deals from occurring in the future, Craigslist CEO Jim Buckmaster at one point broached the idea of imposing a blanket ban on the online resale of any second-hand military merchandise less than 50 years old. But subcommittee chairman Rep. John Tierney brushed off that suggestion as too sweeping in scope. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The Pentagon realizes it has a serious problem on its hands. The illegal sale and export of military technologies and munitions items have become a top priority of the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, which has aided the successful prosecution and imprisonment of several foreigners, including a Sri Lankan who conspired to illegally export machine guns, surface-to-air missiles and ammunition to the Tamil Tigers guerrilla movement and a covert Chinese government agent who tried to procure 70 Black Hawk helicopter engines. Among the U.S. military equipment most eagerly sought abroad are shoulder-fired anti-aircraft rockets, M-16 and M-4 rifles, aircraft spare parts and unmanned aerial vehicles better known as drones.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Pentagon officials told the subcommittee that accounting and inventory procedures have been improved to ensure better control over military equipment, and under a 2006 program called Operation Total Recall, the U.S. Army has recovered more than 20,000 lost or misplaced items valued at $135 million. But the panel's chairman expresses disappointment with the Pentagon's alleged failure to prepare for the kinds of equipment-monitoring challenges that were bound to surface with large-scale military operations like those in Afghanistan and Iraq. "They're doing a horrible job," said Representative Tierney. "Who didn't anticipate that some day we'd have a mission and that we'd want to track the equipment that's distributed to the troops and [determine] whether or not it was getting illegally into the wrong hands? We seem to be better at trying to close the door after the horses are out of the barn than we do about anticipating things." &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The thriving trade in online sales of second-hand U.S. military equipment and supplies is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. As of Friday, for example, one Jonathan Herman in West Hempstead, N.Y., has a "client" willing to sell an F-14 Tomcat wing flap for $800 and an entire cockpit for upward of $15,000. At Thursday's hearing, eBay vice president Tod Cohen said the company "prohibits the sale of military items that have not been disposed of in accordance with Department of Defense regulations." But the online auction giant admits that it is a challenge to enforce all of its policies, when 6 million to 7 million new items get listed every day. And before you go shopping, President Ahmadinejad, Herman says only U.S. citizens need bid on his Tomcat parts.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/6041305650038531172-7798169591440543198?l=anomalisemesta.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/feeds/7798169591440543198/comments/default' title='Poskan Komentar'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=6041305650038531172&amp;postID=7798169591440543198' title='0 Komentar'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/7798169591440543198'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/7798169591440543198'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/2008/04/easy-shopping-for-terrorists.html' title='Easy Shopping for Terrorists?'/><author><name>muchamad ali safa'at</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07348715720341930804</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6041305650038531172.post-6190338198885901899</id><published>2008-04-13T11:19:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2008-04-13T11:22:19.823-07:00</updated><title type='text'>A Sophisticated State</title><content type='html'>&lt;strong&gt;Forgoing flash for substance, Qatar is channeling its oil wealth primarily into culture and education.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;By Sameer Reddy | NEWSWEEK&lt;br /&gt;Apr 21, 2008 Issue &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The visionary architect I. M. Pei, who designed the Louvre's pyramid, the Four Seasons Hotel in Manhattan and other iconic high-modernist structures, had packed away his drafting table for good years ago, or so he thought. But then the Museum of Islamic Art (MIA) came calling. A centerpiece of Qatar's development plan, the museum offered Pei free rein over the design—a project too enticing for him to turn down.&lt;span class="fullpost"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Today the museum serves as a symbol of Qatar's highbrow development strategy. Nestled between Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the Persian Gulf, the tiny desert nation has long been overshadowed by its showier neighbor Dubai. In recent years, however, Qatar has begun a process of reinvention, determined to channel its significant oil reserves into a more sustainable legacy. Under the guidance of its emir, Sheik Hamad al-Thani, and his politically active wife, Sheika Mozah, it has charted a creative course with the intention of transforming itself into the region's cultural hub. Instead of trying to compete with Dubai for tourists seeking over-the-top excess, it has chosen to focus on a different demographic: those in search of sophistication.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;When Qatar wants to make musical headlines, it invites Plácido Domingo to perform instead of a pop singer like Shakira, as Dubai recently did. When developers want to build an adult-size playground, they emulate Venice instead of Las Vegas. And when they want to showcase art and culture, they create their own star vehicle to highlight their people's heritage, rather than franchise a foreign institution, as Abu Dhabi is planning to do with the Louvre.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The MIA offers visitors a unique perspective on local art. Constructed from architectural concrete, stone chameson, granite and stainless steel, the building echoes influences of ziggurats in its blunt, planar exterior. Like the Western perception of the Islamic world, it is dominated by an inscrutable air. Inside, however, the mystery is revealed in a majestic atrium constructed from a geometric series of interlaid circles, squares and triangles seamlessly merging. The design is wholly modern but maintains a distinct link with traditional Islamic architectural and esthetic motifs.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Spread out over five stories, the building will house galleries, an auditorium, a fine-dining restaurant and a café, along with an education wing complete with a high-tech library and classrooms. "The museum will be a center for students, scholars and visitors from around the world to share in the history and culture of Islamic art," says its CEO, Abdullah alNajjar. With a soft launch last month and a formal launch to the public in November, the MIA will be the world's premier institution for Islamic art, encompassing several thousand works. Highlights include a carved emerald amulet from 17th-century India and a Kufic-inscribed earthen bowl from ninth-century Iraq.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In addition to attracting those hungry for culture, Qatar is developing tourism around education. The country was ahead of the curve in boosting its higher-education offerings, inviting Carnegie Mellon, Georgetown, Texas A&amp;M, Virginia Commonwealth and Cornell universities to launch satellite programs in Doha. Realizing there was a strong desire for respected educational options within the Arab world, the government created a hub for young students across the region, removing the need for people to travel abroad in order to continue their education. Officials were smart enough to realize that this influx of students would result in many more families visiting; in anticipation of the increased demand, the number of five-star hotels has swelled to include properties from the Ritz-Carlton, Four Seasons and Sheraton, with others under construction. Visitors will find Qatar relatively liberal; women are not required to cover up, though many do by choice.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Qatar also seeks to promote hip, brainiac appeal with its annual Tasmeem design conference, sponsored by Virginia Commonwealth University. A six-day symposium that explores the state of contemporary design, the conference has drawn distinguished speakers such as Bruce Mau, Stefan Sagmeister and Twyla Tharp.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The nation hasn't completely resisted the lure of the lavish. Emboldened by 15 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, its civic planners have developed their own from-scratch island project, the Pearl, built on land reclaimed from the sea by an extensive engineering effort. A massively ambitious undertaking, the complex includes more than 16,000 luxury condos, townhouses and villas, four luxury hotels, seven small private island "estates," nightclubs, restaurants and the longest luxury retail promenade in the world: more than 2.5 kilometers of luxury boutiques. The first phase is scheduled to open this month.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Perhaps the most surreal, slightly campy aspect of the Pearl is the Qanat Quartier, described in promotional materials as "a waterfront village reminiscent of the best of Venice and Amsterdam," complete with an intricate canal system, gondolas and pedestrian plazas and squares. Even that part of the project, however, manages to stay on message in terms of Qatar's brand identity: an upscale, evolved lifestyle destination, designed to appeal to a select few instead of the grand masses.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Qatar's policymakers remain passionately committed to the belief that it's not necessary to abandon their heritage in order to make room for the modern world. They seek, instead, to harmonize the two and create a third way, a middle path built on a foundation of both technology and tradition. In a corner of the world that is riven by misunderstanding, their efforts stand as a compelling argument that a progressive, intellectual approach to prosperity might be the best way to keep the peace—and attract the tourists.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/6041305650038531172-6190338198885901899?l=anomalisemesta.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/feeds/6190338198885901899/comments/default' title='Poskan Komentar'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=6041305650038531172&amp;postID=6190338198885901899' title='0 Komentar'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/6190338198885901899'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/6190338198885901899'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/2008/04/sophisticated-state.html' title='A Sophisticated State'/><author><name>muchamad ali safa'at</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07348715720341930804</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6041305650038531172.post-7548189397475395917</id><published>2008-04-13T11:15:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2008-04-13T11:18:48.358-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Establishing A New Kind Of Modern</title><content type='html'>&lt;strong&gt;In Saudi Arabia, the conservative and the progressive don't feud. They find a way to coexist.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;By Sameer Reddy | NEWSWEEK&lt;br /&gt;Apr 21, 2008 Issue &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Upon landing at Riyadh's King Khalid International Airport, it's instantly clear that Saudi Arabia is unlike any other place on earth—though not necessarily for the reasons one would expect. Sure, luggage is thoroughly searched for contraband, and the terminal is filled with abaya-clad women and their male counterparts in flowing white robes, known as dishdashas. But there are other, unanticipated sights that immediately command attention—primarily the ultramodern airport itself, a notable landmark and masterpiece of Islamic architecture.&lt;span class="fullpost"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Initiated in the '70s, it radiates out from under a bold, futuristic geodesic dome and is connected to an enormous hexagonal mosque that can accommodate up to 5,000 worshipers, with a courtyard big enough for an additional&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;4,000. The budget for the entire complex exceeded $3.2 billion, and it took more than 10 years to complete. It's one of the many large-scale development projects the Saudi government has been able to undertake thanks to a gargantuan stream of oil revenue. To uninitiated visitors, the high-design structure juxtaposed with the vast traditional space where busy travelers can stop and pray may come as a surprise. But it is a fitting gateway into a country dominated by ambitious public-development projects that jostle for pride of place while embodying the tension between conservative and progressive cultural currents.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Encompassing both futuristic, sky-scraping hotels and old-fashioned date and camel farms, Saudi Arabia is far more complex than its media coverage—usually limited to negative stories about a lack of civil rights—allows. Its smaller neighbors may attract more attention; after all, an airport doesn't invite as much journalistic interest as a man-made, palm-shaped island (in Dubai) or a new outpost of the Louvre (in Abu Dhabi). But in that difference lies the crux of Saudi Arabia's approach to development—and the most convincing reason to make the journey.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Since it opened to tourists in 2004, the country has challenged travelers to confront their preconceived notions while simultaneously offering an authentic version of the Gulf that has not been artificially constructed for Western consumption. Getting there can still be difficult: non-Muslims usually need either a sponsor within the country or a well-connected travel agent or tour guide. But once in, they are welcomed. The fact is that Saudi society is highly conservative and traditional, and in some cases authoritarian—but it is also fiercely modern in its contemporary esthetic, and deeply hospitable to strangers who respect its mores.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The tension is especially pronounced in Riyadh, the capital and largest city. It is the seat of such traditional, defining elements as the royal family and the historic Masmak Fort, whose recapture by Ibn Saud led to the founding of the current ruling dynasty. Women are not allowed to drive, or to socialize with men who are not family members. Yet the city is surprisingly sophisticated, boasting a cultivated and well-informed population. Fueled by outsize bank accounts enriched by the oil economy, they have traveled widely outside the country for education, business and leisure, returning home from destinations like Mumbai, London and Paris with a taste for both the Occident and the East.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The Riyadh skyline runs very flat to the ground. Speeding down the highway toward the city center, the first-time visitor is struck by the vastness of the desert surrounding a small concentration of glittering lights, dominated by the 45-story, bottle-opener-shaped Kingdom Centre and the 44-story obelisk that is Al Faisaliah Tower. Their unapologetic modernism competes with the natural majesty of the landscape, and serves as a metaphor for the technologically advanced trajectory the government is attempting to follow. The Kingdom Centre is owned by Prince Alwaleed bin Talal bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, the high-flying billionaire who is a major stakeholder in the Four Seasons hotel group. It houses offices, a Four Seasons Hotel, apartments, a three-level luxury shopping complex and a "skybridge." The interior architecture is immensely scaled, designed to impress and inspire awe, like so many public spaces in Riyadh.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Because of the religious tradition of Wahhabism, an ultraconservative strand of Islam, restrictions apply as to how these spaces are used. The most obvious are that men and women cannot mix freely, and music is not allowed in public. To the outsider, the effect can be surreal; what should be lively centers of human exchange can feel more like elaborate stage sets. Visitors can experience this sensation while standing in the vast lobby of the Kingdom Centre, but nowhere is it more apparent than in the Harvey Nichols store in Al Faisaliah Tower, where the sound of voices mixes with the click of stiletto heels but no background music is heard.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Most stores in Riyadh offer a fairly mainstream product mix—standard-issue logo bags from Gucci, embroidered Armani chiffon gowns—that appeal to a conservative clientele. But for those seeking to make more of a fashion statement, the most interesting store in Saudi Arabia, hands down, is DNA. The brainchild of international fashion plate Dina Aljuhani, DNA is the region's first concept store, à la Colette in Paris or 10 Corso Como in Milan. A respectable 800 square meters, the museum-like space stocks a global selection of cutting-edge labels, including Tunisian master couturier Azzedine Alaia and the New York design collective ThreeasFour. Aljuhani's vivacious personality has won over some of the biggest names in fashion and persuaded designers like Michel Klein and Martine Sitbon to custom-make abayas for her store, and Diane von Furstenberg and Proenza Schouler to produce longer versions of their short-skirted styles. "Most people think women from the Gulf are either in Al Qaeda or dressed from head to toe in logos," she says. "We want to change that perception, and to show that women here are much more savvy and aware of style and trends than people think."&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The tension between tradition and modernity is readily apparent on the Saudi restaurant scene. Dining has always been a national pastime, with multicourse dinners stretching late into the night. The Globe restaurant, located at the top of the Rosewood Hotel in Al Faisaliah Tower, offers a dazzling example of Middle East meets West. Like a glass marble suspended in the sky, it is another impressive feat of engineering, providing a 360-degree view from within a geodesic globe while serving modern European dishes like Wagyu beef fillet with horseradish confit. But like the city's other architectural marvels, the interior affords its own surreal views: families making hushed conversation while sipping elaborate, alcohol-free mocktails from crystal glasses; a burqa-clad woman slipping a piece of foie gras behind her veil and into her mouth.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Perhaps the best way to appreciate the tension of modern-day Saudi Arabia is to gain an understanding of its history. The National Museum in Riyadh yields an engaging array of antiques, manuscripts and documents relating to the evolution of Islam and Saudi Arabia. Its eight halls are arranged in chronological order; the first explores the region's early inhabitants and the development of Arabic, then it moves into the "Age of Ignorance" that preceded Islam, the rise of the Prophet Muhammad and the development of Islam, and finally modern-day Riyadh.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The painstakingly restored Masmak Fort, built around 1865, contains a museum displaying antique firearms, costumes and agricultural tools— the relics of Saudi life in that period. The dramatically lit building is one of the few remaining traditional structures, a vivid example of how deeply the Saudi landscape has been transformed by the discovery of oil. Located in the Old Town, it is nonetheless surrounded by modern buildings.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Such contrasts can make Saudi Arabia a challenging place to visit. Women can't rent a car or wear a sundress in the unbearable heat. Those seeking a holiday filled with shopping, sunbathing and poolside cocktails should definitely head to Dubai instead; hedonism is not appreciated in Saudi Arabia. But respectful curiosity certainly is. It may be the only place on earth where Buckminster Fuller futurism meets contemporary French cuisine meets Wahhabi Islam—compelling proof that there is more than one definition of what it means to live in the modern world.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/6041305650038531172-7548189397475395917?l=anomalisemesta.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/feeds/7548189397475395917/comments/default' title='Poskan Komentar'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=6041305650038531172&amp;postID=7548189397475395917' title='0 Komentar'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/7548189397475395917'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/7548189397475395917'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/2008/04/establishing-new-kind-of-modern.html' title='Establishing A New Kind Of Modern'/><author><name>muchamad ali safa'at</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07348715720341930804</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6041305650038531172.post-8447090625311853398</id><published>2008-04-13T11:12:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2008-04-13T11:15:37.073-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Till The Bitter End</title><content type='html'>&lt;strong&gt;Mugabe may well succeed in holding onto power in the end. But the cost for Zimbabwe will be terrible.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;By Martin Meredith | NEWSWEEK&lt;br /&gt;Apr 21, 2008 Issue &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;For a few brief days following last month's elections, it seemed the long night of Robert Mugabe's reign over Zimbabwe was ending. Against all odds, opposition parties succeeded in winning a majority in Parliament. But what matters most is the presidential election, and there, neither Mugabe nor his main opponent, Morgan Tsvangirai, gained an outright majority. This gave Mugabe room to manipulate the results and to use his militias, youth groups, the police and the Army to ensure he wins a second round of voting.&lt;span class="fullpost"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The brief mood of euphoria is now gone. A climate of fear has returned to this country, which faces economic collapse and catastrophic food shortages. Mugabe, who has ruled for 28 years, has been very clear about his determination to hold power till the end. "No matter what force you have," he once declared, "this is my territory and that which is mine I cling [to] unto death."&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The "Old Man," as locals call him, may be 84, but there are still reasons to fear him. He has held onto power by rigging elections, violating court orders, suppressing the independent press and using thugs to attack his opponents. Violence has been his stock in trade for more than 30 years: Mugabe once referred to himself as a "black Hitler" and has boasted of having "a degree in violence." A teacher by trade who has six university degrees, Mugabe was also one of the first black leaders to advocate violence against Ian Smith's white minority regime in Rhodesia, as Zimbabwe was then called. Given Smith's intransigence, no other method would likely have succeeded in ousting him. But during the seven-year-long civil war that preceded Smith's overthrow, Mugabe became addicted to the use of violence—not just to establish a new order, but to gain total control over it.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Though Mugabe initially advocated democracy, it was always of a particular type. In 1976, he declared: "Our votes must go together with our guns. After all, any vote we shall have shall have been the product of the gun. The gun which produces the vote and should remain its security officer—its guarantor. The people's votes and the people's guns are always inseparable twins."&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;After winning Zimbabwe's first democratic election in 1980, Mugabe wanted more: the kind of power he would have obtained through a military victory, which he once described as "the ultimate joy." Power was not the means to an end for him. It was the end.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;And sure enough, no sooner did Mugabe take office than he set out to establish a one-party state. His first target was Matabeleland province, a seedbed of opposition. After a minor outbreak of rebel activity there, Mugabe unleashed a military campaign in 1983 that featured the use of North Korean-trained troops and culminated in the mass murder of as many as 20,000 civilians.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;As Mugabe acquired ever-greater powers, he ruled Zimbabwe through a vast system of patronage and used his secret police to harass, intimidate and even murder dissidents. In the process, he developed a monstrous ego, insisting that only he was capable of running the country.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The reality, however, is that Mugabe reduced his once prosperous country to a wreck. In recent years, as opposition mounted, he struck back with increasing ruthlessness. Hoping to bolster his popularity, he sent gangs of party activists to rural areas to seize control of white-owned farms, which were distributed to his supporters. The result was the collapse of the agricultural industry, the backbone of Zimbabwe's economy.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Facing the possibility of defeat in last month's election, Mugabe returned to the tactics of fear that have served him so well in the past. In rural areas that voted for the opposition, the repression has already begun. Villagers are being beaten up en masse and told "vote Mugabe next time or you will die." Mugabe may well succeed in holding on to power in the end. But the cost for Zimbabwe will be terrible: most of the population now faces abject poverty, starvation or the prospect of seeking refuge abroad.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The tragedy is that Zimbabwe, with its huge agricultural and mineral resources, has such high potential. But like many other African countries, it has been driven to ruin by disastrous leadership. Time and again, the failure of Africa's leaders to provide effective government and abide by constitutional rule has produced enduring crises. The ruling elites have managed to prosper. But the mass of ordinary Africans struggle to survive.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Meredith is the author of “Mugabe: Power, Plunder and the Struggle for Zimbabwe” and “The State of Africa: A History of 50 Years of Independence.” &lt;/span&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/6041305650038531172-8447090625311853398?l=anomalisemesta.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/feeds/8447090625311853398/comments/default' title='Poskan Komentar'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=6041305650038531172&amp;postID=8447090625311853398' title='0 Komentar'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/8447090625311853398'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/8447090625311853398'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/2008/04/till-bitter-end.html' title='Till The Bitter End'/><author><name>muchamad ali safa'at</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07348715720341930804</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6041305650038531172.post-707932961643194760</id><published>2008-04-11T05:06:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2008-04-11T05:10:29.315-07:00</updated><title type='text'>The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://bp0.blogger.com/_OX4rpeB8Kgc/R_9U86Q03NI/AAAAAAAAAIU/S9JUV5gLEOo/s1600-h/origin+of+family.gif"&gt;&lt;img style="float:left; margin:0 10px 10px 0;cursor:pointer; cursor:hand;" src="http://bp0.blogger.com/_OX4rpeB8Kgc/R_9U86Q03NI/AAAAAAAAAIU/S9JUV5gLEOo/s200/origin+of+family.gif" border="0" alt=""id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5187958701162814674" /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Buku ini mengetengahkan gambaran sejarah masyarakat dari jaman barbar hingga peradaban modern. Aspek yang menjadi perhatian utama adalah perkembangan keluarga, model perkawaninan dan pengaruhnya terhadap sistem kekerabatan dan pewarisan yang pada akhirnya menimbulkan pemilikan pribadi dan timbulnya negara.&lt;br /&gt;Landasan buku ini adalah pada hasil penelitian tentang etnologi dan sejarah masyarakat yang dilakukan oleh Morgan dan analisis kepemilikan pribadi yang dilakukan oleh Karl Marx. Perkembangan peradaban prahistoris secara umum dapat dibagi menjadi beberapa tahapan, yaitu; tahap Savagery (liar/buas), tahap Barbarisme, dan tahap Civilizaton (beradab). Adapun penjelasan dari masing-masing tahap tersebut adalah sebagai berikut:&lt;span class="fullpost"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;A. Savagery&lt;br /&gt;Merupakan periode di mana manusia memerima hasil yang diberikan oleh alam. Karya seni merupakan alat untuk membantu penerimaan tersebut. Savagery dibagi menjadi tiga masa perkembangan yaitu Lower Stage, Middle Stage, dan Upper Stage. &lt;br /&gt;Lower Stage adalah periode manusia hidup dalam habitat aslinya di hutan-hutan tropis dan sub tropis. Mereka membuat rumah pohon untuk bertahan dari serangan binatang buas. Makanan mereka adalah buah-buahan, kacang-kacangan dan akar-akaran. Tidak ada bukti yang kuat untuk menggambarkan masa ini. Pada periode inilah manusia mulai berbicara dengan bahasa tertentu.&lt;br /&gt;Middle Stage dimulai pada saat telah dimanfaatkannya ikan sebagai makanan dan penggunaan api. Dengan sumber ini manusia menjadi lebih tidak terikat dengan cuaca dan tempat tinggal. Hal ini juga menyebabkan distribusi penduduk tersebar di daerah aliran sungai dan di sekitar pantai. Jaman ini dikenal dengan “paleoliths” (batu) karena penggunaan batu aji kasar sebagai alat dalam bekerja. Pada masa ini juga ditemukan banyak makanan baru dari akar-akaran dan umbi-umbian yang kemudian dipanggang dalam abu atau tanah yang panas. Alat lain yang ditemukan adalah pentungan dan tombak yang sering dijadikan permainan dan taruhan. Pada masa ini kanibalisme mulai muncul dan berlanjut dalam waktu yang lama.&lt;br /&gt;Upper Stage adalah masa yang ditandai dengan penemuan busur dan anak panah yang kemudian menjadi alat utama dalam mencari makanan dan berburu menjadi pekerjaan pokok. Manusia berkembang semakin pandai dan berpengalaman. Pada periode ini mulai membuat tempat tinggal tetap dan mengontrol aktivitas produksi. Pada masa ini dijumpai bejana-bejana dari kayu, perkakas rumah tangga, tenunan tangan dan peralatan batu yang telah ditajamkan. Dengan ditemukannya api dan kapak baru, pembuatan perahu menjadi biasa. Balok kapal dan papan juga telah digunakan untuk membangun rumah.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;B. Barbarism&lt;br /&gt;Periode pada masa manusia belajar untuk mengembangbiakkan hewan dan mempraktekkan pertanian. Pada masa ini ditemukan cara-cara yang dilakukan manusia untuk meningkatkan persediaan hasil alam.&lt;br /&gt;Lower Stage dimulai saat dikenal barang-barang keramik (pottery) yang dibuat dari tanah liat (clay) yang dibentuk dan dibakar. Karakteristik utama dari masa ini adalah mulai dijinakkan, dipelihara, dan diternakkannya hewan-hewan, serta penanaman tumbuhan. &lt;br /&gt;Middle Stage mulai terjadi di Eastern Hemisphere dengan penjinakkan binatang di timur, dan di bagian barat dengan penanaman, irigasi serta penggunaan bata dan batu untuk bangunan. Mereka hidup di rumah kayu di desa yang dikelilingi oleh pagar kayu runcing.&lt;br /&gt;Pada masa ini, di bagian timur Hemisphere ditandai dengan peternakan yang menyediakan daging dan susu, sedangkan tanaman hortikultur belum di kenal. Hal inilah yang menyebabkan perbedaan antara suku Aryan dan Semit pada masa Barbar. Ketersediaan daging dan susu mempengaruhi pertumbuhan yang lebih pada ras Aryan dan Semit. Hal ini berbeda dengan ras Pueblo Indian yang hampir seluruhnya vegetarian sehingga memiliki otak yang lebih kecil dibanding dengan ras Indian sebelumnya yang mengkonsumsi lebih banyak daging dan ikan. Kanibalisme pada masa ini mulai menghilang, kecuali dalam aktivitas relijius.&lt;br /&gt;Upper stage ditandai dengan adanya peleburan biji besi, dan menuju peradaban dengan ditemukannya tulisan alphabet yang digunakan untuk catatan tertulis. Populasi berkembang cepat, suatu wilayah yang kecil menjadi semakin padat.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;C. Civilization&lt;br /&gt;Periode saat manusia mengetahui cara yang lebih maju untuk mengelola hasil alam. Periode ini merupakan periode munculnya industri yang besar dan karya-karya seni.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Sejarah Keluarga&lt;br /&gt;Konsepsi keluarga pada mulanya adalah keluarga kekerabatan. Studi terhadap sejarah primitif menunjukkan kondisi bahwa laki-laki hidup ber-poligami, dan perempuan ber-poliandri. Semua anak adalah anak bagi semuanya. Kondisi ini berkembang dan berlanjut dengan berbagai perubahan yang pada akhirnya menjadi perkawinan monogami. &lt;br /&gt;Morgan sependapat dengan sejarahwan lain bahwa pada tahap primitif kebebasan seksual tidak terbatas, setiap perempuan adalah sama-sama milik setiap laki-laki, dan setiap laki-laki adalah milik setiap perempuan. Morgan menyebutnya dengan istilah “hetaerism”  yang mungkin merupakan cikal bakal prostitusi. Bentuk ini disebut oleh Engels dengan istilah “perkawinan kelompok”. Dan kemudian menjadi perkawinan monogami.&lt;br /&gt;“Perkawinan kelompok” adalah  bentuk keluarga di mana semua kelompok laki-laki dan semua kelompok perempuan saling memiliki, dan hanya menyisakan sedikit tempat untuk kecemburuan. Kebebasan tidak hanya antara saudara laki-laki dan saudara perempuan, tetapi juga antara orang tua dan anak (incest).  &lt;br /&gt;Iroquois Indian menyebut “anak” bukan hanya anaknya sendiri, tetapi juga semua anak-anak saudara laki-lakinya, dan anak-anak itu memanggilnya “bapak”. Namun terhadap anak dari saudara perempuan, dia memanggilnya “keponakan”. Panggilan-panggilan tersebut merupakan ekspresi dari konsepsi kedekatan dan jarak.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;1. Keluarga Kekerabatan, Tahap Awal dari Keluarga&lt;br /&gt;Pada masa ini perkawinan dilakukan secara berkelompok kecuali antara penurun dan keturunan. Semua kakek adalah dan nenek adalah suami-istri, semua anak-anaknya adalah ayah dan ibu. Demikian pula anak-anaknya adalah suami dan istri. Semua saudara laki-laki dan perempuan, semua sepupu laki-laki dan perempuan adalah saudara. Maka semua saudara dan keponakan adalah suami atau istri. Menurut Marx, saudara perempuan adalah istri pada masa primitif  merupakan hal yang sesuai dengan moral.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;2. Keluarga Punaluan&lt;br /&gt;Jika pada tahap awal larangan perkawinan adalah antara orang tua dan anak, maka selanjutnya yang dilarang adalah antara saudara laki-laki dengan saudara perempuan, dan berlanjut pada larangan perkawinan antara saudara kolateral. Hal ini mengakibatkan terpecahnya keluarga utama. Praktek kehidupan bersama dalam masyarakat komunistik primitif menjadi terbatas menjadi masyarakat keluarga-keluarga. Satu saudara menjadi inti dari satu keluarga baru. Keluarga Punaluan menandai berakhirnya keluarga kekerabatan. &lt;br /&gt;Namun demikian masih terdapat perkawinan kelompok secara terbatas. Suami dari saudara perempuan ibu adalah suami ibu juga dan istri dari saudara laki-laki ayah adalah istrinya juga. Dengan demikian anak dari saudara laki-laki ibu dan anak dari saudara perempuan bapak bukan merupakan saudara lagi. Mereka tidak dapat lagi memiliki orang tua bersama-sama.&lt;br /&gt;Perkawinan kelompok menyebabkan seorang anak tidak memiliki Bapak yang jelas, tetapi memiliki ibu yang jelas. Maka keturunan hanya bisa dibuktikan melalui garis ibu, dan karena itu hanya garis keturunan perempuan yang diakui, atau yang sering disebut dengan “mother right”.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/6041305650038531172-707932961643194760?l=anomalisemesta.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/feeds/707932961643194760/comments/default' title='Poskan Komentar'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=6041305650038531172&amp;postID=707932961643194760' title='0 Komentar'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/707932961643194760'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/707932961643194760'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/2008/04/origin-of-family-private-property-and.html' title='The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State'/><author><name>muchamad ali safa'at</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07348715720341930804</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><media:thumbnail xmlns:media='http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/' url='http://bp0.blogger.com/_OX4rpeB8Kgc/R_9U86Q03NI/AAAAAAAAAIU/S9JUV5gLEOo/s72-c/origin+of+family.gif' height='72' width='72'/><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6041305650038531172.post-1446135873972833736</id><published>2008-04-11T05:05:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2008-04-11T05:14:21.691-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Tentang Penelitian</title><content type='html'>Berdasarkan pertanyaan dalam penelitian, dapat dibedakan dua macam penelitian, yaitu penelitian deskriptif (descriptive) dan penelitian eksplanatoris (explanatory). Penelitian deskriptif menggambarkan suatu fenomena secara detail. Penelitian ini menjawab pertanyaan apa (what). Sedangkan penelitian eksplanatoris adalah menjelaskan suatu fenomena sosial khusus tentang mengapa (why) dan bagaimana (how) sesuatu terjadi.&lt;span class="fullpost"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I. Penelitian Eksplanatoris&lt;br /&gt;Tujuan dari penelitian sosial adalah untuk memahami masyarakat. Salah satu bentuk pemahaman adalah dengan mengetahui mengapa dan bagaimana sesuatu terjadi dalam masyarakat. Disamping pemahaman, eksplanasi erat kaitannya dengan prediksi. Berdasarkan penelitian eksplanatoris, dapat diprediksi terjadinya sesuatu dalam masyarakat. Obyek eksplanasi dan prediksi adalah sama. Prediksi melihat sesuatu sebelum terjadi sedangkan eksplanasi sesudah terjadi.&lt;br /&gt;Eksplanasi dan prediksi dibentuk oleh teori-teori yang menjawab pertanyaan mengapa dan bagaimana. Teorisasi adalah suatu proses melakukan eksplanasi dan prediksi tentang suatu fenomena sosial.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;II. Teori&lt;br /&gt;Terdapat berbagai konsepsi tentang teori. Sosiolog klasik menyebut teori sebagai suatu kumpulan pernyataan yang tidak dapat diuji. Dalam keseharian teori memiliki dua makna. Pertama adalah eksplanasi yang mungkin tetapi tidak dapat diuji. Namun bagi ilmuwan sosial walaupun tidak dapat diuji tetapi memiliki potensi untuk diuji. Kedua adalah sesuatu yang tidak praktis.&lt;br /&gt;Komponen dasar dari teori adalah konsep-konsep dan variabel-variabel yang terkait dalam suatu pernyataan yang disebut proposisi. Proposisi dapat berupa sebuah aksioma, postulat, theorem, generalisasi empiris, atau sebuah hipotesa. Seperangkat proposisi yang saling berhubungan membentuk teori. Namun mungkin pula suatu teori terdiri dari satu proposisi tunggal.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;A. Konsep dan Variabel&lt;br /&gt;Semua eksplanasi berisi konsep-konsep dan variabel-variabel. Konsep adalah bayangan mental yang sederhana, atau suatu persepsi. Konsep dapat berupa sesuatu yang tidak dapat diamati secara langsung, seperti keadilan atau cinta. Namun konsep juga dapat berupa sesuatu yang dapat diamati langsung seperti “pohon” atau “merah”.&lt;br /&gt;Di sisi lain, banyak konsep yang terdiri dari beberapa kategori, nilai, atau subkonsep, yang sering berada dalam dimensi atau rentang yang dapat disadari. Konsep yang dapat diterapkan pada lebih dari satu nilai dalam rentang tertentu disebut dengan variabel. Sedangkan konsep yang yang memiliki nilai tunggal dan tidak pernah berubah, disebut dengan constan.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;B. Proposisi&lt;br /&gt;Setelah konsep-konsep dasar diformulasikan, langkah konstruksi teori selanjutnya adalah menuliskan satu atau lebih proposisi. Proposisi secara umum adalah suatu pernyataan sederhana tentang satu atau lebih konsep-konsep atau variabel-variabel. Proposisi yang membahas satu variabel disebut univariate. Proposisi yang membahas hubungan dua variabel disebut bivariate. Jika lebih dari dua variabel disebut multivariate.&lt;br /&gt;Proposisi multivariate biasanya dapat dituliskan menjadi dua atau lebih proposisi bivariate. Contohnya, proposisi “kepadatan penduduk berhubungan dengan tingkat buta huruf dan kecanduan narkoba” dapat dituliskan (1) semakin tinggi kepadatan, semakin tinggi tingkat buta huruf, dan (2) semakin tinggi kepadatan, semakin tinggi tingkat kecanduan narkoba. Kebanyakan proposisi dalam penelitian sosial adalah bivariate.&lt;br /&gt;Suatu variabel (X) dikatakan berhubungan dengan variabel lain (Y), jika suatu perubahan terhadap X diikuti oleh perubahan Y, demikian sebaliknya. Variasi hubungan variabel tersebut disebut dengan variasi concominant atau korelasi (correlation).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;C. Tipe-Tipe Proposisi&lt;br /&gt;Jika konsep-konsep adalah pembentuk (building blocks) proposisi, maka proposisi-proposisi adalah yang membentuk teori. Seperti disebutkan sebelumnya, bahwa subtipe dari proposisi-proposisi adalah hipotesis, generalisasi empiris, aksioma, postulat, dan theorem.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;1. Hipotesis&lt;br /&gt;Terdadap dua proposisi yang lebih sering digunakan sendirian dari pada kombinasi dengan poposisi lain, yaitu hipotesis dan generalisasi empiris. Suatu hipotesis merupakan sesuatu yang dinyatakan dalam bentuk yang dapat diuji dan memprediksi suatu hubungan tertentu dari dua atau lebih variabel. Jika kita melihat adanya suatu hubungan, lalu kita menetapkan sebuah hipotesis dan kemudian mengujinya.&lt;br /&gt;Dalam tulisan ini hipotesis digunakan dalam arti suatu eksplanasi sementara yang karenanya dibutuhkan pengujian bukti-bukti yang secara potensial dapat dilakukan. Definisi ini mengecualikan semua pernyataan yang lebih merupakan opini, nilai-nilai, atau hal yang bersifat normatif. Sebuah hipotesis adalah sebuah pernyataan sementara dan belum terbukti yang harus diuji. Untuk dapat dibuktikan maka harus diuji. Untuk dapat diuji, maka harus dinyatakan sedemikian rupa hingga mungkin dilakukan pengujian.&lt;br /&gt;Hipotesis dapat berasal dari beberapa sumber seperti pengamatan dalam kehidupan sehari-hari. Namun sering kali hipotesis berasal dari penelitian yang telah dilakukan atau dari kepercayaan umum. Hipotesis juga dapat berasal dari analisis secara langsung terhadap data lapangan atau dideduksikan dari suatu teori tertentu. &lt;br /&gt;Sesuatu hipotesis untuk dapat diuji membutuhkan klarifikasi. Hipotesis “seorang genius lebih banyak yang tidak bahagia” tidak dapat diuji hingga konsep kecerdasan dan kebahagiaan didefinisikan secara terukur pada tataran empiris.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;2. Generalisasi Empiris&lt;br /&gt;Generalisasi empiris merupakan suatu hubungan yang berasal dari proses induksi. Generalisasi empiris adalah sebuah pernyataan tentang suatu hubungan yang dikonstruksikan oleh pengobservasian pertama terhadap keberadaan suatu hubungan dan menggeneralisasikan dengan menyatakan bahwa hubungan yang diamati tersebut terdapat pada semua kasus atau kebanyakan kasus.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;3. Komponen-Komponen Teori Aksiomatis: Postulat, Aksioma, Theorem&lt;br /&gt;Walaupun proposisi tunggal seperti hipotesis atau generalisasi empiris dapat disebut dengan pernyataan teoritis atau minitheories, namun banyak peneliti lebih menerima istilah “theory” sebagai seperangkat dua atau lebih proposisi yang saling berhubungan. Bentuk yang umum dari seperangkat proposisi yang saling berhubungan adalah teori aksiomatis (axiomatic theory). Teori aksiomatis atau deduktif mengambil bentuk dasar dari silogisme deduktif, yaitu:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Proposisi 1: Jika A maka B&lt;br /&gt;Proposisi 2: Jika B maka C&lt;br /&gt;Jadi&lt;br /&gt;Proposisi 3: Jika A maka C&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Suatu pernyataan yang benar yang didapat dari deduksi pernyataan lain (Proposisi 3) disebut dengan aksioma atau postulat. Istilah aksioma dan postulat biasa digunakan saling menggantikan. Perbedaanya adalah bahwa “aksioma” memiliki konotasi matematis dan biasanya lebih sering digunakan untuk pernyataan yang benar per-definisi dan untuk proposisi-proposisi yang melibatkan konsep-konsep yang sangat abstrak. Sedangkan istilah “postulat” lebih sering digunakan untuk pernyataan yang memiliki kebenaran yang telah didemonstrasikan secara empiris. Sedangkan suatu proposisi yang dapat dideduksikan dari seperangkat postulat disebut dengan sebuah theorem.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;III. Hubungan Bivariate&lt;br /&gt;Hubungan bivariate dapat memiliki beberapa macam variasi, yaitu positif atau negatif, kekuatan hubungan, simetris (symmetrical) atau asimetris (asymmetrical), variabel bebas (independent) dan variabel tergantung (dependent), linear atau curvilinear, dan apakah hubungan tersebut spurious atau involves atas suatu intervening variabel.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;A. Hubungan Positif – Negatif&lt;br /&gt;Jika peningkatan nilai suatu variabel diikuti oleh peningkatan nilai variabel kedua, maka disebut positif. Demikian pula jika penurunan suatu variabel diikuti dengan penurunan variabel kedua. Hubungan positif terjadi jika variabel-variabel berubah secara sama. Sedangkan jika peningkatan suatu variabel diikuti dengan penurunan variabel lain disebut dengan negatif atau inversi. Jadi perubahan terjadi pada variabel-variabel tersebut berkebalikan.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;B. Kekuatan Hubungan&lt;br /&gt;Jika telah diketahui bahwa terdapat hubungan antara dua variabel, pertanyaan selanjutnya adalah seberapa kuat hubungan tersebut? Konsepsi kekuatan hubungan lebih jelas jika berbicara masalah prediksi dari pada pada saat dua variabel berubah bersamaan. Dengan mengetahui nilai suatu variabel, maka dapat dibuat prediksi yang lebih akurat atas nilai variabel lain. Tingkat kebenaran suatu prediksi disebut dengan kekuatan hubungan. Pengukuran statistik atas kekuatan hubungan disebut koefisien korelasi (correlation coefficient). Koefisien korelasi disimbolkan dengan huruf r yang nilainya bervariasi antara –1.00, hingga + 1.00,. Nilai 0.00 berarti tidak ada hubungan atau prediksi nol persen akurat; sedangkan +1.00 berarti akurasi prediksi adalah 100 persen. –1.00 berarti 100 persen akurasi prediksi hubungan negatif antar variabel.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;C. Hubungan Simetris dan Asimetris&lt;br /&gt;Pembahasan yang telah dilakukan adalah dalam hubungan simetris antar variabel. Perubahan satu variabel diikuti dengan perubahan variabel lain. Dalam hubungan yang asimetris, perubahan variabel A diikuti oleh perubahan variabel B, tetapi tidak berlaku sebaliknya.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;D. Variabel Bebas dan Variabel Tergantung &lt;br /&gt;Dalam hubungan yang asimetris, variabel yang mampu mempengaruhi perubahan variabel lain disebut variabel bebas. Sedangkan variabel yang nilainya tergantung pada variabl lain dan tidak dapat mempengaruhi perubahan variabel lain tersebut, disebut variabel tergantung. Dalam hubungan sebab-akibat, penyebab adalah variabl bebas dan akibatnya adalah variabel tergantung. Dalam literatur statistik, hubungan simetris disamakan dengan eksplanasi, sedangkan hubungan asimetris disamakan dengan prediksi.&lt;br /&gt;Pada umumnya variabel tergantung adalah yang akan dijelaskan dan vaiabel bebas adalah penjelasan dari hipotesis. Seringkali variabel bebas diketahui karena terjadi terlebih dulu dari pada variabel lain. Namun jika keduanya terjadi hampir bersamaan, akan sulit menentukannya.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;E. Hubungan Sebab-Akibat&lt;br /&gt;Penemuan hubungan antara dua atau lebih variabel tidak dengan sendirinya menyatakan bahwa hubungan tersebut adalah sebab-akibat. Hal ini bukanlah sekedar konsepsi yang logis tetapi juga dapat diterapkan dalam hubungan antara sesuatu yang kongkret atau empiris. Kita menyatakan bahwa X menyebabkan Y jika:&lt;br /&gt;1. Ada hubungan antara X dan Y.&lt;br /&gt;2. Hubungan tersebut asimetris sehingga perubahan X menghasilkan perubahan Y, namun tidak sebaliknya.&lt;br /&gt;3. Suatu perubahan X menghasilkan perubahan Y tanpa memperhatikan faktor-faktor lain.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Umumnya dinyatakan bahwa perubahan pada sebab (X) harus terjadi sebelum perubahan pada akibat (Y). Namun beberapa pengertian juga memungkinkan sebab dan akibat terjadi secara simultan. Tetapi tidak ada akibat yang mendahului sebab. Jadi rentang waktu sering menjadi jalan utama untuk menentukan faktor yang menjadi sebab dan manakah akibatnya.&lt;br /&gt;Namun demikian, ada kemungkinan hubungan kausal terjadi secara simetris yang disebut dengan mutual causation. X menyebabkan Y dan secara simultan Y juga menyebabkan X. Keduanya menjadi sebab sekaligus akibat. Namun sebagian besar kasus adalah asimetris.&lt;br /&gt;Masalah lain adalah kausalitas terkait dengan istilah necessary and sufficient conditions. X dikatakan sebagai necessary bagi akibat Y jika Y tidak pernah terjadi hingga X terjadi. X adalah sufficient bagi Y jika Y terjadi setiap kali X terjadi. Terdapat tiga kombinasi yang muncul dari kategori necessary and sufficient condition, yaitu: pertama, X adalah necessary tetapi tidak sufficient bagi Y. Dalam hal ini ada faktor lain yang harus ada sehingga X dapat menyebabkan Y.&lt;br /&gt;Kedua, suatu faktor dapat menjadi sufficient tetapi tidak necessary. Hal ini berarti ada faktor lain yang menjadi sufficient condition terjadinya suatu akibat. Ketiga, X menjadi faktor yang necessary sekaligus sufficient secara simultan untuk terjadinya akibat Y. Ini adalah bentuk sebab akibat yang paling kuat. Y tidak akan pernah ada hingga X ada, dan akan selalu ada jika X ada. Ini adalah bentuk penyebab tunggal (unicausality).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;F. Hubungan Linear – Nonlinear (Curvilinear)&lt;br /&gt;Hubungan liner terjadi pada saat dua variabel bervariasi dalam tingkat yang sama, apakah dalam nilai yang rendah, tinggi atau pertengahan. Sedangkan hubungan nonlinear atau curvilinear tingkat perubahan suatu variabel berbeda dengan dalam nilai yang berbeda pada variabel lain.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;G. Hubungan Spurious and Intervening&lt;br /&gt;Kadang-kadang ditemukan bahwa hubungan antara dua variabel terlihat tidak benar-benar saling terkait. Namun, kedua variabel tersebut berhubungan dalam hal keduanya disebabkan oleh variabel ketiga, yang disebut dengan hubungan spurious. Kemungkinan yang lain adalah bahwa hubungan antara kedua variabel tersebut disebabkan oleh suatu variabel penghubung (intervening variabel).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;H. Variabel Penekan (Suppresor Variabel) dan Variabel Peubah (Distorter Variabel)&lt;br /&gt;Terdapat kemungkinan sebuah “hubungan spurious nol” dalam hal dua variabel yang sesungguhnya berhubungan terlihat tidak berhubungan karena masing-masing berkorelasi dengan variabel ketiga. Variabel inilah yang disebut dengan variabel penekan (suppresor variabel). Variabel penekan menekan hubungan dengan secara positif berhubungan dengan satu variabel dan secara negatif dengan variabel lain. Hubungan sesungguhnya akan muncul jika dilakukan kontrol terhadap variabel penekan. Variabel ketiga tersebut juga disebut dengan variabel peubah yang merubah hubungan antara dua variabel dalam berbagai macam cara.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;IV. Pilihan Strategi untuk Memformulasikan Hipotesis dan Verifikasi&lt;br /&gt;Walaupun terlihat mudah, namun terdapat kesulitan dalam mengknstruksikan dan menguji hipotesis. Kesulitan tersebut terletak pada proses yang melibatkan perpaduan antara teori dan data. Mengikuti Blalock, dapat dilakukan pemisahan antara level konseptual atau teori dan evel data atau empiris. Fenomena empiris adalah semua fenomena yang secara langsung dapat dideteksi dan diamati oleh cara observasi tertentu seperti sentuhan, pendengaran, dan penciuman. Suatu fenomenon sosial dapat diasumsikan terjadi pada masing-masing level. Terdapat konsep yang dapat dibandingkan secara empiris. Sebaliknya, fenomena empiris juga dapat dibandingkan secara konseptual.&lt;br /&gt;Namun terdapat konsepsi yang mungkin terlalu abstrak sehingga sulit diukur secara empiris. Misalnya konsepsi keterasingan, autoritarianisme, intelegensi, ataupun ego. Untuk melakukan pengukuran dapat dilakukan melalui pendekatan kontruksi hipotesis (1) pendekatan klasik (the classical approach), (2) grounded theory, dan (3) strick operationalism.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;A. Pendekatan Klasik&lt;br /&gt;Pendekatan klasik terdiri dari tiga tahapan. Tahap pertama, terdiri atas pendefinisian konsepsi-konsepsi dan penulisan sebuah proposisi yang menyatakan sebuah hubungan diantaranya. Tahap ini secara keseluruhan berada pada level konseptual. Tahap kedua, menjembatani perbedaan antara level konseptual dengan level empiris. Pada tahap ini termasuk melengkapi cara-cara untuk mengukur konsepsi secara empiris dan menuliskan hipotesis yang terkait dengan pengukuran secara empiris atas kedua konsepsi. Hipotesis pada tahap 2 ini identik dengan proposisi pada tahap 1, hanya saja pada tahap 2 ada pada level empiris. Sedangkan pada tahap ketiga, adalah pengumpulan dan analisis data tambahan untuk memverifikasi hipotesis.&lt;br /&gt;Ukuran-ukuran empiris dari masing-masing konsepsi dapat disebut dengan indikator, ukuran, skala, indeks, atau definisi operasional. Hal ini tergantung pada bentuk dan konsteks yang digunakan. Hubungan antara level konseptual dan empiris secara umum disebut dengan korelasi epistemic. Hal tersebut tidak dapat diukur secara langsung tetapi dengan asumsi. Kesalahan pengukuran adalah bahaya utama dalam pendekatan klasik. Karena adanya kemungkinan kesalahan, hipotesis dapat disusun dengan kemungkinan perubahan jika dibutuhkan yang disebut dengan hipotesis kerja (a working hypothesis).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;B. Grounded Theory&lt;br /&gt;Grounded theory adalah teori yang ditemukan atau didapatkan dari data-data dari pada dari sesuatu yang abstrak dan tentatif. Grounded theory dibangun oleh: (1) memasukan tahapan penelitian lapangan tanpa sebuah hipotesis, (2) mendeskripsikan apa yang terjadi, dan (3) memformulasikan eksplanasi tentang mengapa terjadi berdasarkan observasi. Teori yang dapat digunakan adalah yang menggunakan konsep-konsep yang siap diterapkan pada data yang dipelajari. Teori harus dapat menjelaskan perilaku yang dipelajari.&lt;br /&gt;Grounded theory jika dibandingkan dengan pendekatan klasik, tahapannya menyatukan antara tahapan 2 dan 3. Hipotesis yang digunakan adalah yang berasal dari data. Dengan demikian tahapan verifikasi tidak diperlukan.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;C. Operasionalism&lt;br /&gt;Operasionalism adalah tata cara yang dibuat untuk mengukur sebuah konsep. Dalam pandangan ini, konsep terkait dengan seperangkat tata cara. Operasionalism biasanya membutuhkan pengukuran secara kuantitatif atas konsep. Menurut pandangan strick operasionalism, konsep harus dibuat sehingga dapat diukur. Jika tidak, maka tidak ada gunanya dalam penelitian. Strick operasionalism bersifat sangat pragmatis. Strick operasionalism tidak mengenal masalah kesalahan pengukuran. Inilah yang kemudian banyak memunculkan kritik terhadap strick operasionalism.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Diantara ketiga pendekatan tersebut, masing-masing memiliki kelebihan dan kekurangan sebagai berikut; Pendekatan Klasik kelebihannya (1) Komplet, semua tahapan ada, teorisasi dan analisis data terakomodasi secara maksimum, dan (2) dapat menggunakan konsepsi abstrak yang tergeneralisasi dan dapat memakai kekuatan konsep deduktif. Kelemahannya adalah kemungkinan adanya kesalahan pengukuran jika ukuran yang digunakan tidak mewakili konsep abstrak. Ada juga kritik yang dikemukakan (juga kepada grounded theory) yaitu terlalu menekankan pada deduksi dan verikasi sebagai sebuah kelemahan.&lt;br /&gt;Kelebihan utama dari pendekatan grounded theory adalah probabilitas kesalahan pengukuran dapat dikurangi. Hal ini karena konsep merupakan cermin dari data yang diobservasi secara empiris. Kelemahannya adalah penekanan pada konsep yang diderivasi secara empiris membuat kesulitan untuk menggunakan konsep yang abstrak dan hal ini membatasi teorisasi. Disamping itu, data yang di dapat di suatu tempat mungkin sulit untuk digeneralisasi pada tempat lain.&lt;br /&gt;Kelebihan operasionalism adalah tidak adanya kesalahan pengukuran, per-definisi. Kelemahannya adalah bahwa konsep-konsep abstrak yang tidak dapat didefiniskan secara operasional tidak dimungkinkan.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/6041305650038531172-1446135873972833736?l=anomalisemesta.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/feeds/1446135873972833736/comments/default' title='Poskan Komentar'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=6041305650038531172&amp;postID=1446135873972833736' title='0 Komentar'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/1446135873972833736'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/1446135873972833736'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/2008/04/tentang-penelitian.html' title='Tentang Penelitian'/><author><name>muchamad ali safa'at</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07348715720341930804</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6041305650038531172.post-8391133592879406798</id><published>2008-04-10T07:25:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2008-04-10T07:27:20.835-07:00</updated><title type='text'>PEMIKIRAN KEADILAN</title><content type='html'>PEMIKIRAN KEADILAN&lt;br /&gt;(PLATO, ARISTOTELES, DAN JOHN RAWLS)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Oleh: Muchamad Ali Safa’at&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;PENGERTIAN&lt;br /&gt;Keadilan telah menjadi pokok pembicaraan serius sejak awal munculnya filsafat Yunani. Pembicaraan keadilan memiliki cakupan yang luas, mulai dari yang bersifat etik, filosofis, hukum, sampai pada keadilan sosial. Banyak orang yang berpikir bahwa bertindak adil dan tidak adil tergantung pada kekuatan dan kekuatan yang dimiliki, untuk menjadi adil cukup terlihat mudah, namun tentu saja tidak begitu halnya penerapannya dalam kehidupan manusia.&lt;br /&gt;Kata “keadilan” dalam bahasa Inggris adalah “justice” yang berasal dari bahasa latin “iustitia”. Kata “justice” memiliki tiga macam makna yang berbeda yaitu; (1) secara atributif berarti suatu kualitas yang adil atau fair (sinonimnya justness), (2) sebagai tindakan berarti tindakan menjalankan hukum atau tindakan yang menentukan hak dan ganjaran atau hukuman (sinonimnya judicature), dan (3) orang, yaitu pejabat publik yang berhak menentukan persyaratan sebelum suatu perkara di bawa ke pengadilan (sinonimnya judge, jurist, magistrate).&lt;span class="fullpost"&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Sedangkan kata “adil” dalam bahasa Indonesia bahasa Arab “al ‘adl”  yang artinya sesuatu yang baik, sikap yang tidak memihak, penjagaan hak-hak seseorang dan cara yang tepat dalam mengambil keputusan. Untuk menggambarkan keadilan juga digunakan kata-kata yang lain (sinonim) seperti qisth, hukm, dan sebagainya. Sedangkan akar kata ‘adl dalam berbagai bentuk konjugatifnya bisa saja kehilangan kaitannya yang langsung dengan sisi keadilan itu (misalnya “ta’dilu” dalam arti mempersekutukan Tuhan dan ‘adl dalam arti tebusan). &lt;br /&gt;Beberapa kata yang memiliki arti sama dengan kata “adil” di dalam Al-Qur’an digunakan berulang ulang. Kata “al ‘adl” dalam Al qur’an dalam berbagai bentuk terulang sebanyak 35 kali. Kata “al qisth” terulang sebanyak 24 kali. Kata “al wajnu” terulang sebanyak kali, dan kata “al wasth” sebanyak 5 kali.  &lt;br /&gt;Untuk mengetahui apa yang adil dan apa yang tidak adil terlihat bukan merupakan kebijakan yang besar, lebih-lebih lagi jika keadilan diasosiasikan dengan aturan hukum positif, bagaimana suatu tindakan harus dilakukan dan pendistribusian menegakkan keadilan, serta bagaimana memajukan keadilan. Namun tentu tidak demikian halnya jika ingin memainkan peran menegakkan keadilan. &lt;br /&gt;Perdebatan tentang keadilan telah melahirkan berbagai aliran pemikiran hukum dan teori-teori sosial lainnya. Dua titik ekstrim keadilan, adalah keadilan yang dipahami sebagai sesuatu yang irasional dan pada titik lain dipahami secara rasional. Tentu saja banyak varian-varian yang berada diantara kedua titik ekstrim tersebut. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;PLATO &lt;br /&gt;Plato adalah seorang pemikir idealis abstrak yang mengakui kekuatan-kekuatan diluar kemampuan manusia sehingga pemikiran irasional masuk dalam filsafatnya. Demikian pula halnya dengan masalah keadilan, Plato berpendapat bahwa keadilan adalah diluar kemampuan manusia biasa. Sumber ketidakadilan adalah adanya perubahan dalam masyarakat. Masyarakat memiliki elemen-elemen prinsipal yang harus dipertahankan, yaitu:&lt;br /&gt;1. Pemilahan kelas-kelas yang tegas; misalnya kelas penguasa yang diisi oleh para penggembala dan anjing penjaga harus dipisahkan secara tegas dengan domba manusia.&lt;br /&gt;2. Identifikasi takdir negara dengan takdir kelas penguasanya; perhatian khusus terhadap kelas ini dan persatuannya; dan kepatuhan pada persatuannya, aturan-aturan yang rigid bagi pemeliharaan dan pendidikan kelas ini, dan pengawasan yang ketat serta kolektivisasi kepentingan-kepentingan anggotanya.&lt;br /&gt;Dari elemen-elemen prinsipal ini, elemen-elemen lainnya dapat diturunkan, misalnya berikut ini:&lt;br /&gt;3. Kelas penguasa punya monopoli terhadap semua hal seperti keuntungan dan latihan militer, dan hak memiliki senjata dan menerima semua bentuk pendidikan, tetapi kelas penguasa ini tidak diperkenankan berpartisipasi dalam aktivitas perekonomian, terutama dalam usaha mencari penghasilan,&lt;br /&gt;4. Harus ada sensor terhadap semua aktivitas intelektual kelas penguasa, dan propaganda terus-menerus yang bertujuan untuk menyeragamkan pikiran-pikiran mereka. Semua inovasi dalam pendidikan, peraturan, dan agama harus dicegah atau ditekan.&lt;br /&gt;5. Negara harus bersifat mandiri (self-sufficient). Negara harus bertujuan pada autarki ekonomi, jika tidak demikian, para penguasa akan bergantung pada para pedagang, atau justru para penguasa itu sendiri menjadi pedagang. Alternatif pertama akan melemahkan kekuasaan mereka, sedangkan alternatif kedua akan melemahkan persatuan kelas penguasa dan stabilitas negaranya. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Untuk mewujudkan keadilan masyarakat harus dikembalikan pada struktur aslinya, domba menjadi domba, penggembala menjadi penggembala. Tugas ini adalah tugas negara untuk menghentikan perubahan. Dengan demikian keadilan bukan mengenai hubungan antara individu melainkan hubungan individu dan negara. Bagaimana individu melayani negara. &lt;br /&gt;Keadilan juga dipahami secara metafisis keberadaannya sebagai kualitas atau fungsi smakhluk super manusia, yang sifatnya tidak dapat diamati oleh manusia. Konsekuensinya ialah, bahwa realisasi keadilan digeser ke dunia lain, di luar pengalaman manusia; dan akal manusia yang esensial bagi keadilan tunduk pada cara-cara Tuhan yang tidak dapat diubah atau keputusan-keputusan Tuhan yang tidak dapat diduga.  Oleh karena inilah Plato mengungkapkan bahwa yang memimpin negara seharusnya manusia super, yaitu the king of philosopher. &lt;br /&gt;Sedangkan Aristoteles adalah peletak dasar rasionalitas dan empirisme. Pemikirannya tentang keadilan diuraikan dalam bukunya yang berjudul Nicomachean Ethics. Buku ini secara keselurahan membahas aspek-aspek dasar hubungan antar manusia yang meliputi masalah-masalah hukum, keadilan, persamaan, solidaritas perkawanan, dan kebahagiaan.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;ARISTOTELES &lt;br /&gt;Keadilan diuraikan secara mendasar oleh Aristoteles dalam Buku ke-5 buku Nicomachean Ethics.  Untuk mengetahui tentang keadilan dan ketidakadilan harus dibahas tiga hal utama yaitu (1) tindakan apa yang terkait dengan istilah tersebut, (2) apa arti keadilan, dan (3) diantara dua titik ekstrim apakah keadilan itu terletak.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;1. Keadilan Dalam Arti Umum&lt;br /&gt;Keadilan sering diartikan sebagai ssuatu sikap dan karakter. Sikap dan karakter yang membuat orang melakukan perbuatan dan berharap atas keadilan adalah keadilan, sedangkan sikap dan karakter yang membuat orang bertindak dan berharap ketidakadilan adalah ketidakadilan.&lt;br /&gt;Pembentukan sikap dan karakter berasal dari pengamatan terhadap obyek tertentu yang bersisi ganda. Hal ini bisa berlaku dua dalil, yaitu;&lt;br /&gt;1. jika kondisi “baik” diketahui, maka kondisi buruk juga diketahui;&lt;br /&gt;2. kondisi “baik” diketahui dari sesuatu yang berada dalam kondisi “baik”&lt;br /&gt;Untuk mengetahui apa itu keadilan dan ketidakadilan dengan jernih, diperlukan pengetahuan yang jernih tentang salah satu sisinya untuk menentukan secara jernih pula sisi yang lain. Jika satu sisi ambigu, maka sisi yang lain juga ambigu.&lt;br /&gt;Secara umum dikatakan bahwa orang yang tidak adil adalah orang yang tidak patuh terhadap hukum (unlawful, lawless) dan orang yang tidak fair (unfair), maka orang yang adil adalah orang yang patuh terhadap hukum (law-abiding) dan fair. Karena tindakan memenuhi/mematuhi hukum adalah adil, maka semua tindakan pembuatan hukum oleh legislatif sesuai dengan aturan yang ada adalah adil. Tujuan pembuatan hukum adalah untuk mencapai kemajuan kebahagiaan masyarakat. Maka, semua tindakan yang cenderung untuk memproduksi dan mempertahankan kebahagiaan masyarakat adalah adil.&lt;br /&gt;Dengan demikian keadilan bisa disamakan dengan nilai-nilai dasar sosial. Keadilan yang lengkap bukan hanya mencapai kebahagiaan untuk diri sendiri, tetapi juga kebahagian orang lain. Keadilan yang dimaknai sebagai tindakan pemenuhan kebahagiaan diri sendiri dan orang lain, adalah keadilan sebagai sebuah nilai-nilai. Keadilan dan tata nilai dalam hal ini adalah sama tetapi memiliki esensi yang berbeda. Sebagai hubungan seseorang dengan orang lain adalah keadilan, namun sebagai suatu sikap khusus tanpa kualifikasi adalah nilai. Ketidakadilan dalam hubungan sosial terkait erat dengan keserakahan sebagai ciri utama tindakan yang tidak fair.&lt;br /&gt;Keadilan sebagai bagian dari nilai sosial memiliki makna yang amat luas, bahkan pada suatu titik bisa bertentangan dedengan hukum sebagai salah satu tata nilai sosial. Suatu kejahatan yang dilakukan adalah suatu kesalahan. Namun apabila hal tersebut bukan merupakan keserakahan tidak bisa disebut menimbulkan ketidakadilan. Sebaliknya suatu tindakan yang bukan merupakan kejahatan dapat menimbulkan ketidak adilan. &lt;br /&gt;Sebagai contoh, seorang pengusaha yang membayar gaji buruh di bawah UMR, adalah suatu pelanggaran hukum dan kesalahan. Namun tindakan ini belum tentu mewujudkan ketidakadilan. Apabila keuntungan dan kemampuan membayar perusahaan tersebut memang terbatas, maka jumlah pembayaran itu adalah keadilan. Sebaliknya walaupun seorang pengusaha membayar buruhnya sesuai dengan UMR, yang berarti bukan kejahatan, bisa saja menimbulkan ketidakadilan karena keuntungan pengusaha tersebut sangat besar dan hanya sebagian kecil yang diambil untuk upah buruh. Ketidakadilan ini muncul karena keserakahan.&lt;br /&gt;Hal tersebut di atas adalah keadilan dalam arti umum. Keadilan dalam arti ini terdiri dari dua unsur yaitu fair dan sesuai dengan hukum, yang masing-masing bukanlah hal yang sama. Tidak fair adalah melanggar hukum, tetapi tidak semua tindakan melanggar hukum adalah tidak fair. Keadilan dalam arti umum terkait erat dengan kepatuhan terhadap hukum&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;2. Keadilan Dalam Arti Khusus&lt;br /&gt;Keadilan dalam arti khusus terkait dengan beberapa pengertian berikut ini, yaitu:&lt;br /&gt;a. Sesuatu yang terwujud dalam pembagian penghargaan atau uang atau hal lainnya kepada mereka yang memiliki bagian haknya.&lt;br /&gt;Keadilan ini adalah persamaan diantara anggota masyarakat dalam suatu tindakan bersama-sama. Persamaan adalah suatu titik yang terletak diantara “yang lebih” dan “yang kurang” (intermediate). Jadi keadilan adalah titik tengan atau suatu persamaan relatif (arithmetical justice). Dasar persamaan antara anggota masyarakat sangat tergantung pada sistem yang hidup dalam masyarakat tersebut. Dalam sistem demokrasi, landasan persamaan untuk memperoleh titik tengah adalah kebebasan manusia yang sederajat sejak kelahirannya. Dalam sistem oligarki dasar persamaannya adalah tingkat kesejahteraan atau kehormatan saat kelahiran. Sedangkan dalam sistem aristokrasi dasar persamaannya adalah keistimewaan (excellent). Dasar yang berbeda tersebut menjadikan keadilan lebih pada makna persamaan sebagai proporsi. Ini adalah satu spesies khusus dari keadilan, yaitu titik tengah (intermediate) dan proporsi.&lt;br /&gt;b.  Perbaikan suatu bagian dalam transaksi&lt;br /&gt;Arti khusus lain dari keadilan adalah sebagai perbaikan (rectification). Perbaikan muncul karena adanya hubungan antara orang dengan orang yang dilakukan secara sukarela. Hubungan tersebut adalah sebuah keadilan apabila masing-masing memperoleh bagian sampai titik tengah (intermediate), atau suatu persamaan berdasarkan prinsip timbal balik (reciprocity). Jadi keadilan adalah persamaan, dus ketidakadilan adalah ketidaksamaan. Ketidakadilan terjadi jika satu orang memperoleh lebih dari yang lainnya dalam hubungan yang dibuat secara sederajat.&lt;br /&gt;Untuk menyamakan hal tersebut hakim atau mediator melakukan tugasnya menyamakan dengan mengambil sebagian dari yang lebih dan memberikan kepada yang kurang sehingga mencapai titik tengah. Tindakan hakim ini dilakukan sebagai sebuah hukuman.&lt;br /&gt;Hal ini berbeda apabila hubungan terjalin bukan atas dasar kesukarelaan masing-masing pihak. Dalam hubungan yang tidak didasari ketidaksukarelaan berlaku keadilan korektif yang memutuskan titik tengah sebagai sebuah proporsi dari yang memperoleh keuntungan dan yang kehilangan. Tindakan koreksi tidak dilakukan dengan semata-mata mengambil keuntungan yang diperoleh satu pihak diberikan kepada pihak lain dalam arti pembalasan. Seseorang yang melukai tidak diselesaikan dengan mengijinkan orang yang dilukai untuk melukai balik Timbal balik dalam konteks ini dilakukan dengan pertukaran atas nilai tertentu sehingga mencapai taraf proporsi. Untuk kepentingan pertukaran inilah digunakan uang. Keadilan dalam hal ini adalah titik tengah antara tindakan tidak adil dan diperlakukan tidak adil. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Keadilan dan ketidakadilan selalui dilakukan atas kesukarelaan. Kesukarelaan tersebut meliputi sikap dan perbuatan. Pada saat orang melakukan tindakan secara tidak sukarela, maka tindakan tersebut tidak dapat dikategorikan sebagai tidak adil ataupun adil, kecuali dalam beberapa cara khusus. Melakukan tindakan yang dapat dikategorikan adil harus ada ruang untuk memilih sebagai tempat pertimbangan. Sehingga dalam hubungan antara manusia ada beberapa aspek untuk menilai tindakan tersebut yaitu, niat, tindakan, alat, dan hasil akhirnya. Ketika (1) kecideraan berlawanan deengan harapan rasional, adalah sebuah kesalahansasaran (misadventure), (2) ketika hal itu tidak bertentangan dengan harapan rasional, tetapi tidak menyebabkan tindak kejahatan, itu adalah sebuah kesalahan. (3) Ketika tindakan dengan pengetahuan tetapi tanpa pertimbangan, adalah tindakan ketidakadilan, dan (4) seseorang yang bertindak atas dasar pilihan, dia adalah orang yang tidak adil dan orang yang jahat.&lt;br /&gt;Melakukan tindakan yang tidak adil adalah tidak sama dengan melakukan sesuatu dengan cara yang tidak adil. Tidak mungkin diperlakukan secara tidak adil apabila orang lain tidak melakukan sesuatu secara tidak adil. Mungkin seseorang rela menderita karena ketidakadilan, tetapi tidak ada seorangpun yang berharap diperlakukan secara tidak adil.&lt;br /&gt;Dengan demikian memiliki makna yang cukup luas, sebagian merupakan keadilan yang telah ditentukan oleh alam, sebagian merupakan hasil ketetapan manusia (keadilan hukum). Keadilan alam berlaku universal, sedangkan keadilan yang ditetapkan manusia tisak sama di setiap tempat. Keadilan yang ditetapkan oleh manusia inilah yang disebut dengan nilai.&lt;br /&gt;Akibat adanya ketidak samaan ini maka ada perbedaan kelas antara keadilan universal dan keadilan hukum yang memungkinkan pembenaran keadilan hukum. Bisa jadi semua hukum adalah universal, tetapi dalam waktu tertentu tidak mungkin untuk membuat suatu pernyataan universal yang harus benar.  Adalah sangat penting untuk berbicara secara universal, tetapi tidak mungkin melakukan sesuatu selalu benar karena hukum dalam kasus-kasus tertentu tidak terhindarkan dari kekeliruan. Saat suatu hukum memuat hal yang universal, namun kemudian suatu kasus muncul dan tidak tercantum dalam hukum tersebut. Karena itulah persamaan dan keadilan alam memperbaiki kesalahan tersebut. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;JOHN RAWLS&lt;br /&gt;Lain halnya dengan Aristoteles, John Rawls yang hidup pada awal abad 21 lebih menekankan pada keadilan sosial.  Hal ini terkait dengan munculnya pertentangan antara kepentingan individu dan kepentingan negara pada saat itu. Rawls melihat kepentingan utama keadilan adalah (1) jaminan stabilitas hidup manusia, dan (2) keseimbangan antara kehidupan pribadi dan kehidupan bersama.&lt;br /&gt;Rawls mempercayai bahwa struktur masyarakat ideal yang adil adalah struktur dasar masyarakat yang asli dimana hak-hak dasar, kebebasan, kekuasaan, kewibawaan, kesempatan, pendapatan, dan kesejahteraan terpenuhi. Kategori struktur masyarakat ideal ini digunakan untuk:&lt;br /&gt;1. menilai apakah institusi-institusi sosial yang ada telah adil atau tidak&lt;br /&gt;2. melakukan koreksi atas ketidakadilan sosial.&lt;br /&gt;Rawls berpendapat bahwa yang menyebabkan ketidakadilan adalah situsi sosial sehingga perlu diperiksa kembali mana prinsip-prinsip keadilan yang dapat digunakan untuk membentuk situasi masyarakat yang baik. Koreksi atas ketidakadilan dilakukan dengan cara mengembalikan (call for redress) masyarakat pada posisi asli (people on original position). Dalam posisi dasar inilah kemudian dibuat persetujuan asli antar (original agreement) anggota masyarakat secara sederajat.&lt;br /&gt;Ada tiga syarat suapaya manusia dapat sampai pada posisi asli, yaitu:&lt;br /&gt;1. Diandaikan bahwa tidak diketahui, manakah posisi yang akan diraih seorang pribadi tertentu di kemudian hari. Tidak diketahui manakah bakatnya, intelegensinya, kesehatannya, kekayaannya, dan aspek sosial yang lain.&lt;br /&gt;2. Diandaikan bahwa prinsip-prinsip keadilan dipilih secara konsisten untuk memegang pilihannya tersebut.&lt;br /&gt;3. Diandaikan bahwa tiap-tiap orang suka mengejar kepentingan individu dan baru kemudian kepentingan umum. Ini adalah kecenderungan alami manusia yang harus diperhatikan dalam menemukan prinsip-prinsip keadilan. &lt;br /&gt;Dalam menciptakan keadilan, prinsip utama yang digunakan adalah:&lt;br /&gt;1. Kebebasan yang sama sebesar-besarnya, asalkan tetap menguntungkan semua pihak;&lt;br /&gt;2. Prinsip ketidaksamaan yang digunakan untuk keuntungan bagi yang paling lemah.&lt;br /&gt;Prinsip ini merupakan gabungan dari prinsip perbedaan dan persamaan yang adil atas kesempatan.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Secara keseluruhan berarti ada tiga prinsip untuk mencari keadilan, yaitu:&lt;br /&gt;1. Kebebasan yang sebesar-besarnya sebagai prioriotas.&lt;br /&gt;2. perbedaan&lt;br /&gt;3. persamaan yang adil atas kesempatan.&lt;br /&gt;Asumsi pertama yang digunakan adalah hasrat alami manusia untuk mencapai kepentingannya terlebih dahulu baru kemudian kepentingan umum. Hasrat ini adalah untuk mencapai kebahagiaan yang juga merupakan ukuran pencapaian keadilan. Maka harus ada kebebasan untuk memenuhi kepentingan ini. Namun realitas masyarakat menunjukan bahwa kebebasan tidak dapat sepenuhnya terwujud karena adanya perbedaan kondisi dalam masyarakat. Perbedaan ini menjadi dasar untuk memberikan keuntungan bagi mereka yang lemah. Apabila sudah ada persamaan derajat, maka semua harus memperoleh kesempatan yang sama untuk memenuhi kepentingannya. Walaupun nantinya memunculkan perbedaan, bukan suatu masalah asalkan dicapai berdasarkan kesepakatan dan titik berangkat yang sama.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;PENUTUP&lt;br /&gt;Uraian dalam tulisan ini adalah secuil khasanah pemikiran keadilan yang berkembang sepanjang sejarah peradaban manusia, sesuai dengan semangat jamannya, situasi politik, dan pandangan hidup yang berkembang. Untuk mempelajari keadilan memang sebuah aktivitas yang tidak ringan, apalagi mencoba merumuskannya sesuai dengan semangat jaman saat ini.&lt;br /&gt;Namun kesulitan tersebut bukan berarti bahwa studi-studi tentang keadilan harus dikesampingkan. Untuk kalangan hukum, studi keadilan merupakan hal yang utama, sebab keadilan adalah salah satu tujuan hukum, bahkan ada yang menyatakan sebagai tujuan utamanya.&lt;br /&gt;Mempelajari hukum tanpa mempelajari keadilan sama dengan mempelajari tubuh tanpa nyawa. Hal ini berarti menerima perkembangan hukum sebagai fenomena fisik tanpa melihat desain rohnya. Akibatnya bisa dilihat bahwa studi hukum kemudian tidak berbeda dengan studi ilmu pasti rancang bangun yang kering dengan sentuhan keadilan.&lt;br /&gt;Praktek hukum terseret pada tantangan-tantangan spesialistik, teknologis, bukan lagi pertanyaan-pertanyaan moral. Kaum profesional adalah orang-orang yang ahli dalam perkara perundang-undangan, tetapi jangan tanyakan pada mereka tentang moralitas. Praktek ini membuat sindiran sinis terhadap hukum di Amerika di mana semboyan Equal Justice Under The Law di dinding Supreme Court (AS) ditambah dengan kata-kata To All Who Can Afford It.  Bagaimana dengan di Indonesia? &lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;DAFTAR PUSTAKA&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Beilharz, Peter. Ed. Teori-Teori Sosial. (Social Theory: A Guide to Central Thinkers). Diterjemahkan oleh: Sigit Jatmiko. Cetakan I. Yogyakarta. Pustaka Pelajar. 2002.&lt;br /&gt;Chand, Hari. Modern Jurisprudence. Kuala Lumpur. International Law Book Services. 1994.&lt;br /&gt;Darmodiharjo, Darji dan Shidarta. Pokok-Pokok Filsafat Hukum. Jakarta. PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama. 1995.&lt;br /&gt;Friedmann, W. Teori Dan Filsafat Hukum. (Legal Theory). Diterjemahkan oleh: Mohamad Arifin. Susunan I. Cetakan II. Jakarta. PT RajaGrafindo Persada. 1993.&lt;br /&gt;-----------------. Teori Dan Filsafat Hukum. (Legal Theory). Diterjemahkan oleh: Mohamad Arifin. Susunan II. Cetakan II. Jakarta. PT RajaGrafindo Persada. 1993.&lt;br /&gt;Hart, H.L.A. .The Concept Of Law. Tenth Impression. London. Oxford University Press. 1961.&lt;br /&gt;Kelsen, Hans. Introduction To The Problems Of Legal Theory. (Reine Rechtslehre). First Edition. Translated by: Bonnie Litschewski Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson. Oxford. Clarendon Press Oxford. 1996. &lt;br /&gt;Noer, Deliar. Pemikiran Politik Di Negeri Barat. Edisi Revisi. Cetakan II. Jakarta. Pustaka Mizan. 1997.&lt;br /&gt;Popper, Karl R. Masyarakat Terbuka dan Musuh-Musuhnya. (Open Society and Its Enemies). Diterjemahkan oleh:Uzair Fauzan. Cetakan I. Yogyakarta. Pustaka Pelajar. 2002.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Media Massa:&lt;br /&gt;Rahardjo, Satjipto. “52 Tahun Negara hokum Indonesia, Negara Hukum dan Deregulasi Moral”. Harian Kompas. 13 Agustus 1997.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Internet:&lt;br /&gt;“ ‘Adala “.”. http://orb.rhodes.edu/ Medieval_Terms.html.  diakses tanggal 6 November 2002.&lt;br /&gt;Aristoteles. “Nicomachean Ethics”. Transalated by: W. D.  Ross. http://bocc.ubi.pt/ pag/Aristoteles-nicomachaen.html. Diakses pada tanggal 20 Oktober 2000.&lt;br /&gt;Gergen, Mark P. “What Renders Enrichment Unjust?”. http://www.utexas.edu /law/conferences/ restitution/gergen.pdf. Diakses pada tanggal 6 Nopember 2002.&lt;br /&gt;Hutagalung, Daniel. “Paradoks Demokrasi”. http://www.detakanalisis.com/kolom/ 2002/ 04/090402-kolom-1535.htm. Diakses pada tanggal 6 Nopember 2002.&lt;br /&gt;Kilcullen, R. J. “Tape 11: Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Draft)”. http://www.humanities.mq.edu.au/ Ockham/y6411.html. Diakses pada tanggal 6 Nopember 2002.&lt;br /&gt;Neurath, R. Rawls’s “A Theory of Justice”. http://www.sydgram.nsw.edu.au/ College_Street/ extension/philosophy/rawls.htm. Diakses pada tanggal 6 Nopember 2002.&lt;br /&gt;Nozick, Robert. “Two Conception of Justice”. http://www.catholicwelfare.com.au/ publications/COMMON_Wealth/2of6.HTM. Diakses pada tanggal 6 Nopember 2002.&lt;br /&gt;Nurjaeni, “Kosep Keadilan Dalam Al-Qur’an”, http://www.duriyat.or.id/artikel/ keadilan.htm, diakses pada tanggal 6 November 2002&lt;br /&gt;Plato. The Republic. “Translated by: Benjamin Jowett”. http://www.universi dadabierta.edu.mx/SerEst/Filosofia/FilosofiaI/GuiaFilosofia1.htm. Diakses pada tanggal 20 Oktober 2000.&lt;br /&gt;The Philosophy Club. “Rawls’s Theory of Justice”. http://www.sydgram.nsw.edu.au/ College_Street/extension/philosophy/rawls.htm. Diakses pada tanggal 6 Nopember 2002.&lt;br /&gt;Vaggalis, Ted and Drury College. “John Rawls’s Political Liberalism”.http://caae. phil.cmu.edu/Cavalier/Forum/meta/background/Rawls_pl.htm. Diakses pada tanggal 6 Nopember 2002.&lt;br /&gt;Wahid, Abdurrahman, Konsep-Konsep Keadilan, http://www.isnet.org/~djoko/Islam/ Paramadina/00index, diakses pada tanggal 6 November 2002.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/6041305650038531172-8391133592879406798?l=anomalisemesta.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/feeds/8391133592879406798/comments/default' title='Poskan Komentar'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=6041305650038531172&amp;postID=8391133592879406798' title='0 Komentar'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/8391133592879406798'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/8391133592879406798'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/2008/04/pemikiran-keadilan.html' title='PEMIKIRAN KEADILAN'/><author><name>muchamad ali safa'at</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07348715720341930804</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6041305650038531172.post-8727658233407096673</id><published>2008-04-10T07:21:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2008-04-10T07:23:51.711-07:00</updated><title type='text'>GERAKAN STUDI HUKUM KRITIS</title><content type='html'>Critical Legal Studies merupakan sebuah gerakan yang muncul pada tahun tujuh puluhan di Amerika Serikat. Gerakan ini merupakan kelanjutan dari aliran hukum realisme Amerika yang menginginkan suatu pendekatan yang berbeda dalam memahami hukum, tidak hanya seperti pemahaman selama ini yang bersifat Socratis.  Beberapa nama yang menjadi penggerak GSHK adalah Roberto Unger, Duncan Kennedy, Karl Klare, Peter Gabel, Mark Tushnet, Kelman, David trubeck, Horowitz, dan yang lainnya. Critical Legal Studies oleh Ifdhal Kasim diterjemahkan dengan istilah bahasa Indonesia Gerakan Studi Hukum Kritis (GSHK) . Istilah yang akan digunakan dalam tulisan ini selanjutnya adalah Gerakan Studi Hukum Kritis disingkat GSHK.&lt;span class="fullpost"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Perbedaan utama antara GSHK dengan pemikiran hukum lain yang tradisional adalah bahwa GSHK menolak pemisahan antara rasionalitas hukum dan perdebatan politik. Tidak ada pembedaan model logika hukum; hukum adalah politik denga baju yang berbeda. Hukum hanya ada dalam suatu ideologi.  GSHK menempatkan fungsi pengadilan dalam memahami hukum sebagai perhatian utama . &lt;br /&gt;Walaupun menolak dikatakan sebagai tipe pemikiran Marxis yang membedakan antara suprastruktur dan infrastruktur  serta hukum sebagai alat dominasi kaum kapitalis, GSHK mendeklarasikan peran untuk membongkar struktur sosial yang hierarkhis. Struktur sosial merupakan wujud ketidakadilan, dominasi, dan penindasan. Tugas kalangan hukum adalah membawa perubahan cara berpikir hukum dan perubahan masyarakat. Pemikiran ini terinspirasi pemikiran filsafat kritis dari Jurgen Habermas , Emil Durkheim , Karl Mannheim, Herbert Marcuse , Antonio Gramsci , dan lain-lain. Jurgen Habermas, Karl Mannheim, Herbert Marcuse, dan Antonio Gramsci adalah tokoh-tokoh utama mahzab kritis. Filasafat kritis adalah salah satu aliran filasat yang berkembang dengan menggunakan pendekatan kritis terhadap realitas sosial. Aliran ini diilhami oleh pemikiran Hegel dan Karl Marx. Aliran ini berkembang mulai dari Mahzab Frankfurt sampai dengan Post Modernisme. &lt;br /&gt;Pendukung GSHK memahami dan menggunakan pemikiran hukum dan teori-teori sosial secara lebih intensif dibanding kaum realis. Mereka telah banyak menghancurkan segala hal yang berlaku dalam hukum . Namun banyak juga yang mengkritik bahwa hanya sedikit dari pemikir GSHK yang menawarkan model yang konstruktif.&lt;br /&gt; Tulisan ini bertujuan untuk mengenal secara singkat pemikiran-pemikiran dalam GSHK dari berbagai ahli hukum, kelebihan dan kekurangannya, serta konteksnya dengan perkembangan hukum di Indonesia. Sebagai pijakan awal pada bagian pertama, akan diuraikan pemikiran GSHK yang dijelaskan dalam buku Modern Jurisprudence tulisan Hari Chand, disertai dengan beberapa kritikan yang ada dalam buku tersebut.  Dikatakan sebagai pijakan awal, karena pada bagian ini juga akan diberikan beberapa penambahan baik secara langsung  maupun dalam catatan kaki hal-hal yang terkait dengan pembahasan GSHK dari sumber lain.&lt;br /&gt; Pada bagian kedua akan diuraikan beberapa pemikiran lain dari GSHK yang tidak dibahas dalam buku Modern Jurisprudence. Bagian ketiga, setelah mengetahui pemikiran GSHK, merupakan analisis terhadap keseluruhan Pemikiran GSHK dengan tujuan untuk menemukan kekuatan dan kelemahan dari GSHK, baik pada tataran teoritis maupun dalam pelaksanaannya. &lt;br /&gt;Bagian tersebut akan dirangkaikan dengan penerapan pemikiran GSHK untuk menganalisis hukum di Indonesia . Bagian akhir adalah penutup dari seluruh tulisan ini yang lebih merupakan catatan akhir bagaimana menyikapi GSHK dari pada sebuah kesimpulan sebagaimana lazimnya sebuah tulisan.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;A. Gerakan Studi Hukum Kritis Dalam Buku Modern Jurisprudence&lt;br /&gt; Seperti praktek pemikiran hukum sebelumnya, American Legal Realist, GSHK melanjutkan tradisi pengkajian empiris terhadap hukum. Tetapi pendekatan yang digunakan adalah paradigma-paradigma ilmu sosial "kiri"  seperti aliran Marxisme, teori kritis mazhab Frankfurt, neo-Marxis, Strukturalisme, dan lain-lain . Hal ini tidak berarti GSHK merupakan pewaris pandangan-pandangan tersebut, namun memanfaatkannya secara ekletis . Secara radikal GSHK menggugat teori, doktrin atau asas-asas seperti netralitas hukum (neutrality of law), otonomi hukum (autonomy of law), dan pemisahan hukum dengan politik (law politics distinction) .&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Gerakan Studi Hukum Kritis dan Pemikiran Hukum Amerika&lt;br /&gt;Sampai tahun 1850, pendapat umum menyatakan bahwa hakim memutus perkara dengan menggunakan pertimbangan kebijakan (instrumental view). Mulai pada tahun 1890, pandangan yang dianut kemudian adalah bahwa hakim memutuskan perkara dengan penerapan suatu peraturan tersendiri yang tepat . Setelah tahun 1937, paham hukum realis berpendapat bahwa pencarian obyektivitas, dan sistem pemikiran hukum yang tidak memihak adalah ilusi semata. Gerakan kaum realis menciptakan ketidakpercayaan terhadap peradilan dan menambah kekuasaan pakar dan aparat negara.  Menurut kaum realis, hukum dan moralitas itu terpisah. Sementara paham kontemporer menyatakan bahwa antara hukum dan moralitas memiliki hubungan yang erat. Hukum adalah suatu ilmu moral dan hakim memutus sebagai seorang aparat moral. Ronald Dworkin dan Posner menemukan moralitas yang berada dalam hukum kebiasaan. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Kritik terhadap Liberalisme&lt;br /&gt;Unger mengkritik liberalisme yang menurutnya menghasilkan perubahan moral individu dan politik masyarakat modern yang berbahaya. Lisberalisme membengkokan moral, intelektual, dan sisi spiritual seseorang. Maka dia melontarkan suatu kritik yang menyeluruh. Dia menemukan "struktur mendalam" dari liberalisme yang terdiri dari enam prinsip; (1) rasionalitas dan hawa nafsu, (2) keinginan yang sewenang-wenang, (3) Analisis, (4) Aturan-aturan dan nilai-nilai, (5) nilai subyektif, dan (6) individualisme.  Dia menunjukan antinomi yang ada antara rasionalitas dan hawa nafsu, antara aturan dan nilai. Untuk menyelesaikan antinomi tersebut, ada dua jalan, yaitu; pertama, suatu penyelesaian politis untuk mewujudkan transformasi kondisi kehidupan sosial di mana dominasi harus dihilangkan karena menimbulkan nilai yang kebetulan dan berubah-ubah. Kedua, suatu revolusi teroritis dibutuhkan untuk menciptakan suatu sistem berpikir yang berdasar pada kebaikan umat manusia. Alan Hunt menyatakan bahwa kritik liberalisme ini tidak sesuai dengan ilmu hukum modern kontemporer yang paling banyak berpengaruh.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Dominasi dan Hierarkhi&lt;br /&gt;GSHK menyatakan bahwa masyarakat liberal dipenuhi dengan dominasi dan hierarkhi. Kelas atas membentuk struktur yang berlaku bagi lainnya untuk memperlancar kehidupannya.  Negara hukum yang ideal adalah yang dapat menandai kontradiksi dan hierarkhi dalam masyarakat liberal. Jika dikatakan bahwa hukum tidak bertugas untuk menemukan kebenaran, tetapi menemukan kompleksitas yang telah ada, maka teori hukum tidak akan bermakna tanpa teori sosial. Kebenaran pernyataan tentang kehidupan sosial sesungguhnya telah dikondisikan oleh seluruh sistem sosial yang berlaku . Kebenaran bersifat relatif menurut masyarakat tertentu atau kelompok sejarah tertentu .&lt;br /&gt;Seseorang secara keseluruhan struktur sosial adalah produk sejarah, bukan alam. Sejarah dipenuhi dengan pertentangan-pertentangan, dan aturan sosial merupakan garis pemisah yang menggambarkan posisi masing-masing. Kekuatan menjadi hak, kepatuhan menjadi tugas, dan untuk sementara pembagian hierarkhi sosial menjadi kabur .&lt;br /&gt;GSHK mencoba untuk mempengaruhi realitas sosial. Struktur yang ada merupakan penggunaan kepercayaan dan asumsi yang menciptakan suatu masyarakat dalam realitas hubungan antar manusia. Struktur kepercayaan atau ideologi tersebut memiliki potensi terselubung dalam tendensinya untuk mempertahankan dinamikanya sendiri untuk menciptakan doktrin hukum yang menyalahkan kondisi dan alam . Bagi GSHK, kesadaran hukum adalah alat yang berhubungan dengan pikiran untuk melakukan penindasan. Hal ini merupakan cara untuk menyembunyikan atau menghindari kebenaran fundamental bahwa segala sesuatu itu dalam proses perubahan dan kehadiran. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Penekanan pada pengaruh eksternal&lt;br /&gt;Para ahli hukum banyak dipengaruhi oleh faktor-faktor eksternal seperti sosial, ekonomi, politik dan psikologi, tetapi kaum GSHK lebih menekankan pada konteks sosial dan politik. Interpretasi banyak dipengaruhi oleh kondisi historis, maka prinsip-prinsip dan rasionalitas hukum tidak kebal dari pengaruh-pengaruh sosial dan politik. Mereka menegaskan bahwa pemikiran hukum mempengaruhi perubahan hukum dan melegitimasi tatanan sosial yang telah ada dengan cara yang berlaku tanpa terasa .&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Kritik terhadap Teori Hukum&lt;br /&gt;Alirah Hukum kritis merupakan kritik dari teori hukum yang menuntut bahwa pendekatan doktrinal itu cacat, dengan prinsip-prinsip abstrak seperti kemerdekaan, kebebasan berkontrak dan hak milik dapat menimbulkan kontradiksi dalam berbagai hal . Mereka menggunakan teknik-teknik sosiologis, antropologis, dan ideologis dalam tatanan hukum. Mereka mencoba melukiskan penekanan antara ide normatif dan struktur sosial. GSHK menunjukan bagaimana hukum memberikan konstribusi terhadap stabilitas dan mengabadikan tatanan sosial yang ada. Duncan Kenedy dalam The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries merupakan salah satu contoh bagus dari metode ini yang menggambarkan analisis mendalam tentang bagaimana komentar-komentar tersebut melegitimasikan praktek-praktek sosial yang telah ada di Inggris waktu itu. Dengan jalan ini Kennedy dapat menunjukan bahwa keseluruhan pemikiran hukum modern memberikan sumbangan terhadap stabilitas suatu tatanan sosial.&lt;br /&gt;Sedangkan Unger melihat mainstream aliran hukum dan ekonomi sebagai salah satu aliran utama yang melayani hak politik, aliran hak dan prinsip yang melayani sentralisme . Instrumen utama aliran hukum dan ekonomi adalah penggunaan yang samar-samar atas konsepsi pasar. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Penghilangan dan Pengafkiran Ortodoksi&lt;br /&gt;GSHK berpendapat bahwa pen-delegitamasi-an diperlukan untuk mengangkat kemungkinan-kemungkinan yang mengekspresikan realitas. Sesuatu harus membebaskan diri terlebih dahulu dari ilusi-ilusi mistik  yang mewujud dalam kesadaran dengan jalan dunia hukum liberal dan aktivitas kritis yang dapat membebaskan masa depan. Tetapi hal ini sangat tergantung pada seseorang untuk mengadopsi filsafat ini atau tidak. Sebagai sebuah teori untuk tindakan politik, GSHK sendiri penting, seseorang harus memiliki pandangan terhadap tanggungjawabnya sendiri.&lt;br /&gt;Unger menawarkan sebuah "struktur dari non struktur", suatu komitmen terhadap penataan sosial yang akan selalu menjadi perdebatan dan percobaan dalam berbagai macam kehidupan sosial.  Dia mencoba melakukan suatu “perputaran kapital” dana untuk membiayai program individual dan untuk memberikan akibat pada desentralisasi produksi dan perdagangan . Dia menyarankan penciptaan empat macam hak:&lt;br /&gt;1. Hak kekebalan yang memberikan kekuasaan untuk melawan intervensi dan dominasi oleh individu atau organisasi lain, termasuk negara.&lt;br /&gt;2. Hak de-stabilisasi yang menuntut untuk meruntuhkan praktek institusi dan bentuk-bentuk sosial yang telah ada.&lt;br /&gt;3. Hak pasar yang memberikan suatu pendakuan (claim) kondisional terhadap bagian modal sosial yang dapat dibagi.&lt;br /&gt;4. Hak solidaritas yang memupuk jalinan saling menguntungkan, loyalitas dan pertanggungjawaban.&lt;br /&gt;Hari Chand mengkritik struktur dari non struktur Unger ini membatasi pertentangan sosial yang dituntut untuk difasilitasi. Hal ini tidak legitimate dan dapat diobyektifkan seperti tatanan sosial yang lain .&lt;br /&gt;Penganut GSHK menempatkan negara sebagai pelaksana aksi transformasi yang paling efektif. Kebebasan yang sebenarnya membutuhkan kehidupan sosial yang memiliki instrumen untuk revisinya sendiri. Kebebasan sesungguhnya ada pada aktivitas penemuan batas perbedaan antara kemampuan transendensi dan pembatasan struktur  dimana disitulah hidup dan perjuangan dari setiap perbedaan maksud pencapaian dan pengaburan tujuan.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Transformasi Sosial&lt;br /&gt;Aliran kritis tidak percaya terhadap rekayasa sosial dan reformasi liberal, mereka menginginkan untuk memajukan sosial melalui transformasi sosial. Mereka harus mencari suatu potensi hukum dan sosial yang transformatif. Pencarian tersebut terutama dengan tiga metodologi yaitu pengungkapan makna implisit text, teori sosial, dan kritik murni. Penafsiran aturan hukum dilakukan untuk membuka idedologi, struktur dan materi, dan kemudian mencoba memperlihatkan kebenaran-kebenaran yang bermukim dalam system hukum. Dalam lapangan hukum, digambarkan bahwa doktrin hukum saat ini adalah tidak efektif, tidak merepresentasikan perasaan dan pikiran umum rakyat .&lt;br /&gt;GSHK mempercayai bahwa sebuah teori harus merupakan hasil dari eksperimentasi dan penyelidikan sosial sehingga dapat bersifat praktis untuk mengembangkan teori. Hal ini paralel dengan pemikiran Karl Mark tentang makna obyektif praksis yang dimulai dari kritiknya terhadap filsafat hingga doktrin materialisme historis . Sebagai contoh, mekanisme penyelesaian perselisihan diupayakan dengan persatuan dan partisipasi. Mereka melihat dampak hukum terhadap nilai-nilai, persepsi sendiri dan ide-ide. Aliran kritis memberontak terhadap tradisi masyarakat akademik sebagaimana mereka menolak ide-idee, cita-cita atau suposisi dari pendidikan tradisional.  Aliran hukum kritis ingin mencapai mimpi transformasi sosial yang ambisius di bawah universitas.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Tema-tema pokok gerakan GSHK&lt;br /&gt;Ketidakpastian&lt;br /&gt;Positivisme menuntut bahwa memutuskan suatu kasus menunjuk pada ketetapan dan kepastian. Namun GSHK menganggap bahwa klaim atas suatu kepastian adalah palsu. Baik aturan hukum maupun ajaran prinsip-prinsip hukum dan pepatah tidak bisa digunakan untuk menentukan hasil akhir dari suatu kasus. Rasionalitas hukum adalah semacam manipulasi. Hal ini karena prinsip-prinsip, doktrin atau pepatah yang sama dapat digunakan untuk lapangan kasus yang berbeda dengan hasil yang berlawanan atau berbeda. Berbagai aturan hukum dan berbagai kata atau frase  yang digunakan dalam aturan sangat rentan terhadap berbagai penafsiran tergantung pada hakim menerima interpretasi yang mana. Singkatnya, tidak tergantung pada substansi hukum, apalagi alasan rasio hukum. Yang ditolak adalah bahwa seluruh hukum memiliki aturan yang tetap.&lt;br /&gt;Namun menurut Hari Chand, positivis memang salah dengan menuntut hukum memutuskan kasus sebagaimana GSHK juga salah karena melihat hukum sebagai ketidakpastian. Kenyataan kepastian hukum juga ada tetapi tidak benar jika hal itu ada pada masing-masing dan setiap hukum dan aturan atau sistem hukum. Pada suatu kasus yang berat, mungkin tidak aturan hukum yang dapat dijadikan pedoman oleh hakim dan fakta ketidakmenentuan banyak terdapat pada kasus-kasus yang berat. Namun tesis ketidakmenentuan tidak dapat dibenarkan dalam banyak kasus lainnya.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Pertentangan&lt;br /&gt;Bahwa doktrin hukum mengandung kontradiksi adalah pandangan pokok lain dari aliran hukum  kritis. Unger memberikan contoh hukum kontrak yang didasarkan atas prinsip kebebasan untuk memilih dari patner dan ketentuan dan kondisi yang diinginkan para pihak dan counterprinsip tidak boleh meruntuhkan aspek sosial kehidupan bersama dan tidak dilakukannya transaksi  dan bargaining yang tidak fair. Namun selalu ada suatu permainan prinsip dominasi dalam hukum kontrak. Pada kenyataanya terdapat unsur dominasi dalam kesatuan .&lt;br /&gt;Prof. Finnis mengatakan bahwa Unger gagal untuk melihat bahwa seseorang dapat mempertahankan seperangkat aturan dan doktrin dengan mewujudkan prinsip pertentangan tanpa mendaku hal ini. Hal ini dikatakan oleh Chand bahwa pandangan unger tentang tesis kontradiksinya tidak menunjukan bahwa sistem hukum menuju keruntuhan, namun hanya mengindikasikan bahwa doktrin yang tidak sempurna tersebut harus diperbaiki agar sesuai dengan situasi yang baru.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Legitimasi dan Kesadaran yang salah&lt;br /&gt;Profesor Horwitz mengajukan sebuah tesis dalam bukunya The Transformation of American Law, bahwa doktrin-doktrin hukum dibangun dengan bantuan pertumbuhan industri dan maka melayani kepentingan ekonomis dari bagian masyarakat yang kaya. Tidak semua aliran hukum kritis menerima pandangan yang terdengar seperti sebuah Marxisme ortodok ini. &lt;br /&gt;Tesis lain yang dianut sebagian besar pendukung GSHK adalah bahwa hukum melayani yang berkuasa melalui legitimasi. Sebagai contoh, penekanan pada hak dan aturan hukum membuat rakyat percaya bahwa sistem hukum adalah semata-mata adil dan masuk akal, sehingga seolah-olah tidak ada alternatif lain bagi rakyat. Beberapa orang tokoh GSHK menerapkan ide Antonio Gramci tentang ideologi dalam atmosfir hukum. Dalam buku Prison Note , Gramci menyatakan bahwa kelas penguasa memupuk kekuasaannya bukan dengan kekuatan secara khusus tetapi juga dengan berbagai macam moral dan kepercayaan sosial yang memaksa rakyat menerima sistem tersebut sebagai menguntungkan, dapat mencapai keadilan dan bagus. Sama halnya sistem hukum mempropagandakan seperangkat ide tentang kesejahteraan, perjanjian, hak individual dan aturan hukum yang mempengaruhi pikiran rakyat bahwa ssstem tersebut pada dasarnya adil. Sebagai contoh, Klare mendeskripsikan Hukum Perburuhan Amerika sebagai perwujudan suatu moral dan visi politik yang berisi seperangkat kepercayaan, nilai, dan asumsi politik yang menyatu dalam kekuasaan (yaitu pandangan dunia) dan yang melayani sebagai suatu pelegitimasian ideologi.&lt;br /&gt;Menurut Chand, Klaim GSHK bahwa hukum maju selangkah dan melegitimasi  aturan yang tidak adil dan sistem hukum yang tidak adil menimbulkan pertanyaan besar. Seseorang dapat mengatakan bahwa hukum telah tidak mendapatkan monopoli untuk mencetak kesadaran manusia. Mungkin pikiran seseorang cukup luas mementingkan akibat dari penemuan manusia, termasuk hukum.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Aturan-aturan dan Standar-standar&lt;br /&gt; Duncan Kennedy mempresentasikan suatu analisis tentang aturan-aturan dan standar-standar. Ada dua bentuk aturan; bentuk formal yang umumnya penggunaannya jelas dan pasti, sangat administratif, aturan umum dan bentuk yang mendukung penggunaan standar yang sesuai. Legal Reasoning, ditujukan untuk kedua bentuk, hasilnya adalah semua argumen hukum menunjukan ketidakstabilan dan pertentangan.&lt;br /&gt;Kennedy menyatakan bahwa ada tiga dimensi dari bentuk-bentuk argumen:&lt;br /&gt;1. Realisabilitas Formal&lt;br /&gt;Kennedy meminjam bentuk Spirit of Roman Law yang dikemukakan Ihering untuk menyampaikan ide bahwa kualitas keteraturan dalam peraturan ditentukan dalam penentuannya atau persyaratan spesifik dari beberapa aspek kenyataan, misalnya, umur tertentu dari seseorang dapat digunakan menentukan kapasitasnya, menentukan jumlah kerusakan untuk tuntutan tertentu. &lt;br /&gt;Disamping Realisabilitas yang formal, kemampuan menyadari adalah sebuah standar prinsip dan kebijakan, misalnya, persaingan sehat, kepedulian, keadilan, dll. &lt;br /&gt;2. Generalisasi&lt;br /&gt;Peraturan-peraturan dibuat untuk mencakup sebanyak mungkin situasi yang ada pada kenyataannya. Beberapa peraturan lebih umum atau lebih khusus dari pada yang lainnya. Semakin luas jangkauan peraturan, semakin serius ketidaktepatan  diatas atau dibawah tingkat pencapaian. Sebagai contoh, adalah mungkin untuk menyediakan suatu perbedaan umur dari kapasitas untuk memilih, minum, mengemudi, membuat kontrak, dll. Tetapi satu aturan umum tentang kemampuan hukum pada usia 18 tahun menghilangkan semua pertentangan yang mungkin muncul dari perbedaan usia dalam kemampuan hukum. Peraturan khusus dimunculkan jika sebuah standar dilaksanakan untuk suatu situsasi khusus di lapangan.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Individualisme dan Altruisme&lt;br /&gt;Orientasi peraturan menunjukan cita-cita individualisme sementara altruisme merepresentasi dalam bentuk standar yang menunjukan kepentingan individu adalah bukan hal yang utama . Individual percaya bahwa aktivitas hukum adalah salah tempat sementara altruisme mengharapkan hakim untuk menerapkan standar komunitas bersama. Selalu ada konflik antara individualisme dan altruisme .&lt;br /&gt;Tujuan kaum individualis terdiri dari aturan kepemilikan yang menyediakan suatu kepemilikan hukum dengan kebebasan kewenangan tetapi dalam batasan yang pasti, dan peraturan kontrak dibuat sebagian oleh para pihak sebagian oleh kelompok. Teori liberal yang mewujud dalam individualisme menolak kebebasan peradilan, sebagai hakim adalah hakim yang seharusnya menerapkan hukum dan tidak membuatnya. &lt;br /&gt;Kalangan altruis berharap untuk memiliki kolektivisme  sehingga nilai yang diajukan dan dituju adalah pelayanan. Bagi altruis, nilai kewenangan tidak hanya tidak menyenangkan, tetapi juga tidak adil.Altruisme tidak mengijinkan hakim untuk menerapkan peraturan tanpa melihat hasil yang dicapai. Kerja altruis untuk mempertahankan nilai moral seseorang yang sesuai dengan kawannya.&lt;br /&gt;Keberadaan pertentangan menyebabkan ketidakmungkinan untuk menyeimbangkan nilai-nilai individualis dan altruis. Kennedy melukiskan gambaran bahw Lawyer dibutuhkan karena nilai-nilai; wibawa hakim adalah karena professional dan teknis, kharisma dan spirit, karenanya penggugat yang ahli dalam pembentukan bahasa dapat mendominasi dan menindas yang lain, atau mungkin secara sederhana mensejahterakan karenya;  individualisme adalah struktur dari status quo.” &lt;br /&gt;Tentu saja, seseorang tidak bisa menentukan keputusan akhir dari suatu kasus berdasarkan argumen individualis atau altruis sebagaimana keduanya dapat diderivasikan dari materi hukum yang sama.&lt;br /&gt;Dalam kenyataan hidup seorang individu tidak pernah sendirian. Kita tidak bisa menjadi orang yang bebas tanpa keluarga, negara, masyarakat atau komunitas. Individu dileburkan dalam kolektivitas. Pada saat yang sama peleburan dengan yang lain mungkin dipaksakan pada keberadaan kita.&lt;br /&gt;Selanjutnya dia mengambil pandangan bahwa norma-norma kolektif sangat berat dalam berbagai macam status quo yang dalam gerakan yang benar-benar sukarela adalah sesuatu yang tidak bisa dipahami dan jalan keluarnya adalah mengasumsikan pertanggungjawaban untuk dominasi totalitarian terhadap pikiran orang lain, maka paksa mereka untuk menjadi bebas.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Kritik Roberto Unger terhadap Formalisme dan Obyektivisme &lt;br /&gt;Bagi Unger, formalisme berarti sebuah komitmen untuk, dan kepercayaan terhadap kemungkinan dari sebuah metode pembenaran hukum. Termasuk di dalamnya tujuan yang impersonal, kebijakan dan prinsip-prinsip yang merupakan komponen yang dibutuhkan dalam rasionalisasi hukum.&lt;br /&gt;Sedangkan obyektivisme, Unger mengartikan sebagai kepercayaan bahwa materi hukum yang memiliki otoritas yang merupakan sistem pengundangan, kasus-kasus, dan ide-ide hukum yang diterima, mewujud dan hidup dalam sebuah skema pengelompokan manusia yang dapat dipertahankan. Hal tersebut menggambarkan tatanan moral, walaupun tidak sempurna.&lt;br /&gt;Menurut Unger, formalisme dan obyektivisme gagal, sebagimana halnya keduanya gagal untuk dipidahkan satu dan lainnya. Dia mengkritik obyektivisme sebagai hukum yang memiliki pertentangan dan persaingan dedngan prinsip-prinsip. Sebagai contoh, hukum kontrak memiliki prinsip kebebasan bagi para pihak dan counterprinsip yang tidak mengijinkan akibat terhadap kepentingan umum dari seluruh komunitas. Unger juga mengkritik fomalisme sebagai adanya kebutuhan teori bagi yang mempercayai formalisme. Tanpa beberapa teori, rasionalisasi hukum adalah sebuah permainan analogi yang mudah.&lt;br /&gt; Dalam buku The Critical Legal Studies Movement, Unger memulai kritiknya terhadap obyektivisme berdasarkan pada usaha akbar para ahli hukum untuk mencari suatu struktur hukum yang di dalamnya built-in demokrasi dan pasar. Bangsa telah memilih suatu jenis masyarakat tertentu yaitu komitment terhadap republik demokratis dan suatu sistem pasar sebagai bagian yang harus ada dalam republik.&lt;br /&gt;Namun kegagalan yang tidak berkesudahan dalam menemukan bahasa hukum yang universal mengenai demokrasi dan pasar mengungkapkan bahwa bahasa semacam itu tidak pernah ada. Teori kontrak dan kepemilikan menyediakan ruang bagi usaha kaum obyektivis untuk mengungkapkan isi hukum yang sudah built-in dengan pasar, sama halnya dengan teori perlindungan kepentingan-kepentingan konstitusional serta tujuan-tujuan sah tindakan negara yang dirancang untuk mengungkapkan esensi hukum suatu republik demokratis.&lt;br /&gt;Sedangkan kritik Unger terhadap formalisme bertitik tolak dari argumen bahwa pemikiran setiap cabang doktrin harus bersandar secara diam-diam, kalau tidak secara eksplisit, pada suatu pemerian bentuk-bentuk interaksi manusia yang benar dan realistis di bidang kehidupan masyarakat tempat doktrin itu berlaku. Misalnya, seorang ahli hukum konstitusi membutuhkan suatu teori republik demokratis yang menggambarkan hubungan yang tepat antara negara dan masyarakat atau ciri-ciri esensial organisasi sosial dan pemberian hak pribadi yang harus dilindungi pemerintah.&lt;br /&gt;Tanpa visi pembimbing ini, pemikiran hukum tampak terkungkung dalam permainan analogi murahan. Pertentangan kepentingan dan visi yang banyak ragamnya yang menyangkut pembentukan undang-undang harus merupakan wahana suatu rasionalitas yang dapat diartikulasikan dalam suatu teori tunggal yang terpadu. Teori-teori hukum dominan sebenarnya melakukan penyucian yang berani dan tidak masuk akal dengan mengambil bentuk untuk memperlakukan hukum sebagai suatu tempat penyimpanan tujuan, kebijakan, dan prinsip yang sama sekali bertentangan dengan pandangan percaturan politik legislatif standar. &lt;br /&gt;Konstribusi Roberto Unger terhadap gerakan GSHK telah diterima dengan baik dan dihargai oleh Hugh Collins. Unger dalam teori sosial kritisnya memunculkan kemungkinan mempertahankan kondisi sosial yang memuaskan pertanyaan untuk kepuasan sendiri, maka seseorang memperoleh keberhasilan dengan berbagai macam jalan yang dalam kehidupannya mungkin sesuai dan memiliki arti bagi tujuan. Unger mengkritik pendekatan yang berlaku pada sosiologi, sejarah dan ekonomi yang gagal untuk mengambil pentingnya pertentangan struktur. Dia memberikan contoh seseorang yang menginginkan menjadi seorang penulis tetapi pasar tidak berposisi memilih profesi itu. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Konteks Formatif&lt;br /&gt;Unger mengatakan bahwa masyarakat merepresentasikan individu-individu dengan seperangkat struktur paksaan yang disebutnya konteks formatif. Dia mendefinisikan konteks formatif Sebagai dasar penyusunan institusional dan perspektif imaginatif yang melingkupi aktivitas rutin kita atau aktivitas imaginatif dan konflik dan perlawanan akibat ketidakstabilan. Unger mengkritik hitungan konvensional rasionalisasi hukum, khususnya rasionalisasi yang berdasarkan pada formalisme atau obyektivisme.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Doktrin Penyimpangan&lt;br /&gt;Unger menuntut bahwa aliran hukum yang menganut pandangan GSHK harus melakukan aktivitas politik untuk merubah masyarakat. Untuk menentukan kesalahan formalisme dan obyektivisme, Unger mengusulkan tiga tingkatan doktrin hukum:&lt;br /&gt;1. Peraturan yang otoritatif&lt;br /&gt;2. Tujuan (cita-cita), prinsip yang bersandar dalam peraturan.&lt;br /&gt;3. Konflik antara prinsip-prinsip dan counterprinsip menunjukan ketidakharmonisan dan pertentangan asumsi ideologis tentang kehidupan sosial.&lt;br /&gt;Masyarakat modern telah dipaksa membuka konflik yang transformatif. Dia mengatakan bahwa fungsi doktrin hukum dalam masyarakat saat ini adalah bertarung terhadap hak dan bentuk yang memungkinkan dari kehidupan sosial. Kalangan hukum modern telah mencoba menghindari konflik ini tetapi gerakan hukum kritis juga menuntut tidak dilakukan.&lt;br /&gt;Dipertahankannya bentuk-bentuk doktrin yang mapan selalu terletak pada tantangan implisit untuk menerima genre yang berkuasa. Kita selalu dihadapkan pada menyerahkan diri pada versi tatanan sosial yang sudah stabil atau menghadapi perang antara semua melawan semua. Ciri pokok dari doktrin penyimpangan adalah usaha untuk menyeberangi tapal batas empiris maupun normatif yang memisahkan antara hukum dari teori sosial empiris dan argumen mengenai organisasi masyarakat yang benar. &lt;br /&gt;Konflik ini dikaraterisasikannya sebagai vertikal dan horizontal dibuat untuk perombakan konstruksi yang sangat esensial. Dia membedakan hal ini dengan mudah dari hukum kontrak. Prinsip dan counterprinsip dapat dipahami sebagai ekspresi dari latar belakang keinginan dan skema perkumpulan manusia. Dalam usaha ini, counterprinsip mengontrol prinsip dari sisi perluasan yang iperialistik. Dia mengatakan bahwa hubungan komunal bervariasi sepanjang dunia perdagangan dan komersial berdasarkan hukum kontrak. Perkawanan dan keluarga tidak disyaratkan atau tidak diperhatikan oleh kontrak dengan kata lain wilayah kontrak tidak disentuh oleh perkawanan dan pengaruh yang saling menguntungkan. Hasil ini berpengaruh terhadap model demokrasi dan masyarakan privat. Idenya adalah superliberalism. &lt;br /&gt;Dia mengusulkan untuk suatu “reinventing democracy” yang bisa dipaksakan dalam merubah hierarkhi sosial dan meredistribusi sumber-sumber. Hal ini mencakup sebuah konsep hukum baru yang membutuhkan hak destabilisasi. J.W. Harris mengkritik penghakiman Unger yang disebut Pahlawan yang memainkan peran seorang aliran kritis dan menggenggam politik dan tidak menggenggam dirinya sendiri dan pandangannya dari praktek hukum. &lt;br /&gt;Secara umum gerakan GSHK menyalahkan pencarian sebuah sistem hak sebagai sebuah sistem yang tidak dapat dibuat secara koheren. Lebih dari itu, Individual meningkat melebihi komunitas dan kebutuhan komunitas terhadap  individual dilupakan. Gabel dan Kennedy telah menuntut bahwa rakyat tidak membutuhkan hak mereka. Apa yang mereka butuhkan adalah bentuk nyata dari sistem kehidupan sosial yang bebas dari ilusi saat ini. Beberapa orang  juga mengatakan bahwa eksistensi hak bermanfaat sebagai polisi dan orang lain dipaksakan. Hak-hak adalah poin yang berkumpul kepada sesorang.&lt;br /&gt;Kritik juga menolak keinginan dan kemungkinan rule of law. Duncan Kennedy memegang pendapat bahwa hukum secara keseluruhan itu tidak pasti dan tidak pernah ada suatu solusi hukum yang benar selain kebenaran etik dan solusi politik untuk sebuah permasalahan hukum. Anggota GSHK berbeda dalam hal peran instrumental dari hukum dalam masyarakat; beberapa mengambil pendekatan Marxian ortodhok, yang lainnya memegang pendapat bahwa hukum melayani kelas yang dominan dengan cara yang lebih bervariasi.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;B. Pemikiran-Pemikiran Lain Dari Gerakan Studi Hukum Kritis&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Gerakan Studi Hukum Kritis dan Kontadiksi Liberalisme&lt;br /&gt;Mark Kelman mendaku ada tiga kontradiksi utama dalam liberalisme, yaitu (1) kontradiksi antara komitmen terhadap aturan mekanis yang dapat diterapkan sebagai bentuk yang tepat penyelesaian perselisihan dan komitmen terhadap kepedulian situasional sebagai standar sementara, (2) kontradiksi antara komitmen terhadap nilai atau kemauan liberal tradisional yang arbitrer, subjektif, dan individual serta kenyataan yang obyektif dan universal berhadapan dengan komitmen terhadap cita-cita bahwa kita bisa mengetahui kebenaran etika sosial secara obyektif atau harapan bahwa seseorang bisa menyatukan pembedaan antara subjektif dan obyektif dalam mencari kebenaran moral, (3) kontradiksi antara  komitmen terhadap diskursus kehendak, dimana semua tindakan manusia dilihat sebagai hasil penentuan keinginan individu sendiri, dan diskursus determinis, di mana aktivitas subyek tidak sesuai karena secara sederhana merupakan hasil dari struktur sosial yang ada.&lt;br /&gt;Kontradiksi pertama merupakan dua posisi yang mengundang untuk memilih antara seperangkat nilai dan pandangan umum. Argumen formal tentang penggunaan aturan atau standar adalah terkait dengan cita-cita keteraturan masyarakat yang tepat. Hakim berada dalam posisi yang hati-hati dalam memilih aturan yang terkait dengan pandangan etis subtantif.&lt;br /&gt;Kontradiksi kedua secara singkat menunjukan masalah kegagalan metode liberalisme positivis dalam menyesuaikan dengan kebutuhan normatif. Kesulitan ini dihadapi ketika penerapan metode empiris terhadap kemauan manusia. Sedangkan kontradiksi ketiga menunjukan pada konflik panjang antara kehendak bebas dan determinisme.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Teori Hukum dan Teori Sosial&lt;br /&gt;Salah satu yang diajukan secara prinsipil oleh GSHK adalah kebutuhan untuk mengintegrasikan teori hukum dengan teori sosial. Dalam pandangan GSHK, realitas bukan merupakan produk dari alam yang tidak bisa ditawar, namun merupakan "pertarungan antara individu yang dibatasi oleh suatu garis tertentu". Diskursus hukum adalah suatu diskursus yang perhatian utamanya pada kehidupan sosial. Dengan mengidentifikasi bentuk-bentuk kesadaran sosial, pendukung GSHK berharap bisa memajukan individu. Dengan menunjukan bahwa kehidupan sosial semakin tidak terstruktur dan semakin komplek, semakin tidak berpihak dan semakin irasional, dari pada proses hukum yang dikira, kepentingan yang dilayani oleh doktrin dan teori hukum  akan muncul.&lt;br /&gt;Dalam pandangan Robert Gordon, kepentingan yang dilayani tersebut adalah suatu ideologi (cara pandang) dari kelompok masyarakat tertentu yang dominan. Dia mengajukan beberapa metode untuk menunjukan dan meruntuhkan ideologi dalam pemikiran hukum utama, yaitu melalui; perongsokan, dekonstruksi, dan geneologi. Pembentukan dominasi dijelaskan dengan menggunakan pemikiran Levi Strauss dan konsep hegemoni yang diungkapkan oleh Antonio Gramci .Salah satu cara untuk membongkar struktur sosial adalah dengan menggunakan metode geneologi dan archeology. Metode ini menelusuri dasar-dasar dan pemikiran dasar pembentukan struktur sosial yang hierarkhis.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Dari Kritik ke Konstruksi&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Doktrin Deviasi&lt;br /&gt;Dipertahankannya bentuk-bentuk doktrin yang mapan selalu terletak pada sebuah tantangan implisit untuk menerima genre yang berkuasa. Tantangan itu berupa pilihan umum untuk menyerahkan diri pada versi tatanan sosial yang sudah stabil atau menghadapi perang antara semua melawan semua. Pertentangan ini diselesaikan dengan doktrin deviasi yang ciri pokoknya adalah usaha untuk menyeberang tapal batas empiris maupun normatif yang memisahkan antara teori sosial empiris dan dari argumen mengenai organisasi masyarakat yang benar.  &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Penetapan Kembali Demokrasi dan Pasar&lt;br /&gt;Hasil konstruktif kritik terhadap obyektivisme adalah usaha untuk mencari alternatif cita-cita kelembagaan demokrasi dan pasar dengan menggunakan doktrin deviasi. Pencarian ini membutuhkan tiga gagasan, yaitu teori transformasi sosial untuk bisa membedakan cita-cita yang programatis yang realistis, pikiran programatis yang dilakukan dengan pembalikan dan pemujian berupa pendefinisian kembali tanpa usaha kapitulasi buta, dan konsepsi hubungan yang tepat antara negara dan masyarakat.&lt;br /&gt;Hasilnya berupa tiga bentuk versi yang sepadan, yaitu; pertama, pelonggaran kumulatif tatanan masyarakat tertentu terutama mengenai pelapisan dan pembagian sosial, pola yang diberlakukan mengenai cara-cara hubungan manusia yang mungkin dan dikehendaki. Kedua, peluang hidup dan pengalaman hidup pribadi harus semakin terbebas dari tirani kategori-kategori sosial yang abstrak. Ketiga, perbedaan antara apa yang dimaksudkan oleh dunia sosial dan apa yang dikeluarkannya, antara kegiatan rutin dan revolusi, harus diperinci sebanyak mungkin.&lt;br /&gt;Demokrasi bisa ditemukan kembali melalui beberapa persyaratan yaitu: &lt;br /&gt;1. bentuk-bentuk organisasi ekonomi dan politik mapan yang memungkinkan kelompok rakyat yang relatif kecil menguasai syarat-syarat pokok kemakmuran kolektif dengan mengambil keputusan-keputusan investasi yang amat penting.&lt;br /&gt;2. Menekankan arti penting bidang-bidang utama kehidupan organisasi pabrik, birokrasi, kantor, rumah sakit, dan sekolah.&lt;br /&gt;3. Sarana komunikasi dan pemberian dana politik.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Revolusi Politik dan Kebudayaan&lt;br /&gt;Tujuan yang menjadi pedoman dan pemersatu kebiasaan budaya revolusioner adalah untuk membentuk kembali hubungan pribadi langsung dengan membebaskan mereka dari latar belakang rancangan pembagian hierarkhi sosial. Rencana ini memberikan suatu kesempatan bagi pertukaran praktis atau ikatan yang penuh gairah untuk menghormati batas-batas yang ditetapkan tatanan kekuasaan yang mapan. Rencana itu juga memberikan peran tertentu pada setiap orang sesuai dengan kedudukan yang mereka pegang dalam seperangkat perbedaan sosial atau gender yang ditetapkan sebelumnya. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;C. Kelebihan Dan Kekurangan Gerakan Studi Hukum Kritis&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Kelebihan&lt;br /&gt;GSHK terdiri dari berbagai macam pemikiran yang dikemukakan oleh banyak ahli hukum. Pemikiran-pemikiran tersebut bervariasi dari pemikiran yang bercirikan marxian ortodok sampai pada pemikiran post-modern. Namun ada beberapa kesepahaman antara pemikiran-pemikiran tersebut, yaitu ketidakpercayaan terhadap netralitas hukum, struktur sosial yang hierarkhis dan didominasi ideologi kelompok tertentu, dan keinginan untuk merombak struktur sosial.&lt;br /&gt;Kekritisan GSHK dalam memahami realitas sosial dan tata hukum serta komitmen untuk mengembangkan teori hukum berdasarkan praksis sosial untuk merombak struktur sosial yang hierarkhis adalah kelebihan utama GSHK. Kekuatan ini diwujudkan dalam bentuk analitis kritis terhadap tata hukum, nilai-nilai dan rasio-rasio hukum yang digunakan oleh para hakim yang selama ini disebut netral dan benar secara obyektif.&lt;br /&gt;Kelebihan lain dari GSHK adalah perhatiannya yang sangat besar terhadap pengakuan individu sebagai subyek kehendak utama dalam tatanan sosial. Kelebihan ini seperti membangkitkan kembali pandangan eksistensialis Kant-ian yang akhir-akhir tergerus oleh gelombang modern dan industri sehingga menimbulkan keterasingan individu subyektif karen tersedot arus budaya massa yang abstrak.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Kekurangan&lt;br /&gt;Sebagaimana pemikiran kritis yang lain, apabila tidak digunakan secara tepat dengan mengingat tujuan dan batas penggunaan, kritisisme bisa berujung pada nihilisme. Atau paling tidak terjebak  pada lingkaran kritik tanpa ujung dalam tingkatan wacana sehingga melupakan tugas praksis terhadap masyarakat.&lt;br /&gt;Kelemahan lain adalah dari sifat asali pemikiran kritis yang selalu dalam dirinya sendiri melakukan dekonstruksi sehingga perubahan dan gejolak selalu terjadi. Padahal realitas masyarakat selualu cenderung mempertahankan nilai-nilai dan tatanan lama dan hanya mengijinkan perubahan yang tidak terasa. Maka konsekuensi dari pendukung GSHK akan selalu berada di pinggir sistem sosial kalau tidak tidak anggap sebagai makhluk aneh yang harus disingkirkan. Akibatnya GSHK sangat sulit menjadi mainstream pembangunan hukum. Tugas utama GSHK adalah melancarkan kritik untuk perubahan yang dilakukan oleh orang lain. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Analisis Kritis terhadap Hukum di Indonesia&lt;br /&gt;Penggunaan GSHK untuk menganalisis hukum di Indonesia paling mudah dilakukan terhadap pembangunan hukum pada masa orde baru. Pada masa inilah dapat dilihat secara jelas kepentingan-kepentingan ekonomi dan politik dominan yang menghuni ide tata hukum. Kepentingan atas pertumbuhan ekonomi memaksa kebijakan kemudahan usaha dengan jalan pemberian kredit yang disertai dengan deregulasi dan debirokratisasi. Kepentingan pembangunan ekonomi mensyaratkan stabilitas politik yang dilakukan dengan cara mengurangi hak sipil dan politik rakyat .&lt;br /&gt;Sebagai salah satu contoh, disini akan diungkapkan kepentingan kelas dominan dalam menentukan substansi Rancangan Undang-Undang Pemilu yang saat ini dibahas di DPR. Pemilu tahun 2004 memiliki arti strategis. Bagi penguasa, momen ini memiliki arti untuk melanggengkan kekuasaannya . Sehingga sejak saat ini pun banyak langkah dan kebijakan yang dilandasi pertimbangan kepentingan kekuasaan tahun 2004. Di sisi lain, masa transisi politik adalah masa paling mudah melakukan perubahan karena tidak adanya kekuatan yang dominan. Pemberantasan KKN harus dilakukan dalam rentang waktu transisi politik. &lt;br /&gt;Apabila sampai saat rekonsolidasi politik perubahan belum berhasil, maka proses perubahan akan kembali memasuki masa-masa yang sulit karena semakin mapannya kekuasaan. Makna pemilu 2004 menjadi semakin penting karena pada waktu inilah dimulai sistem perwakilan baru yaitu bikameral  di Indonesia yang ditandai dengan adanya DPD dan bergesernya kedudukan MPR , serta merupakan awal pelaksanaan pemilihan Presiden secara langsung. Untuk bisa menciptakan wakil rakyat yang amanah dan bertanggungjawab serta sebagai salah satu agenda pemberantasan KKN, harus dipilih dan diciptakan sistem pemilu yang dapat memenuhi kepentingan tersebut .&lt;br /&gt;Pemilu 1999 yang menggunakan sistem proporsional dengan daftar tertutup  telah menimbulkan jarak antara wakil rakyat dan konstituennya . Dengan memilih tandar gambar partai, kampanye partai politik lebih menekankan pada sentimen primordial dan nama besar tokoh partai, sehingga pilihan konstituenpun tidak berdasarkan pertimbangan rasional program dan citra calonnya. Sebagai bukti dapat diungkapkan bahwa perbedaan pilihan untuk DPR, DPRD Propinsi dan DPRD Kota/Kabupaten hanya 0,04%.  &lt;br /&gt;Akibatnya, saat ini sulit untuk menggunggat pertanggungjawaban wakil rakyat . Penilaian negatif seseorang terhadap wakil rakyat akan dengan mudah terhapus oleh nama besar dari partai. Sistem pemilu tahun 1999, juga melahirkan hegemoni kekuasaan partai politik . Kekuasaan partai politik sangat besar dalam menentukan calon dan apa yang harus diperbuat wakil rakyat. Sistem pemilu tahun 1999 ternyata telah mengukuhkan budaya politik yang abstrak, paternalis, dan tidak bertanggungjawab.&lt;br /&gt;Rancangan Undang-Undang Pemilihan Umum yang saat ini sedang dibahas di DPR, dalam beberapa hal mencoba untuk menutup berbagai kekurangan dalam sistem pemilu yang digunakan tahun 1999. Dengan menggunakan sistem proporsional dengan daftar terbuka diharapkan dapat dicapai aspek representasi dari sistem proporsional dan aspek akuntabilitas dari sistem distrik. &lt;br /&gt;Sistem ini tentu saja memiliki sisi positif dan sisi negatif. Sisi positif bagi perkembangan partai politik adalah; pertama, mengalihkan konflik penyusunan daftar nama calon dalam partai politik . Sebelumnya, konflik tidak sehat,  karena keputusannya tergantung pada pimpinan partai. Dalam sistem proporsional dengan daftar terbuka calon tidak disusun berdasarkan peringkat. Calon jadi adalah calon yang mendapatkan jumlah suara tertentu menurut peringkat sesuai jatah kursi daerah setempat. Kedua, karena seorang calon nasibnya ditentukan oleh suara yang didapat, maka calon tersebut terutama harus berkampanye di daerahnya . &lt;br /&gt;Kampanye dengan menghadirkan tokoh tertentu diluar daerah pemilihannya menjadi kurang berarti bagi terpilihnya seorang calon. Kampanye yang dilakukan harus menyentuh kebutuhan riil masyarakat, dan masyarakat bisa menggugat serta mengkoreksinya pada pemilu kemudian. Ketiga, dengan sistem tersebut, akan mengeliminasi hegemoni partai politik terhadap wakil rakyat dan memperdekat jarak wakil rakyat dengan konstituennya.&lt;br /&gt;Sisi positif bagi masyarakat, adalah pembangunan budaya politik yang rasional. Pertama, masyarakat tidak hanya memilih tanda gambar partai, tetapi juga memilih calon yang akan mengisi kursi partai tersebut. Sehingga sangat mungkin partai pilihan pemilih berbeda antara DPRD Kota/Kabupaten, DPRD Propinsi, dan DPR. Masyarakat juga belajar kalkulasi rasional terhadap citra dan program wakil rakyat. Kedua, kepentingan-kepentingan daerah atau isu-isu lokal menjadi mendapatkan tempat dalam perpolitikan Indonesia . &lt;br /&gt;Sedangkan sisi negatifnya adalah pelaksanaannya yang cukup rumit dan membutuhkan pengetahuan pemilih yang detil dan lengkap. Dengan kondisi masyarakat Indonesia yang tingkat pendidikannya rendah, pelaksanaan sistem ini memang cukup sulit. Belum lagi masalah teknis lain, seperti bentuk surat suara, waktu yang digunakan untuk memilih dan waktu penghitungan suara.&lt;br /&gt;Namun kendala tersebut bukan berarti tidak bisa diselesaikan. Kendala kesadaran dan pengetahuan pemilih bisa diatasi apabila ada proses voter education yang memadai dalam tahapan pemilu. Proses ini tentu saja tidak hanya dilakukan oleh KPU sebagai pelaksana pemilu, tetapi juga oleh elemen masyarakat yang lain.  Kendala kerumitan proses kampanye, pemilihan, dan penghitungan, juga bisa diatasi dengan pemisahan pelaksanaan pemilu. Disamping karena pokok persoalan pemilihannya berbeda, hal ini juga akan memperkukuh kalkulasi rasional masyarakat pada masing-masing pemilihan.&lt;br /&gt;Namun lagi-lagi upaya perubahan ini menghadapi tembok kekuasaan yang saat ini berada dalam bangunan partai politik. Enam partai besar sudah menunjukan indikasi penolakan sistem proporsional dengan daftar terbuka. Berbagai alasan dikemukakan mulai dari yang ideologis sampai pada yang teknis. &lt;br /&gt;Penolakan tersebut dapat dimaklumi karena; pertama, sistem ini akan memperlemah kontrol partai politik terhadap wakil rakyat. Kedua, sistem ini akan menimbulkan kesadaran kritis pemilih. Pemilih yang sadar tidak akan lagi terikat secara emosional tetapi lebih pada citra dan program calon wakil rakyat. Akibatnya, partai yang tidak memiliki program yang sungguh-sungguh akan ditinggalkan. Ketiga, sistem ini membutuhkan proses kampanye yang panjang, dialogis dan menitikberatkan pada pendidikan politik, padahal partai politik saat ini lebih menyukai proses mobilisasi massa.&lt;br /&gt;Tembok penghalang tersebut sangat kukuh, karena bermukim dalam lembaga DPR dan pemerintahan. Kedua institusi inilah yang secara yuridis normatif memegang kekuasaan membentuk Undang-undang. Tampaknya harapan memperoleh wakil rakyat yang lebih bertanggungjawab sulit terwujud.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;D. Penutup&lt;br /&gt;Pemikiran hukum di Indonesia hingga saat ini masih didominasi oleh dua aliran besar, yaitu positivis dan sociological jurisprudence. Aliran positivis terutama dipegang oleh kalangan aparat penegak hukum, akademisi dan birokrasi, sehingga seringkali menjadi penghalang perkembangan hukum serta mengalami kebuntuan ketika menghadapi kasus-kasus baru.&lt;br /&gt;Sedangkan aliran sociological jurispurudence banyak tergambar dari perilaku dan aktivitas politisi terutama lembaga pembuat undang-undang (legislatif). Aliran ini awal mulanya diterapkan pada masa orde baru untuk mendukung program-program pembangunan orde baru dan melanggengkan kekuasaan dengan menjaga stabilitas politik. Saat ini yang tersisa adalah menjadikan hukum sebagai ajang legiitimasi dalam memperoleh dan melanggengkan kekuasaan.&lt;br /&gt;GSHK sendiri masih sangat baru bagi kalangan hukum di Indonesia. Perkembangan awal GSHK digunakan oleh kalangan aktivis LSM untuk memahami kebijakan dan struktur hukum yang menindas. Hal ini sesuai dengan mainstream utama pemikiran LSM yang cenderung kritis dengan menggunakan pemikiran-pemikiran marxian dan mazhab kritis.&lt;br /&gt;Saat ini Indonesia berada dalam masa transisi yang ditandai oleh pergulatan kekuatan-kekuatan yang mencoba untuk mendominasi baik dari dalam negeri maupun kekuatan kapitalis internasional. Maka sudah saatnya pemikiran-pemikiran GSHK juga digunakan untuk memahami, mengkritik, membangun, dan menerapkan hukum di Indonesia.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Daftar Pustaka&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;ACE Project. Sistem Pemilu. Diterbitkan atas kerjasama IDEA. United Nations dan IFES. Jakarta. 2001. &lt;br /&gt;Baqir Ash-Shadr, Sayyid Al-Islam Ayatullah Al-‘Uzhma As-Sayyid Muhammad. Falsafatuna. terjemahan M. Nur Mufid bin Ali. Cetakan VI. Bandung. Mizan. 1998.&lt;br /&gt;Beilharz, Peter. Teori-Teori Sosial. (Social Theory: A Guide to Central Thinkers). penerjemah: Sigit Jatmiko. Jogjakarta. Pustaka Pelajar. 2002.&lt;br /&gt;Boyle, James. The Politics Of Reason; Critical Legal Theory And Local Social Thought. University of Pennsylvania Review. April 1985.&lt;br /&gt;Chand, Hari. Modern Jurisprudence. International Law Book Service. Kuala Lumpur. 1994.&lt;br /&gt;Durkheim, Emil. The Sociology of Knowledge, http://www.hewett.norfolk.sch.uk/curric/ soc/ durkheim/ durkw4.htm, diakses 6 Nopember 2002.&lt;br /&gt;Friedmann,W. Teori dan Filasafat Hukum; Susunan I. (Legal Theory). terjemahan: Mohamad Arifin. Cetakan Kedua. Jakarta. PT. Raja Grafindo Perkasa. 1993.&lt;br /&gt;Gidden, Antony. The Third Way. Jakarta. PT. Gramedia Pustaka. 1999&lt;br /&gt;Gramsci, Antonio. The Prison Notebooks. http://www.kb.dk/elib/bio/gramsci/soerensen/ gramsum/. diakses tanggal 6 Nopember 2002.&lt;br /&gt;Gordon, Robert dan Thomas Kearn (editor). Law in the Domains of Culture. (University of Michigan Press. 1998.&lt;br /&gt;Habermas, Jurgen. Knowledge and Human Interest. Chapter Three.  Polity Press. 1968.&lt;br /&gt;Horwitz, Morton J. The Transformation Of American Law. 1870-1960 by. New York: Oxford University Press. 1992&lt;br /&gt;Jaine Mileaf on Levi-Strauss, "Science of the Concrete", http://dept.english.upenn.edu/ ~jenglish/Courses/mileaf.html, diakses 23 Oktober 2002.&lt;br /&gt;Kennedy, D. The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries’ .  Buffalo Law Review. 1979. hal. 47.&lt;br /&gt;Mannheim, Karl. Ideologi dan Utopia. judul asli: Ideology and Utopia. penerjemah: F. Budi Hardiman.. Cetakan Kedua. Yogyakarta. Kanisius. 1991.&lt;br /&gt;Marcuse, Herbert. The Paralysis of Criticism: Society Without Opposition, http//cartoon. iguw.tuwien.ac.at/Christian/marcuse.htm, diakses tanggal 6 Nopember 2002. &lt;br /&gt;Parson, Talcot. Essei-Essei Sosiologi Talcot Parson. (Talcot Parson Essays Sociology). Jakarta. Aksara Persada Press. 1986.&lt;br /&gt;Poloma, Margareth M. Sosiologi Kontemporer. (Contemporary Sociological Theory). terjemahan Tim YASOGAMA. Cetakan kedua. Jakarta. CV. Rajawali. 1987.&lt;br /&gt;Rizal, Jufrina dan Agus Brotosusilo (peny). Filsafat Hukum. Buku Ke-II. Program Pascasarjana Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia. September 2001.&lt;br /&gt;Scheppele, Kim Lane. Legal Theory and Social Theory. Annual Review of Sociologi. Annual 1994 v20.&lt;br /&gt;Simon, Roger. Gagasan-Gagasan Politik Gramsci. Jakarta. Pustaka Pelajar dan Insist Press. 2000.&lt;br /&gt;Suseno, Franz Magnis. Etika Politik. Cetakan kelima. Jakarta. PT. Gramedia. 1999.&lt;br /&gt;………………………. Pemikiran Karl Marx; Sosialis Utopis Ke Perselisihan Revisionis. Jakarta. PT. Gramedia, 2001&lt;br /&gt;The Fallacies of Egoism and Altruism, and the Fundamental Principle of Morality, http://www.friesian.com/moral-1.htm, diakses tanggal 17 Desember 2002.&lt;br /&gt;Unger, Roberto M. Gerakan Studi Hukum Kritis. judul Asli: The Critical Legal Studies Movement. penerjemah: Ifdhal Kasim. Cetakan Pertama. Jakarta. ELSAM. 1999.&lt;br /&gt;………………….. The Critical Legal Studies Movement. First Edition. Cambridge. Harvard University Press. 1983.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Makalah&lt;br /&gt;Asshiddiqie, Jimly.  Menuju Struktur Parlemen Dua Kamar, Makalah disampaikan dalam Seminar Nasional tentang Bikameralisme yang diselenggarakan oleh Forum Rektor Indonesia bekerjasama dengan National Democratic Institut, di Medan, 12 Juni 2001.&lt;br /&gt;Budiarjo,Miriam.  Pemilu 1999 dan Pelajaran Untuk Pemilu 2004. Makalah untuk Centre for Electoral Reform (CETRO). Jakarta. 9 September 1999.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Media Massa&lt;br /&gt;Duit Mengalir Sampai Jauh; Proses Demokrasi yang Mahal. MEDIA TRANSPARANSI. Edisi 09 Juni 1999.&lt;br /&gt;Haryadi, Agus. Bikameral Setengah Hati. Harian KOMPAS, 15 Mei 2002.&lt;br /&gt;Potret Suram Dari Senayan. FORUM Keadilan No. 34 Edisi 22 Desember 2002.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/6041305650038531172-8727658233407096673?l=anomalisemesta.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/feeds/8727658233407096673/comments/default' title='Poskan Komentar'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=6041305650038531172&amp;postID=8727658233407096673' title='0 Komentar'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/8727658233407096673'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/8727658233407096673'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/2008/04/gerakan-studi-hukum-kritis.html' title='GERAKAN STUDI HUKUM KRITIS'/><author><name>muchamad ali safa'at</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07348715720341930804</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6041305650038531172.post-9221481522408653615</id><published>2008-04-09T04:10:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2008-04-09T04:13:35.755-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Juridical Coups d’état – all over the place</title><content type='html'>8 German Law Journal No. 10 (1 October 2007) -  &lt;br /&gt;  &lt;br /&gt;Juridical Coups d’état – all over the place. Comment on “The Juridical Coup d’état and the Problem of Authority” by Alec Stone Sweet &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;By Wojciech Sadurski&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;There is a strong temptation to take the metaphor of “coup d’état” too seriously and follow it up by showing that it is not all that accurate. Normally we speak of a coup d’état, at least in a democratic setting, when there is an illegitimate capture of the existing power structures by a group that has no mandate (normally, electoral) to rule. So the coup d’état used in its proper locus, that is, in the description of the political power-capture, has both normative and descriptive content: (1) normatively, it has usually a condemnatory color; (2) descriptively, it identifies a change of the ruling group within more-or-less unchanged authority structures. None of these ingredients applies to the intriguing and thought-provoking analysis offered by Alec Stone Sweet: (1) juridical coups d’état are clearly not condemned by him: at least he tells us that his analysis is purely descriptive rather than normative; (2) juridical coups d’état result in fundamentally altered authority structures: indeed, it is, for Stone Sweet, their main definitional feature. So taken pedantically, the metaphor of coup d’état is singularly inadequate for Stone Sweet’s purposes. &lt;span class="fullpost"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;But of course, one should not be pedantic, and the temptation to labor the metaphor should be resisted: like any metaphor, it may be good in some respects and bad in others, and in one respect at least in the present discussion it is certainly good, namely that it adds a certain dramatic flavor to Stone Sweet’s analysis, thus stimulating reflection better than different, more aseptic language, would do. And yet I wish to dwell on the metaphor just for a moment because, as we know, metaphors are not innocent, and the language used may tell us something about the attitude of the speaker. It is hard to dispel the impression that Stone Sweet, notwithstanding his protests to the contrary, has a certain negative attitude towards the decisions he dubs juridical coups d’état; there is a sense of usurpation, illegitimacy and unfoundedness there, and if the metaphor of coup d’état adds a certain dramatic effect to this impression, there would be nothing puzzling about it. Not, at least, if Stone Sweet were not the prominent comparative constitutionalist that he is, and if we did not have the benefit of knowing his views on some of the cases he discusses here, presented earlier in his more comprehensive writings on the subject of constitutional adjudication in Europe. In his Governing with Judges, having described the outcome of the 1971 decision of the Conseil constitutionnel (the decision dubbed now as coup d’état), Stone Sweet concludes: “Thus, for the first time, and against the wishes of de Gaulle, his agents, and other political parties in 1958, France has both an effective bill of rights and an effective constitutional court”.[1]  Stone Sweet was very prudent there not to display any admiration for this consequence, just as he is prudent now not to express any open disapproval for the “coups d’état”. And yet, in the eyes of an average reader there is, I submit, a difference in the inevitable evaluative vectors attached to both these descriptions. To be clear about the point I am making: I am not imputing any inconsistency between these two accounts by the same author but rather am warning that concepts such as “coup d’état” or “effective bill of rights with an effective constitutional court” are not exactly neutral, no matter how much the speaker protests that he is not engaging in any value judgments. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Before moving on to my main point about Stone Sweet’s analysis, I wish to put on the table one marginal concern which his discussion raises: not fundamental perhaps but significant enough, I believe, to be flagged here. There is a certain problem of confirmation – or falsification – with the hypothetical test which he erects for the juridical coup d’état: that such a coup results in a new dispensation in the allocation of authority which would have been rejected by the founders of a given constitutional system. This is the problem which we routinely have with all counterfactual tests: how to ascertain the intentions and expectations of the founders? Sometimes it can be done with a reasonably high degree of confidence – Stone Sweet’s description of the founders of the Fifth Republic seems to be compelling – but very often we do not have the benefit of relying on any explicit statements, declarations, announcements, travaux preparatoires etc. which would give us a reliable insight into the founders’ intentions. But an even more fundamental question is, why should it matter? Indeed, it may well be the case that the founders would not want, or should not have wanted, that their specific intentions regarding the details of the separation of powers should prevail over the changed views as to the institutional structures of rights protection. There is a distinction, popular in the theory of constitutional interpretation, between specific “application” intentions and intentions to enact a general principle (“enactment” intentions) the specific meaning of which is to be conferred upon the constitutional provision by future lawmakers (including, the lawmaking courts). Ronald Dworkin describes this distinction as “between what some officials intended to say in enacting the language they used, and what they intended – or expected or hoped – would be the consequence of their saying it”[2]: the former counts but the latter does not, in ascertaining legislative (or constitution-makers’) intentions. Admittedly this distinction works better for abstract constitutional rights than for provisions on the separation of powers, but the boundary is not watertight. Suppose the framers were concerned mainly about designing a structure for the most effective possible pattern of rights protection, and in time the incorporation of rights into the constitution (France), or the “horizontalization” of rights (Germany) is found to be the best application of this broad, abstract intention. Does it necessarily run against the constitution-makers’ intentions?&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;But my central observation related to Stone Sweet’s analysis is this. While his analysis of the three cases which constitute his main evidence of judicial coup d’état is convincing and no doubt fully accurate, the whole idea rests on a rather strict distinction between those exercises of judicial creativity – judicial activism, if one prefers the word – which apply fundamentally to the substance, and those which are structural, that is, which affect the structure of authority, and which upset the constitutionally established position of different branches of government, and in particular, enhance the position of courts (including of specialized constitutional courts). It is these latter, but not the former, cases of exercise of judicial creativity which amount to “judicial coups d’état” for Stone Sweet. The centrality of the substantive/structural distinction for Stone Sweet’s analysis is obvious: in its absence, the decisions discussed by Stone Sweet would be just a subset of “judicial activism” or judicial creativity –decisions about which we may disagree whether they were warranted by the constitutional bases in their respective legal system, but this disagreement would be just a routine dispute caused by any novel judicial choice. Analysis in terms of coups d’état would not add anything new to an ongoing discourse on the grounds and legitimacy of judicial review.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;So the structural/substantive discussion is central to the analysis; the question is, is it plausible? I have my doubts. To put it briefly, any decision which is novel in the substantive sense – which is path breaking in taking a decision which some people who are reasoning in good faith may believe is not authorized by the constitution, is at the same time structural because it implies an assertion that the court has the competence not only to decide that which it has actually decided but also, more generally, in the sphere in which it has entered. There is no sustainable distinction between a first-order decision about the substantive choice made by the court and the second-order decision about whether the field to which the choice belongs is one within which the court can take any decision in the first place. And if this is the case, any novel decision on substance (implying, as it does, a second-order decision about the court’s competence) is at the same time a structural decision – and can be seen, with a lower or higher degree of hyperbole, as a juridical coup d’état.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;An example will help clarify the point just made. In his paper, Stone Sweet alludes en passant to the US Supreme Court’s decision Griswold v. Connecticut (en passant, because he is really concerned with legal systems where judicial constitutional review is exercised by specialized constitutional courts, and also because Griswold is for Stone Sweet a case in which the categorization in terms of coups d’état is problematic). But precisely because it is problematic for Stone Sweet, it is interesting to consider it for a moment: why would one find it an uncertain case, from the point of view of Stone Sweet’s analysis? Griswold is normally depicted as a paradigmatic illustration of judicial activism, US-style: as a case which goes far beyond the constitutional provisions, and “finds” hitherto invisible choices (in that case, the right to privacy) in the constitution, notwithstanding the absence of textual bases for such choices. Stone Sweet points to the reasoning of Justice Douglas (writing for the majority) who, in Stone Sweet’s words “[sought] so tortuously to avoid the charge that he has fundamentally revised the U.S. Constitution” (which is, as we know, what all judges say when they engage in activist, dynamic review of statues under the constitution). He could have added the celebrated dissent by Justice Black who said “The Court talks about a constitutional ‘right of privacy’ as though there is some constitutional provision forbidding any law ever to be passed which might abridge the ‘privacy’ of individuals. But there is not.”.[3] And also that of Justice Stewart: “It is the essence of judicial duty to subordinate our own personal views, our own ideas of what legislation is wise and what is not”.[4] They make two assertions, respectively, about the meaning of the constitutional provisions, and about the limits of judicial competence, which directly confront the majority opinion written by Justice Douglas, even though in Douglas the former assertion (about the substance of the Constitution) is explicit, and the latter (about judicial competence) only implicit.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;What is the meaning of the decision, from the point of view of our substantive/structural distinction? At first sight, the matter is obvious: the decision is about “substance” only; it identifies a new right, inferred from the constitutional “penumbra.” The inference may be right or wrong, and people may (and do) disagree about it, but the substantive rightness or wrongness of the court’s decision (the argument might go) is neither here not there from the point of view of the structural issues of legal authority. But this is not so; it would be deeply counter-intuitive to claim that decisions such as Griswold do not affect structural grounds of judicial authority. They do, and do so very importantly and directly. This is because, to reassert the point just made, Griswold can be read not only as saying that in US law there is a constitutional right to privacy which substantially restricts the states’ rights to legislate in the field of morality. It can also be read as saying that the Supreme Court (and all other appellate courts) has the authority to question and invalidate democratic decisions of state legislatures (as was the case in Griswold) on issues characterized as belonging to the constitutional right of privacy, as interpreted by the Supreme Court. In fact, and this is the main point I am making, the first and the second reading are indistinguishable from each other. It is not as if the Court proceeded in two steps: first staked its claim to authority in a given area (a second-order choice) and only then determined what its substantive view on the matter is (a first-order choice), but rather the latter step necessarily and inevitably involves the first step, and so any substantive decision is at the same time a structural one.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The same type of argument can be made with respect to those constitutional courts which occupy the central place in Stone Sweet’s analysis, that is, specialized institutions conducting abstract constitutional review of legislative acts. Rather than referring to one of the three courts discussed by Stone Sweet let me mention a court from a region which I have studied at some length, Central Europe. When the first Hungarian Constitutional Court (considered to be one of the most activist in the world) took some of its most famous decisions, say on the death penalty (which it found unconstitutional notwithstanding the absence of any constitutional textual basis for this finding)[5] or on the constitutionality of the “vetting” (“lustration”) law meant to remove former collaborators with the Communist security service from public office,[6]  was it moving simply in a substantive realm or also in the structural field? None of these decisions seems to be “structural” in the way Stone Sweet depicts “the structural” in the three decisions he discusses, and yet each such decision established or reinforced the court’s competence in the field where its authority had been previously denied or contested or at the very least untested. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;What follows from this comment? If I am correct, whenever a court establishes a novel rule or principle – a rule or principle which, under at least some established conventions of constitutional interpretation, cannot be inferred from the constitution – and uses it to displace the choice of another branch of government, it commits a minor (or sometimes, a major) coup d’état. The juridical coups d’état used by Stone Sweet as exemplifications of his thesis strike us perhaps as different because the structural implications are much more visible, on their face. But structural reconfiguration of authority takes place whenever a court has the last word on issues on which it disagrees with the legislature – and the legislature cannot or does not want to prevail over the court’s choices. And if all judicial activism collapses into a series of minor or major coups d’état, then the specificity or distinctness of coups d’état such as performed by the three courts in the cases discussed by Stone Sweet is called into question.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;[1] Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe 41 (2000).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;[2] Ronald Dworkin, “Comment” in A Matter of Interpretation, 116 (Antonin Scalia, 1997).  Also see Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 48-50 (1985).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;[3] Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), 508.  (Black J. dissenting)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;[4] Id., 531-32.  (Stewart J. dissenting).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;[5] Decision 23/1990 of 31 October 1990 discussed in Wojciech Sadurski,  Rights Before Courts: A Study of Constitutional Courts in Postcommunist States of Central and Eastern Europe 100-101, 131-133. (2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;[6]  Decision 60/1994 of 22 December 1994 discussed in, Id., 242-43.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/6041305650038531172-9221481522408653615?l=anomalisemesta.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/feeds/9221481522408653615/comments/default' title='Poskan Komentar'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=6041305650038531172&amp;postID=9221481522408653615' title='0 Komentar'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/9221481522408653615'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/9221481522408653615'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/2008/04/juridical-coups-dtat-all-over-place.html' title='Juridical Coups d’état – all over the place'/><author><name>muchamad ali safa'at</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07348715720341930804</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6041305650038531172.post-7885057305369164201</id><published>2008-04-09T04:08:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2008-04-09T04:10:39.490-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Turkey’s Judicial Coup D’etat</title><content type='html'>This battle could last for months longer, and whether the AKP wins or loses, the consequences are bad.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;By Morton Abramowitz and Henri J. Barkey | NEWSWEEK&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Turkey is at war with itself again, over religion and politics in Turkish life, and the consequences for both itself and its friends could be devastating. Last month, the nation's chief prosecutor prepared an indictment of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) for allegedly violating the Constitution's principle of secularism. The indictment, triggered by the AKP's decision to remove constitutional provisions prohibiting wearing headscarves in universities, seeks literally to abolish the party. It also demands that 71 AKP officials, including Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul, be banned from politics for five years.&lt;span class="fullpost"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Erdogan clearly erred by suddenly ramming the headscarf liberalization through Parliament. But the banning of a ruling party—one that has been in power for over five years, and quite successfully at that—is unprecedented in the modern West. The AKP won overwhelmingly in parliamentary elections last July, and this kind of politics makes a mockery of the democratic process. Though it is legal to pursue such a case, it is, to many Turks, quite simply a judicial coup. Yet last week Turkey's Constitutional Court agreed to hear the case, jeopardizing the country's political and economic stability, already suffering from world market pressures. This battle could last for months, its outcome is uncertain and its consequences, whether the AKP wins or loses, would be bad. So Turkey's principal international partners, the United States and the European Union, are watching with consternation—and their fingers crossed. At the most fundamental level, the case renders the stability of Turkey uncertain. More immediately, Washington needs Turkey's cooperation for its plans for Iraq and particularly for keeping Iraqi Kurdistan stable. Political instability is likely to prevent the Turkish government from making progress on its other major domestic headache, the Kurdish question, and on knotty foreign-policy priorities important to the United States and the EU, such as cooperation on Iran and resolving the longstanding Cyprus problem. Moreover, a ban of the AKP will undermine Turkey's chances for EU accession.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;So far, EU leaders have shown no reluctance to make this clear to Turkey. The United States is in a tougher position. In the past, Washington has shown only tepid disapproval of extraconstitutional attempts to bring down the AKP government. This time it has publicly criticized the court, but Washington's words carry little weight with tough-minded secularists in the judiciary, media and military on this issue. Nor, to the surprise of Turks, does the United States like to muck around in their domestic politics. U.S. action is further complicated by the tricky legal nature of the dispute, as well as the pressing interest in maintaining good relations with Turkey. Moreover, the fact remains that if secularists are truly prepared to bring down the house, nothing the EU or the United States says will make any difference.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Still, the United States cannot stand on the sidelines. The threat to Turkey's stability is sufficiently grave, and the potential damage to U.S. interests so great that at some point a more forceful U.S. intervention is warranted. The United States must make clear privately, and if necessary publicly, that attempting to remove the AKP in this manner endangers bilateral cooperation and makes U.S. support of Turkish positions politically difficult. The hope is that Turkey recognizes it is far too tied to the West economically and politically to ignore such warnings altogether.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The ideal scenario now would be for all parties somehow to pull back from the abyss and adopt more conciliatory stances. In response to the suit, AKP leaders have signaled that they will robustly defend the party and possibly seek constitutional amendments that would diminish the powers of the chief prosecutor's office and set the evidentiary bar higher for dissolving political parties than just providing a long list of statements by AKP leaders, often out of context. Right now the bar is where the court wants it to be. The AKP may also throw down the gauntlet by finding some way to call early elections that the popular party is likely to win, possibly with a greater majority.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In either case, passions would be inflamed. A showdown with the judiciary and military would become nearly unavoidable. So the judiciary must find a way to end its case, and Erdogan ought to begin a national dialogue on reforming the Constitution—a relic from the days when generals ruled the country. Issues relating to restrictions on freedom of speech and the headscarf could be dealt with in this manner. Unfortunately, such a de-escalation is unlikely in the current atmosphere. This court case is a setback for democracy in a key Western ally in a strategically important region. It indicates a deep and widening chasm in Turkish society. Sustained efforts by Turks—of all stripes—and their friends abroad are needed to help prevent Turkey from tearing itself apart. That would be bad for everybody.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Abramowitz is a senior fellow at the Century Foundation and was U.S. Ambassador to Turkey from 1989 to 1991. Barkey is the chair of the International Relations Department at Lehigh University, and was a member of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff from 1998 to 2000.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/6041305650038531172-7885057305369164201?l=anomalisemesta.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/feeds/7885057305369164201/comments/default' title='Poskan Komentar'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=6041305650038531172&amp;postID=7885057305369164201' title='0 Komentar'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/7885057305369164201'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/7885057305369164201'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/2008/04/turkeys-judicial-coup-detat.html' title='Turkey’s Judicial Coup D’etat'/><author><name>muchamad ali safa'at</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07348715720341930804</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6041305650038531172.post-7290714257817342069</id><published>2008-04-08T13:45:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2008-04-08T13:50:17.762-07:00</updated><title type='text'>PARTAI POLITIK</title><content type='html'>The Law on Political Parties (Party Law)&lt;br /&gt;Amended version of 31 January 1994 (Federal Law Gazette I, Page 149),last amended pursuant to Article 1 of the Law dated 28 June 2002(Federal Law Gazette I, Page 2268)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Law on Political Parties (Party Law)&lt;br /&gt;Section I&lt;br /&gt;General Provisions&lt;br /&gt;Article 1&lt;br /&gt;(1) Political parties are a component of the free democratic basic order required under the Constitution. Due to their free and continuous participation in the formation of the political will of the people, they perform a public function which is incumbent on them under the Basic Law and which they undertake to fulfill to the best of their ability.&lt;span class="fullpost"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;(2) The parties shall participate in the formation of the political will of the people in all fields of public life, in particular by exerting influence on the shaping of public opinion; inspiring and furthering political education; promoting active public participation in political life; training capable people to assume public responsibilities; participating in federal, Land and local government elections by nominating candidates; exerting influence on political developments in parliament and government; incorporating their defined political aims into the national decision-making process; and ensuring continuous, vital links between the people and the instruments of state.&lt;br /&gt;(3) The parties shall lay down their aims in political programs.&lt;br /&gt;(4) The parties shall use their funds solely for performing the functions incumbent on them under the Basic Law and this law.&lt;br /&gt;Article 2&lt;br /&gt;Definition of a Political Party&lt;br /&gt;(1) Parties are associations of citizens which exert influence permanently or for longer periods of time on the formation of the political will at federal or Land level and participate in the representation of the people in the German Bundestag or regional parliaments (Landtag) provided that they offer sufficient guarantee of the sincerity of their aims in the general character of their circumstances and attendant conditions, particularly with regard to the size and strength of their organization, their memberships and their conduct in public. Only natural persons may be members of a party.&lt;br /&gt;(2) An organization shall lose its legal status as a party if it does not participate in either a federal election or a Landtag election with nominations of its own for six years.&lt;br /&gt;(3) Political organizations shall not be deemed parties if&lt;br /&gt;1. the majority of their members or the members of their executive committees are aliens; or&lt;br /&gt;2. the registered seat of business is located outside the purview of the present law.&lt;br /&gt;Article 3&lt;br /&gt;Active and Passive Legitimization&lt;br /&gt;A political party may institute legal proceedings in its own name and lawsuits may be brought against it. The same shall apply to its top regional branches, unless specified otherwise in the party statutes.&lt;br /&gt;Article 4&lt;br /&gt;Designation&lt;br /&gt;(1) The name of the party must be clearly distinguishable from that of any existing party; this shall also apply to acronyms. In canvassing and the electoral procedure, only the regis-tered name or acronym may be used; supplementary designations may be omitted.&lt;br /&gt;(2) Regional branches shall bear the name of the party and the designation of their or-ganizational status. This supplementary designation in connection with the name of regional branches is only permissible if it is placed after the name of the party. The supplementary designation may be omitted in general advertising and canvassing.&lt;br /&gt;(3) Regional branches which withdraw from a party shall lose the right to continue to use the party's name. A newly chosen name may not merely consist of an addendum to the pre-vious name. The same shall apply to acronyms.&lt;br /&gt;Article 5&lt;br /&gt;Equal Treatment&lt;br /&gt;(1) Where a public authority provides facilities or other public services for use by one party, equal treatment must be accorded to all parties. The scale on which such facilities and services are provided may be graduated to conform with the importance of the parties to the minimum extent needed for the achievement of their aims. The importance of a party shall be judged in particular from the results of previous government elections. The scale on which such facilities and services are accorded to a party that is represented in the Bundestag by a parliamentary group must be at least half that granted to any other party.&lt;br /&gt;(2) With regard to the accordance of public services in connection with an election, Paragraph 1 shall apply only for the duration of the election campaign to parties which have submitted nominations.&lt;br /&gt;(3) The public services defined in Paragraph 1 may be made dependent on certain pre-conditions which all parties have to fulfill.&lt;br /&gt;(4) Section IV shall remain unaffected.&lt;br /&gt;Section II&lt;br /&gt;Internal Organization&lt;br /&gt;Article 6&lt;br /&gt;Statutes and Program&lt;br /&gt;(1) A party must have written statutes and a written program. The regional branches shall conduct their affairs on the basis of their own statutes, unless specified otherwise in the statutes of their immediately superior regional branch.&lt;br /&gt;(2) The statutes must contain provisions on:&lt;br /&gt;1. The name and any acronym used, the registered seat and the field of activities of the party.&lt;br /&gt;2. The admission and resignation of members.&lt;br /&gt;3. The rights and duties of members.&lt;br /&gt;4. Permissible disciplinary measures against members and their exclusion from the party (Article 10 (3) - (5)).&lt;br /&gt;5. Permissible disciplinary measures against regional branches.&lt;br /&gt;6. The general organization of the party.&lt;br /&gt;7. Composition and powers of the executive committee and other bodies.&lt;br /&gt;8. Matters which may only be decided at members' and delegates' assemblies pursuant to Article 9.&lt;br /&gt;9. The preconditions, form and time limit for convening members' and delegates' assemblies and the official recording of the resolutions passed.&lt;br /&gt;10. Regional branches and bodies which are authorized to submit (sign) nominations for elections to parliaments insofar as there are no relevant legal provisions.&lt;br /&gt;11. A ballot among members and the procedure to be adopted when the party convention passes a resolution to dissolve the party or a regional branch or to merge with another party or parties pursuant to Article 9 (3). The resolution shall be deemed confirmed, amended or rescinded according to the result of the ballot.&lt;br /&gt;12. Form and content of a financial structure which shall comply with the rules laid down in Section V of this law.&lt;br /&gt;(3) The executive committee must inform the Federal Returning Officer of:&lt;br /&gt;1. The party's statutes and program.&lt;br /&gt;2. The names and functions of the members of the executive committee of the party and its Land branches.&lt;br /&gt;3. The dissolution of the party or a Land branch.&lt;br /&gt;Amendments to Sentence 1 (1) and (2) above must be notified by 31 December of the given calendar year. The relevant documents are held by the Federal Returning Officer and made available to the public for perusal and inspection. Copies of the documents must be provided free of charge on request.&lt;br /&gt;(4) Parties whose organizations are confined to the territory of a Land (Land parties) shall be subject to the provisions set out in this law for parties as a whole shall apply to the Land branches.&lt;br /&gt;Article 7&lt;br /&gt;Organization&lt;br /&gt;(1) Parties shall be organized in regional branches. The size and scope of the regional branches shall be laid down in the statutes. The regional structure of the party must be developed to a sufficient degree to enable individual members to participate on an appropriate scale in the formation of the political will of the party. Any party whose organization is confined to the territory of a city-state does not need to establish regional branches; it constitutes a party within the meaning of the present law. It is permissible for several regional branches to merge for organizational purposes if this does not substantially impair the branch structure of the party organization.&lt;br /&gt;(2) Where there are no Land branches in a party, the provisions set out in the present law for Land branches shall apply for the next level of regional branch below that of the party itself.&lt;br /&gt;Article 8&lt;br /&gt;Bodies&lt;br /&gt;(1) The members' assembly and executive committee constitute the essential bodies of the party and its regional branches. The statutes may state that in the supra-local branches the members' assembly may be replaced by a delegates' assembly whose members are elected for a maximum of two years at members' or delegates' assemblies of the subordi-nate branches. Land parties without any regional branches (Article 7 (1) 4) may replace the members' assembly with a delegates' assembly if they have more than 250 members. Dele-gates' assemblies may also be established for local branches which have more than 250 members or which cover a large geographical area.&lt;br /&gt;(2) The statutes may also provide for other institutions (bodies) which help in the formation of opinion at regional branch level. They must be explicitly designated as such in the statutes.&lt;br /&gt;Article 9&lt;br /&gt;Members' and Delegates' Assemblies&lt;br /&gt;(Party Convention, General Assembly)&lt;br /&gt;(1) The members' or delegates' assembly (party convention, general assembly) is the supreme body of a regional branch. In higher-level regional branches, this assembly is called a "party convention" and, at lower levels, a "general assembly"; the provisions for the party convention set out below shall also apply to the general assembly. Party conventions shall convene at least every second calendar year.&lt;br /&gt;(2) Pursuant to the statutes, members of the executive committee and members of other bodies of a regional branch as well as members of the group of people defined in Article 11 (2) may be members of a delegates' assembly, but in this case the number of them eligible to vote must not exceed a fifth of the total number of assembly members.&lt;br /&gt;(3) On the basis of the competence of a regional branch within the party, the party convention shall decide on party programs, statutes, subscriptions, arbitration procedures, the dissolution of the party and mergers with other parties.&lt;br /&gt;(4) The party convention shall elect the chair of the regional branch, his deputies and the other members of the executive committee, the members of any other bodies that may be established and delegates in the bodies of higher-level regional branches unless the present law permits another procedure.&lt;br /&gt;(5) The party convention shall receive a progress report from the executive committee at least every two years and shall pass a resolution on it. Prior to its presentation, the financial part of the report shall be verified by auditors elected by the party convention.&lt;br /&gt;Article 10&lt;br /&gt;Members' Rights&lt;br /&gt;(1) Pursuant to the detailed provisions of the statutes, the competent bodies of the party shall freely decide on the admission of new members. No reasons need to be given for rejecting an application for admission. Neither general nor temporary bans admission shall be permissible. Persons who have been deprived by judicial decision of their eligibility for office or of their right to vote may not become members of a party.&lt;br /&gt;(2) Party members and delegates in the party bodies shall have equal voting rights. Pur-suant to the detailed provisions of the statutes, the exercise of voting rights can be made dependent on members having paid their membership fees. A member may resign from the party at any time without notice.&lt;br /&gt;(3) The statutes shall contain provisions stipulating&lt;br /&gt;1. permissible disciplinary measures against members;&lt;br /&gt;2. the reasons for such measures;&lt;br /&gt;3. the party bodies which may initiate disciplinary measures. If a member is deprived of party offices or of the qualification to hold such offices, the reasons for such a decision must be stated.&lt;br /&gt;(4) A member may only be expelled from the party if he or she deliberately infringes the statutes or the principles of discipline of the party, thereby inflicting serious damage on the party.&lt;br /&gt;(5) The arbitration court defined as competent under the arbitration procedure code shall decide on expulsions from the party. The right to appeal to a higher court must be guaranteed. Decisions must be justified in writing. In urgent and serious cases calling for immediate action, the executive committee of the party or a regional branch may exclude a member from exercising his or her rights until the arbitration court has reached a decision.&lt;br /&gt;Article 11&lt;br /&gt;Executive Committee&lt;br /&gt;(1) The executive committee shall be elected at least every two calendar years. It must comprise at least three members.&lt;br /&gt;(2) By virtue of the statutes, the executive committee may include members of parliament and other high-ranking persons in the party if they hold office or mandate as the result of an election. The proportion of members not elected under the provisions of Article 9 (4) must not exceed one fifth of the total number of executive committee members. The chair-person and treasurer of a party may not exercise comparable functions in any political foundation associated with the party.&lt;br /&gt;(3) The executive committee shall manage the regional branch and conducts its affairs in accordance with the law and the statutes as well as with the resolutions of the supreme bodies of the party. It shall represent the regional branch in accordance with Article 26 (2) of the Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) unless the statutes specify otherwise.&lt;br /&gt;(4) An executive presiding committee may be formed from the members of the executive committee to implement the resolutions of the latter and to carry out regular and particularly urgent executive committee business. Its members may also be elected by the executive committee or stipulated in the statutes.&lt;br /&gt;Article 12&lt;br /&gt;General Party Committees&lt;br /&gt;(1) Members of general party committees and similar institutions endowed pursuant to the statutes with extensive powers for deliberating or deciding on questions of party policy and organization may also be elected by subordinate regional branches.&lt;br /&gt;(2) The chairperson and members of the group of persons defined in Article 11 (2) may also belong to such a body by virtue of the statutes. The proportion of non-elected members must not exceed one third of the total number of members of this body; it may be augmented by the election of non-voting members with merely advisory functions, but even in this case the proportion of non-elected members must still be less than half of the total number of members.&lt;br /&gt;(3) Members of the bodies specified in Paragraph 1 shall hold office for a maximum of two years.&lt;br /&gt;Article 13&lt;br /&gt;Composition of Delegates' Assemblies&lt;br /&gt;The composition of a delegates' assembly or of any other body wholly or partly comprising delegates from regional branches must be laid down in the statutes. The number of dele-gates from a regional branch shall primarily be calculated on the basis of the number of members represented. The statutes may stipulate that the composition of the remaining delegates, no more than half of the total number, shall be determined in accordance with the proportion of votes obtained at regional branch level in previous parliamentary elections. The exercise of this right to vote may be made dependent on the fulfillment of the regional branch's requirement to pay its membership fees.&lt;br /&gt;Article 14&lt;br /&gt;Party Arbitration Courts&lt;br /&gt;(1) Courts of arbitration shall be set up at least at party level and at the top-level regional branches to settle and decide on disputes between the party or a regional branch and indi-vidual members as well as on disputes over the interpretation and implementation of the statutes. Joint courts of arbitration may be set up for several regional branches at district level.&lt;br /&gt;(2) The members of the arbitration courts shall be elected for a maximum of four years. They must not be members of the executive committee of the party or a regional branch, be employed by the party or a regional branch, nor receive regular income from them. They shall be independent and not be subject to instructions.&lt;br /&gt;(3) The statutes may provide for the arbitration courts to comprise, in general or in par-ticular cases, associate judges nominated on a parity basis by the litigants.&lt;br /&gt;(4) The functions of the arbitration court shall be governed by an arbitration court code designed to guarantee litigants a legal hearing, fair proceedings and the challenge of a member of the arbitration court for bias.&lt;br /&gt;Article 15&lt;br /&gt;Formation of Will in the Bodies&lt;br /&gt;(1) The bodies shall adopt their resolutions on the basis of a simple majority vote unless a higher majority vote is prescribed by law or by the statutes.&lt;br /&gt;(2) The elections of the members of the executive committee and the delegates to delegates' assemblies as well as to bodies of higher-level regional branches shall be secret. Voting may be open at all other elections unless voters object when asked.&lt;br /&gt;(3) The statutory provisions governing the filing of motions must be such as to ensure a democratic formation of will and in particular the adequate discussion of proposals also put forward by minorities. At least the delegates of the regional branches at the next two lower levels must be granted the right to file motions at the assemblies of higher-level regional branches. Any commitment to resolutions taken by other bodies shall be impermissible at elections and polls.&lt;br /&gt;Article 16&lt;br /&gt;Measures Against Regional Branches&lt;br /&gt;(1) The dissolution and expulsion of subordinate regional branches or the removal from office of whole bodies of the aforementioned shall be permissible only in cases of serious infringement of party principles or discipline. The statutes shall stipulate&lt;br /&gt;1. the reasons for which the measures shall be permissible;&lt;br /&gt;2. the higher-level regional branch and the body of that regional branch that may pass such measures.&lt;br /&gt;(2) The executive committee of the party or a higher-level regional branch must receive confirmation of a measure provided for in Paragraph 1 from a senior body. The measure shall be repealed if it is not confirmed at the next party convention.&lt;br /&gt;(3) It is permissible to appeal to an arbitration court against measures provided for in Paragraph 1.&lt;br /&gt;Section III&lt;br /&gt;Nomination of Candidates for Election&lt;br /&gt;Article 17&lt;br /&gt;Nomination of Candidates&lt;br /&gt;The nomination of candidates for election to all levels of government must be by secret ballot. The nomination procedure shall be as prescribed by the electoral laws and party statutes.&lt;br /&gt;Section IV&lt;br /&gt;State Funding&lt;br /&gt;Article 18&lt;br /&gt;Principles and Volume of State Funding&lt;br /&gt;(1) The parties shall receive funds as a contribution towards the funding of the duties generally incumbent upon them under the Basic Law. The allocation of state funds shall depend on the success a party achieves with the voters in European, Bundestag and Landtag elections, on the sum of its membership fees and on the amount of money it obtains from donations.&lt;br /&gt;(2) The maximum total volume of state funds which may be paid to all parties each year shall be 133 million euros (absolute upper limit).&lt;br /&gt;(3) Under the state partial funding program, the parties shall each year receive:&lt;br /&gt;0.70 euro for each valid vote cast for its list or&lt;br /&gt;0.70 euro for each valid vote cast for a party in a constituency or polling district whose list was not approved in a Land, and&lt;br /&gt;0.38 euro for each euro which it has obtained as bestowals (membership fee, deputy fee or rightfully obtained donation); in this context, only bestowals up to 3,300 euros per natural person shall be taken into account.&lt;br /&gt;Notwithstanding numbers 1 and 2 above, the parties shall receive 0.85 euro for every vote they obtain up to four million valid votes.&lt;br /&gt;(4) Parties which, according to the final election result, have obtained at least 0.5 % of the valid votes cast for lists at the latest European or Bundestag election or 1 % in a Land election shall be entitled to state funds in accordance with Paragraph 3, nos. 1 and 3; in order to qualify for payments under Paragraph 3, sentence 1, no. 1 and sentence 2, the party must meet these requirements in the election concerned. Parties which, according to the final election result, have obtained 10 % of the valid votes cast in a constituency or polling district shall be entitled to state funds under Paragraph 3, no. 2. Sentences 1 and 2 shall not apply to parties of national minorities.&lt;br /&gt;(5) The amount of state funds must not exceed the annual income gained by a party under Article 24 (4), nos. 1 to 7 (relative upper limit). The sum of the funds made available to all parties must not exceed the absolute upper limit.&lt;br /&gt;(6) Upon publication of the statements of account by the President of the German Bundestag of the parties represented in the German Bundestag, the Bundestag shall in accordance with Article 23 (2), sentence no. 3 decide on the adaptation of the amount to the absolute upper limit (Article 18 (2)). To this effect, the President of the Federal Statistical Office shall submit a report to the German Bundestag by 30 April of each year concerning the development of the price index of expenditures typical for a party with respect to the previous year. This report shall be based on a basket of the goods and services associated with the typical expenditures of the parties according to the recommendation of the committee pursuant to Paragraph 7.&lt;br /&gt;(7) During the first year of his term of office, the Federal President shall appoint a independent expert commission to review the basket on which the price index of the typical expenditures of the parties is based. It shall, if necessary, redefine the composition and weighting of the basket as well as the base year for the price index. It shall submit the results of this review to the President of the German Bundestag. In case of changes to the structure of state funding, another independent expert commission shall be appointed upon request of the German Bundestag.&lt;br /&gt;(8) If a party is dissolved or banned, it shall lose its eligibility for support under the state partial funding program from the date of its dissolution.&lt;br /&gt;Article 19&lt;br /&gt;Filing of an Application for State Partial Funding&lt;br /&gt;(1) The parties must apply to the President of the German Bundestag in writing by 30 September of the year of entitlement for the fixing and disbursement of the state funds for the year of entitlement as defined by the Law. Applications must be submitted by an executive committee member who under the party statutes is responsible for financial affairs and must contain the address to which mail is to be delivered and bank account particulars. It is sufficient for the federal association to submit a common application for the whole party. Partial applications are permissible. In case state funds for a party have already been fixed for the year preceding the year of entitlement, the President of the German Bundestag will fix the sum without further application. The party must notify the President of the German Bundestag of any changes concerning the fixing procedure immediately. If no such notification is given, the party be liable.&lt;br /&gt;(2) Applications for installments must be submitted in writing to the President of the German Bundestag by the 15th of the month preceding the next installment. Applications may be submitted for several installments for the year at the same time. Paragraph 1, sentences 5 to 7 shall apply mutatis mutandis.&lt;br /&gt;Article 19a&lt;br /&gt;Fixing Procedure&lt;br /&gt;(1) The President of the German Bundestag shall fix the volume of state funds each eligible party is entitled to for the previous year (year of entitlement) by 15 February each year. He may only fix and disburse state funds for a party pursuant to Articles 18 and 19a on the basis of a statement of account that corresponds to the provisions in Section V. If the President of the German Bundestag institutes proceedings pursuant to Article 23a (2) with regard to a statement of account that has been submitted in due time, he shall only provisionally fix the state funds for this party on the basis of its statement of account and shall disburse these funds against a security deposit equivalent to the probable financial obligations of the party (Articles 31a to 31c). He will fix the volume of state funds after the conclusion of the procedure.&lt;br /&gt;(2) The basis for fixing the volume of state funds is the number of valid votes obtained by the eligible parties by 31 December of the year of entitlement in the latest European, Bundestag or Landtag elections and the bestowals published in the statements of account (Article 18 (3), sentence 1, no. 3) for the previous year (account year). The President of the German Bundestag shall record the valid votes for each party qualified for consideration under Article 18 (4) in a vote account and keep it up to date.&lt;br /&gt;(3) The party shall submit its statement of account to the President of the German Bundestag by 30 September of the year following the account year. The President of the German Bundestag can extend this deadline by up to three months. If a party does not submit its statement of account on time, it shall once and for all forfeit its entitlement to state funds linked to bestowals (forfeiture of bestowal share). If a party has not submitted its statement by 31 December of the year following the year of entitlement, it will once and for all forfeit its entitlement to state funds for the year of entitlement (forfeiture of the electoral vote share). The deadline will be met regardless of the correctness of the content if the statement complies with the form specified in Article 24 and the auditor’s certificate is attached pursuant to Article 30 (2). The amounts fixed and disbursed to the other parties shall remain unaffected.&lt;br /&gt;(4) The calculation of the relative upper limit (Article 18 (5)) shall be based on the income published in the statements of account for the account year pursuant to Article 24 (4), nos. 1 to 7.&lt;br /&gt;(5) During the fixing procedure, first the absolute limit (Article 18 (2)) must be observed and then the relative limit for each party (Article 18 (5)). If the total sum of state funds calculated exceeds the absolute limit, the parties shall only be entitled to a volume of state funds equal to their proportion of that sum.&lt;br /&gt;(6) The state funds for the valid votes obtained in Land elections shall be disbursed to the party’s Land branch at the rate of 0,50 euro per vote; any reductions made under Paragraph 5 shall not be taken into consideration if they can be made within the scope of the disbursements that have to be made by the Federation (Article 21 (1), sentence 1, alternative 2). The remaining state funds shall be disbursed to the party’s national branch or, if the party is only represented at Land level, to the Land branch.&lt;br /&gt;Article 20&lt;br /&gt;Installments&lt;br /&gt;(1) Parties entitled to state funds must be granted installments on the amount established by the President of the German Bundestag. Such payments shall be calculated on the basis of the funds allocated to each party in the previous year. Installments shall be paid on 15 February, 15 May, 15 August, and 15 November; they must not exceed 25 % of the total sum fixed for the party concerned for the preceding year. If there are signs that a party might be obliged to reimburse funds, the grant may be made dependent on a security deposit.&lt;br /&gt;(2) Installments must be reimbursed by the parties immediately if they exceed the amount fixed or if a party has no entitlement to them. If the amount fixed shows that there was an over-payment, the President of the German Bundestag shall assess the amount that that has to be reimbursed as part of the administrative act comprising the fixing and shall take this amount into account directly.&lt;br /&gt;(3) Paragraph 19a (6) shall apply mutatis mutandis.&lt;br /&gt;Article 21&lt;br /&gt;Provision of Federal Government Funds and Payment Procedure&lt;br /&gt;(1) The funds provided for in Articles 18 and 20 shall in the case of Article 19a (6), sentence 1, be disbursed to the parties by the Laender, in other cases by the Federal Government through the President of the German Bundestag. The President of the German Bundestag shall bindingly inform the Laender of the amounts accruing to the Land branches of the parties.&lt;br /&gt;(2) The Federal Audit Office shall examine whether the President of the German Bundestag as the agency administering the funds has fixed the volume of the state funds and disbursed them in accordance with the provisions of this Section.&lt;br /&gt;Article 22&lt;br /&gt;Internal Financial Compensation The parties' national branches shall make adequate arrangements for the adequate financial compensation of their Land branches.&lt;br /&gt;Section V&lt;br /&gt;Rendering of Account&lt;br /&gt;Article 23&lt;br /&gt;Obligation to Render A Public Statement of Account&lt;br /&gt;(1) The executive committee of the party shall render public account of the origin and appropriation of funds received by the party within a calendar year (accounting year) as well as of its assets in a statement of account.&lt;br /&gt;(2) The statement of account must be scrutinized by a certified auditor or auditing company in accordance with Articles 29 to 31. In the case of parties which do not meet the requirements of Article 18 (4), sentence 1, the statement of account may be scrutinized by a sworn public accountant. It must be submitted to the President of the German Bundestag by 30 September of the year following the accounting year and circulated by him or her as a Bundestag printed paper. The President of the German Bundestag may extend the limit up to a maximum of three months in extenuating circumstances. The party statement of account shall be submitted for discussion to the next national party convention following its publication.&lt;br /&gt;(3) The President of the German Bundestag shall examine whether the statement of account has been prepared in accordance with the regulations of Section V. The result of the scrutiny shall be recorded in the report specified in Paragraph 5.&lt;br /&gt;(4) The President of the German Bundestag shall not fix the volume of state funds to be allocated to a party under Articles 18 and 19 until a statement of account complying with the provisions of Section V has been submitted. The decisive basis for payments as defined in Article 18 shall be the statement of account for the preceding year, for payments as defined in Article 20 the statement of account submitted the preceding year. A party that fails to submit the report by 31 December of the following year shall forfeit its entitlement to state funds; the amounts fixed and disbursed to the other parties shall remain unaffected.&lt;br /&gt;(5) The President of the German Bundestag shall report to the German Bundestag each year on the trend in the financial situation of the parties and the party statements of account. The report shall be circulated as a Bundestag printed paper.&lt;br /&gt;Article 23a&lt;br /&gt;Illegally Obtained Donations&lt;br /&gt;(1) A party which obtains donations illegally or fail to publicize them in the statement of account in accordance with the regulations of this Law (Article 25 (2)) shall forfeit its entitlement to state funds equivalent to twice the amount of money illegally obtained or not publicized in accordance with the provisions of this Law. Donations obtained illegally must be surrendered to the Office of the President of the German Bundestag.&lt;br /&gt;(2) Donations as defined in Article 25 (1), sentence 2, shall be regarded as illegally obtained if they have not been immediately transferred to the Office of the President of the German Bundestag, in contravention of Article 25 (3).&lt;br /&gt;(3) The Office of the President of the German Bundestag shall, at the beginning of each calendar year, transfer the funds received within a calendar year to institutions serving charitable, church, religious or scientific purposes.&lt;br /&gt;(4) The political parties shall incorporate in their statutes regulations to cover the event of measures as defined in Paragraph 1 being caused by Land branches or their subordinate regional branches.&lt;br /&gt;Article 23b&lt;br /&gt;Obligation to Report Inaccuracies in the Statement of Account&lt;br /&gt;(1) If a party obtains knowledge of inaccuracies in the statement of account that it has submitted to the President of the German Bundestag in due time and form, the party shall immediately report this fact to the President of the German Bundestag.&lt;br /&gt;(2) If a party reports an inaccuracy, it will not be subject to the legal consequences specified in Article 31b or 31c if at the date of receipt of the report there was no firm evidence that these inaccuracies were known publicly or were neither known to the President of the German Bundestag nor had been discovered in an official proceedure and the party fully discloses and corrects the facts and figures. The unlawfully received financial benefits shall be returned to the President of the German Bundestag within a time limit he or she sets.&lt;br /&gt;(3) Paragraph 23a (5 and 6) shall apply mutatis mutandis.&lt;br /&gt;Article 24&lt;br /&gt;Statement of Account&lt;br /&gt;(1) The statement of account shall comprise a bill of receipts and expenditure and an account of assets. It shall be drawn up in accordance with the principles of proper bookkeeping and with due regard to the purposes of this Law. The statement of account of the whole party shall incorporate separate accounts for the party's national branch and the Land branches as well as statements of account of the subordinate regional branches of each Land branch. Land branches and their subordinate regional branches shall attach to their statements of account a complete list of all donations received, together with the names and addresses of the donors. The Land branches shall keep the statements of account of their subordinate regional branches together with their own accounting documents.&lt;br /&gt;(2) The bill of income shall include:&lt;br /&gt;1. Membership fees and similar regular contributions&lt;br /&gt;2. Donations from natural persons&lt;br /&gt;3. Donations from legal entities&lt;br /&gt;4. Income from assets&lt;br /&gt;5. Income from organized events, distribution of printed material and publications and other activities associated with income&lt;br /&gt;6. State funds&lt;br /&gt;7. Other income&lt;br /&gt;8. Grants from party branches&lt;br /&gt;9. Gross receipts from items 1 to 8.&lt;br /&gt;(3) The bill of expenditures shall include:&lt;br /&gt;1. Personnel expenditure&lt;br /&gt;2. Business expenditure&lt;br /&gt;3. Expenditure for general political work&lt;br /&gt;4. Expenditure for election campaigns&lt;br /&gt;5. Interest&lt;br /&gt;6. Other expenditure&lt;br /&gt;7. Grants to party branches&lt;br /&gt;8. Gross expenditure from items 1 to 7.&lt;br /&gt;(4) The statement of assets shall comprise:&lt;br /&gt;1. Property assets&lt;br /&gt;I. Capital assets:&lt;br /&gt;1. Property in the form of houses and real estate&lt;br /&gt;2. Office equipment&lt;br /&gt;3. Financial investments&lt;br /&gt;II. Working capital:&lt;br /&gt;1. Claims on party branches&lt;br /&gt;2. Claims on state funds&lt;br /&gt;3. Monetary assets&lt;br /&gt;4. Other assets&lt;br /&gt;III. All property&lt;br /&gt;2. Debits:&lt;br /&gt;I. Reserve funds:&lt;br /&gt;1. Pension obligations&lt;br /&gt;2. other reserve funds&lt;br /&gt;II. Liabilities&lt;br /&gt;1. Liabilities towards party branches&lt;br /&gt;2. Liabilities towards banking institutions&lt;br /&gt;3. Other liabilities III.&lt;br /&gt;Gross debit&lt;br /&gt;3. Net assets (positive or negative)&lt;br /&gt;(5) The statement of account must show the total amount of bestowals made by natural persons up to 6,000 German marks per person as well as the total amount of bestowals made by natural persons which exceed the amount of 6,000 German marks separately.&lt;br /&gt;(6) The statement of account shall be preceded by a summary covering the following items:&lt;br /&gt;1. Income of the whole party in accordance with Paragraph 2, nos. 1 to 7, and their total&lt;br /&gt;2. Expenditure of the whole party in accordance with Paragraph 3, nos. 1 to 6, and their total&lt;br /&gt;3. Surplus or deficit&lt;br /&gt;4. Items of possession of the whole party in accordance with Paragraph 4, nos. 1 I and II 2 to 4 and their total&lt;br /&gt;5. Debit items of the whole party in accordance with Paragraph 4 nos. 2 I and II 2 and 3 and their total&lt;br /&gt;6. Net assets of the whole party (positive or negative)&lt;br /&gt;7. Gross receipts, gross expenditures, surpluses or deficits as well as net assets of the three organizational levels - national branch, Land branches and their subordinate regional branches.&lt;br /&gt;In addition to the absolute figures for nos. 1 and 2, the percentage rate of the income sum pursuant to no. 1 and of the expenditure sum pursuant to no. 2 respectively must be indicated.&lt;br /&gt;(7) The number of members at the end of the year must be indicated.&lt;br /&gt;(8) The party may attach brief explanations to the statement of account, especially to specific items.&lt;br /&gt;(9) Public grants appropriated for political youth organizations shall not count towards the absolute and relative upper limits. They must be indicated in a party's statement of account for information purposes but shall not be included in its bill of income and expenditure.&lt;br /&gt;Article 25&lt;br /&gt;Donations&lt;br /&gt;(1) Parties are entitled to accept donations. Donations can be given in cash up to the amount of 1,000 euros. Party members who receive donations for a party shall immediately forward them to an executive committee member who in accordance with the statutes is responsible for financial affairs. Donations to a party shall be considered obtained when they reach the area of disposal of an executive committee member responsible for financial affairs or of a full-time member of the party; donations that are forwarded back to the donor immediately after receipt shall not be deemed as having reached the party.&lt;br /&gt;(2) Parties are not allowed to accept the following donations:&lt;br /&gt;1.    Donations from public corporations, parliamentary factions and groups as well as fractions and groups of municipal agencies;&lt;br /&gt;2.    Donations from political foundations, incorporated bodies, associations of individuals and funds which, under the statutes, the foundation charter or other rules and regulations and by virtue of the actual business, are intended exclusively and directly for non-profit-making, charitable or church purposes (Paragraphs 51 to 68 of the tax law)&lt;br /&gt;3.    Donations from outside the area of application of this Law unless&lt;br /&gt;a.     these donations accrue to a party directly from the assets of a German citizen as defined by the Basic Law, a citizen of the European Union or a business enterprise more than 50 per cent of whose shares are owned by Germans as defined by the Basic Law or by a citizen of the European Union or whose principal residence is located in a member state of the European Union;&lt;br /&gt;b.    they are donations to parties of national minorities in their ancestral country which are granted to them from states bordering on the Federal Republic of Germany and in which members of their ethnic community live, or&lt;br /&gt;c.     they are donations of no more than 1,000 euros from an alien.&lt;br /&gt;4.    Donations from professional associations which were bestowed on them with the proviso that they be forwarded to a political party.&lt;br /&gt;5.    Donations from enterprises that are fully or partly under state ownership or are administrated or managed publicly if the state has more than a 25 per cent holding.&lt;br /&gt;6.    Donations which exceed 500 euros and whose donors cannot be determined, or donations from an anonymous third party which have evidently been forwarded.&lt;br /&gt;7.    Donations that are clearly made to the party in the expectation of or in return for a specific economic or political advantage.&lt;br /&gt;8.    Donations solicited by a third party against a payment from the party if the payment exceeds 25 per cent of the value of the solicited donation.&lt;br /&gt;(3) Donations and deputy fees in excess of a total of 10,000 euros given to a party or to one or more of its regional branches in a calendar year (accounting year) must be recorded in the statement of account, together with the names and addresses of the donors and the total amount of the donations. Single donations in excess of 50,000 euros shall be reported to the President of the German Bundestag immediately. He or she shall publish the donation as a Bundestag printed paper as soon as possible, stating the name of the donor.&lt;br /&gt;(4) The party shall forward inadmissible donations as defined in Paragraph 2 to the Office of the President of the German Bundestag at the latest together with the submission of the statement of account for the respective year (Article 19a (3).&lt;br /&gt;Article 26&lt;br /&gt;Definition of Income&lt;br /&gt;(1) Income is any monetary payment made to the political party unless special stipulations apply to specific types of income (Article 24 (2)). Exemption from customary obligations and from the assumption of responsibility by others for events and measures with which explicit canvassing is done for a political party shall likewise be considered income.&lt;br /&gt;(2) All income shall be entered to their full in their appropriate places. Article 27 (2) shall remain unaffected.&lt;br /&gt;(3) Non-monetary assets shall be assessed at the prices normally paid in the ordinary course of business for identical or comparable services.&lt;br /&gt;(4) Party work done by citizens shall as a matter of principle be unpaid work. Payments in kind and services provided by party members on a non-commercial basis and usually free of charge shall not be counted as income. The reimbursement of costs and expenses shall remain unaffected.&lt;br /&gt;(5) Transitory items of money and services as well as membership fees and other income appropriated from the outset for quota allocation among several regional branches shall be booked at the branch which will ultimately receive them.&lt;br /&gt;Article 27&lt;br /&gt;Individual Types of Income&lt;br /&gt;(1) Membership fees shall only be regular payments a member pays by virtue of statutory provisions. Donations shall be payments exceeding the aforementioned contributions, in particular admission fees, special assessments and collections as well as monetary bestow-als of all kinds unless they are usually made free of charge on a non-commercial basis.&lt;br /&gt;(2) The net profit must be entered for the sources of income specified in Article 24 (2), nos. 4 and 5. The requirement to disclose income in the accounts pursuant to Article 24 (2), nos. 2 and 3 and Paragraph (5) shall remain unaffected. Other income as defined in Article 24 (2), no. 7 must be broken down and provided with explanatory notes whenever it exceeds 5 per cent of the total income from nos. 1 to 6 in one of the breakdowns shown under Article 24 (1).&lt;br /&gt;(3) The bill of income may disregard payments in kind and services which the party members usually provide free of charge on a non-commercial basis which do not exceed a value of 1,000 German marks in each individual case. Sentence 1 shall apply as appropriate to the organization of canvassing events and measures.&lt;br /&gt;Article 28&lt;br /&gt;Compulsory Bookkeeping&lt;br /&gt;Political parties must keep accounts of income and expenditure which are liable to account as well as of their assets. The accounts shall be drawn up in accordance with the principles of proper bookkeeping and with regard to the purposes of this Law. The accounting documents must be stored for six years; account books, balance sheets and statements of account for ten years. The period of storage shall commence at the end of the accounting year.&lt;br /&gt;Article 29&lt;br /&gt;Audit of the Statement of Account&lt;br /&gt;(1) The audit specified Article 23 (2), sentence 1 and Paragraph 3 shall apply to the party's national branch, its Land branches and to at least four subordinate regional branches chosen by the auditor.&lt;br /&gt;(2) The auditor may require the executive committee and the persons authorized by them to furnish any information and evidence he may need to perform his auditing duty with due care. He must therefore also be allowed to examine the documents used to compile the statement of account, the books and written documents as well as the cash balance and existing assets.&lt;br /&gt;(3) The executive committee of the regional branch to be audited shall provide the audi-tor written assurance that all the receipts which are liable to account, expenditure and assets are included in the statement of account. Reference may be made to the assurance provided by the executive committees of subordinate regional branches. It is sufficient for the executive committee member responsible for financial affairs to provide this assurance.&lt;br /&gt;Article 30&lt;br /&gt;Audit Report and Auditor's Certificate&lt;br /&gt;(1) The result of the audit must be set out in writing in an audit report which must be de-livered to the executive committee of the party and to the executive committee of the audited regional branch.&lt;br /&gt;(2) If no objections are to be lodged after the final result of the audit, the auditor must confirm by means of a certificate that, after a dutiful audit and on the basis of the party's account books and documents as well as the information and evidence furnished by the executive committees, the statement of account as audited (Article 29 (1)) complies with the provisions of this Law. If objections are to be lodged, the auditor must refuse to provide this confirmation in its auditor's certificate or modify it accordingly. The names of the regional branches audited must be stated in the auditor's certificate.&lt;br /&gt;(3) The auditor's certificate must be attached to the statement of account to be submitted and published verbatim in accordance with Article 23 (2), sentence 2.&lt;br /&gt;Article 31&lt;br /&gt;Auditors&lt;br /&gt;(1) A certified auditor or a certified accountant may not be an auditor if he:&lt;br /&gt;1. holds an office or a function in the party or for the party or has held one during the last three years;&lt;br /&gt;2. in the course of keeping the accounts or preparing the statement of account required to be audited, he has participated in more than just auditing work;&lt;br /&gt;3. is the legal representative, employee, member of the supervisory board or partner of a legal or natural person or of a partnership or the owner of an enterprise if the legal or natural person, the partnership or one of its partners or the specific enterprise may not be the party auditor pursuant to no. 2;&lt;br /&gt;4. in the auditing, employs a person who may not be an auditor pursuant to nos. 1 to 3.&lt;br /&gt;(2) An auditing company or a certified auditing company may not be an auditor if:&lt;br /&gt;1. pursuant to Paragraph (1), no. 3 as the partner of a legal person or a partnership or pursuant to Paragraph (1), no. 2 or 4 it may not be an auditor;&lt;br /&gt;2. pursuant to Paragraph (1), no. 2 or 3, one of its legal representatives or partners may not be an auditor.&lt;br /&gt;(3) The auditors, their assistants and the legal representatives of an auditing company who assist in the audit are obliged to discharge their duties conscientiously and impartially and to exercise discretion&lt;br /&gt;Section VI&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Article 31a&lt;br /&gt;Procedures for Unlawful Statements of Account and Penal Provisions&lt;br /&gt;(1) If bestowals were unlawfully indicated in the statement of accounts (Article 18 (3), no. 3, sentence 1) and the state funds that the party was entitled to were therefore wrongly fixed, the President of the German Bundestag shall revoke the fixing of the state funds pursuant to Article 19a (1). This shall not apply if the correction is made in the statement of accounts for the following year (Article 23a (5), sentence 3. Article 48 (2) of the Administrative Procedure Act shall not apply.&lt;br /&gt;(2) No revocation shall be possible after the end of the time period fixed in Article 24 (2).&lt;br /&gt;(3) With the revocation, the President of the German Bundestag fixes the amount that has to be reimbursed by the party in an administrative act. If a settlement emerges in the further course of the state funding procedure, the difference shall be taken into account in the next installment paid to the party.&lt;br /&gt;(4) The amounts fixed and disbursed to the other parties shall remain unaffected.&lt;br /&gt;(5) The parties shall include provisions in their statutes in case action pursuant to paragraph 1 is caused by Land branches or subordinate regional branches.&lt;br /&gt;Article 31d&lt;br /&gt;Penal Provisions&lt;br /&gt;(1) Anyone intent on concealing the origin or the use of party means or assets or on evading the obligation render public account who&lt;br /&gt;1. causes false data concerning the income or the assets of the party to be recorded in a statement of account submitted to the President of the German Bundestag or submits a false statement of account to the President of the German Bundestag or&lt;br /&gt;2. as a recipient divides a donation into installments and credits them or has someone credit them or&lt;br /&gt;3. does not forward a donation notwithstanding Article 25 (1), sentence 3&lt;br /&gt;shall be sentenced to up to three years imprisonment or fined. In accordance with sentence 1, no one shall be punished if under the conditions set forth in Article 23b (2) they report the fact for the party pursuant to Article 23b (1) or help to report the fact.&lt;br /&gt;(2) Anyone who as an auditor or an auditor's assistant gives a false report on the result of the audit of a statement of account, fails to disclose relevant facts in the audit report or grants a confirmation certificate whose content is false shall be sentenced to up to three years imprisonment or fined. Offenders acting against payment or with the intent of enriching themselves or someone else or damaging someone else shall be sentenced to up to five years imprisonment or fined.&lt;br /&gt;Section VII&lt;br /&gt;Implementation of the Ban on Unconstitutional Parties&lt;br /&gt;Article 32&lt;br /&gt;Enforcement&lt;br /&gt;(1) Where a party or a branch of a party has been declared unconstitutional pursuant to Article 21 (2) of the Basic Law, the appropriate authorities appointed by the Land governments shall adopt within the law any measures needed to enforce the judgment as well as any additional enforcement procedures ordered by the Federal Constitutional Court. To this end, the supreme Land authorities shall have the unrestricted right to give instructions to the Land authorities and agencies which are responsible for public safety or order.&lt;br /&gt;(2) Where the organization or activities of the party or of the party branch declared to be unconstitutional extend beyond the territory of a Land, the Federal Minister of the Interior shall issue the orders necessary to ensure uniform enforcement.&lt;br /&gt;(3) The Federal Constitutional Court may order the enforcement to be carried out in accordance with Article 35 of the Law on the Federal Constitutional Court, notwithstanding Paragraphs (1) and (2).&lt;br /&gt;(4) Objections to and action to set aside enforcement measures shall have no suspensive effect on the enforcement. Where the proceedings of an administrative court pertain to a matter which is of fundamental importance for the enforcement of a judgment, the proceedings shall be discontinued and a Federal Constitutional Court decision obtained. The Federal Constitutional Court shall also decide upon objections raised against the manner in which special enforcement measures ordered by the Court are to be carried out.&lt;br /&gt;(5) In the event of a confiscation of assets, Articles 10 to 13 of the Law on Associations of 5 August 1964 (Federal Law Gazette I, p. 593) shall apply as appropriate. The authority imposing the ban shall be the supreme Land authority or, if Paragraph (2) applies, the Federal Minister of the Interior.&lt;br /&gt;Article 33&lt;br /&gt;Ban on Substitute Organizations&lt;br /&gt;(1) There shall be a ban on the establishment of organizations which continue to pursue the unconstitutional aims of a party banned under Article 21 (2) of the Basic Law in connection with Article 46 of the Law on the Federal Constitutional Court in lieu of the said banned party (substitute organization) or to continue existing organizations as substitute organizations.&lt;br /&gt;(2) Where the substitute organization is a party which already existed prior to the ban on the original party or where it is represented in the Bundestag or a Landtag, the Federal Constitutional Court shall declare by judgment that it is a substitute organization; Articles 38, 41, 43, 44 and 46 (3) of the Law on the Federal Constitutional Court and Article 32 of the present Law shall apply as appropriate.&lt;br /&gt;(3) Article 8 (2) of the Law on Associations shall be applied as appropriate to other parties and organizations which, within the meaning of Article 2 of the Law on Associations, constitute substitute organizations of a banned party.&lt;br /&gt;Section VIII&lt;br /&gt;Final Provisions&lt;br /&gt;Article 34&lt;br /&gt;(Amendment to Income Tax Law)&lt;br /&gt;Article 35&lt;br /&gt;(Amendment to Corporate Tax Law)&lt;br /&gt;Article 36&lt;br /&gt;(Application of Tax Regulations)&lt;br /&gt;Article 37&lt;br /&gt;Non-Applicability of a Provision of the Civil Code&lt;br /&gt;Article 54, sentence 2 of the Civil Code shall not apply to political parties.&lt;br /&gt;Article 38&lt;br /&gt;Means of Coercion Available to the Federal Returning Officer&lt;br /&gt;The Federal Returning Officer may prompt the executive committee of the party to take the action specified in Article 6 (3) by means of a compulsory payment. The provisions of the Administration Enforcement Law shall apply as appropriate; the Federal Returning Officer therefore acts as an enforcement authority. The compulsory payment shall be no less than 250 euros and no more than 1,500 euros.&lt;br /&gt;Article 39&lt;br /&gt;Provisions Concerning Final Payments and Transitional Arrangements&lt;br /&gt;(1) Land legislation based on Article 22, sentence 2 of this Law applicable until 1 January 1994 shall no longer apply.&lt;br /&gt;(2) The calculation of state funds pursuant to Article 18 (3), no. 3 and of the relative upper limit shall be based on the bestowals indicated in the statements of accounts pursuant to Article 24 (2), nos. 1 and 2 of this Law in the version applicable until 31 December 2002 for the fixing of the amounts for the years 2003 and 2004. This shall apply likewise to the preparation of the statements of account for 2002.&lt;br /&gt;(3) Article 23a (3) shall apply to the audit of statements of accounts issued from the account year 2002.&lt;br /&gt;Article 40&lt;br /&gt;(deleted)&lt;br /&gt;Article 41&lt;br /&gt;(Entry into Force)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/6041305650038531172-7290714257817342069?l=anomalisemesta.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/feeds/7290714257817342069/comments/default' title='Poskan Komentar'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=6041305650038531172&amp;postID=7290714257817342069' title='1 Komentar'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/7290714257817342069'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/6041305650038531172/posts/default/7290714257817342069'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://anomalisemesta.blogspot.com/2008/04/partai-politik.html' title='PARTAI POLITIK'/><author><name>muchamad ali safa'at</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/07348715720341930804</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>1</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6041305650038531172.post-4314794729171763072</id><published>2008-04-08T13:32:00.001-07:00</published><updated>2008-04-08T13:40:15.924-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Paper</title><content type='html'>21 HOUJIL 1&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;(Cite as: 21 Hous. J. Int'l L. 1)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Houston Journal of International Law&lt;br /&gt;Fall, 1998&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;*1 THE MISPLACED RELIANCE ON FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS IN NATION BUILDING: THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Lieutenant Colonel Susan S. Gibson &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_Bd1"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_Fd1"&gt;[FNd1]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Copyright ©  1998 Houston Journal of International Law; Lieutenant Colonel&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Susan S. Gibson&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;                                &lt;br /&gt;  *2 In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;James Madison &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B1"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F1"&gt;[FN1]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I. Introduction&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber3"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;A. Statement of the Thesis and Scope of This Paper&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  The end of the Cold War has brought many changes to the field of United Nations peacekeeping. However, most of the changes have been changes in size and quantity--more operations and bigger operations--rather than different types of operations. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B2"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F2"&gt;[FN2]&lt;/a&gt; Currently, as in the past, U.N. peacekeeping operations to relieve internal conflict or civil war continue to focus almost exclusively on ending military conflicts and then holding free and fair elections. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B3"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F3"&gt;[FN3]&lt;/a&gt; However, this focus only addresses half of Madison's formula for framing a stable *3 government: "(enabling) the government to control the governed." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B4"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F4"&gt;[FN4]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span class="fullpost"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  As we enter a new era with vast new possibilities, it is time to reexamine our peacekeeping goals and the means we have chosen to reach those goals. The end of the Cold War has brought not only the ability to conduct more operations free from the Cold-War Security Council veto, it has also brought a political climate that will allow the United Nations to structure many peacekeeping operations to focus on free and fair elections and to assist the country in forming a government that will "control itself" after the elections. It is time for the United Nations to explicitly embrace the second half of Madison's formula and seek ways to build a lasting peace around a government that is based on democratic principles and the rule of law. Recently, the United Nations has begun to recognize the role of "good governance" for meeting the &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber4"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;objectives of sustainable development, prosperity, and peace. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B5"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F5"&gt;[FN5]&lt;/a&gt; However encouraging this may seem, it is still not clear that this good governance requires a form of government that is designed to control the power of the ruling elite, nor is there any indication of how good governance is to be achieved.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  There are vast amounts of literature on when the United Nations should intervene and on the type of military intervention that is appropriate in various circumstances. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B6"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F6"&gt;[FN6]&lt;/a&gt; This *4 paper will not discuss those issues. Rather, its focus is on defining and achieving the ultimate goals of peacekeeping and nation-building operations once the decision has been made to intervene. In particular, I am not advocating intervention for the purpose of establishing democracies. The line between the sovereign and the international has not blurred to the point that the world could or should take up the democratic equivalent of the Great Crusades. However, once intervention is justified by other conditions, or once intervention has been requested by the nation itself, it is time to critically examine the goals of any intervention and the means chosen to reach those goals.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  In the past, the idea of holding free and fair elections has dominated the thinking and therefore the means and the goals of most operations. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B7"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F7"&gt;[FN7]&lt;/a&gt; The United Nations has developed specific, mandatory tools for bringing about free and fair elections; what it has not developed are the tools for developing &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber5"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;stable governments after the elections. While the United Nations feels it can dictate the conduct of elections--down to suspending incompatible laws, running its own public information radio station, or initiating prosecutions &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B8"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F8"&gt;[FN8]&lt;/a&gt;-- it is powerless to do anything stronger than encouraging good governance once the elections are over. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B9"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F9"&gt;[FN9]&lt;/a&gt; In some cases, the United Nations is powerless even in the face of pre-existing framework agreements *5 that set the terms for U.N. intervention and contain specific requirements for the new form of government. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B10"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F10"&gt;[FN10]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  In this article, I will argue that peacekeeping and nation-building operations should be a means for achieving lasting peace and stability and for protecting human rights. I will then assert that free and fair elections, by themselves, have not and can not achieve those goals. While neutrality is essential for military forces during the military phase of a peacekeeping operation, once the operation moves to the nation-building phase it is time for the United Nations to be non-neutral regarding the form of government to be created by the newly peaceful nation. The United Nations should actively encourage and take concrete steps to promote a form of government that will control itself and that will protect the fundamental human rights of its citizens. In the same way that the United Nations has developed procedures for achieving free and fair elections, it should develop procedures to help countries form and nurture stable, democratic forms of government.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber6"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  In support of my argument, I will examine the evidence for the "democratic peace" and the ability of democracies to protect human rights and to enhance the economic well being of the citizens and the nation. I will also question the United Nations formula for monitoring free and fair elections and probe the lessons to be learned from a few recent case studies of nation-building interventions centered on free and fair elections. In conclusion, I will argue that it is time for the United Nations to reject the premise of neutrality in nation-building interventions and to openly and vigorously promote the formation of democratic governments founded on the rule of law.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;B. Definitions&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Nation Building: Many types of peace interventions undertaken by various organizations are grouped under the *6 general rubric of peacekeeping. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B11"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F11"&gt;[FN11]&lt;/a&gt; The term has been used to describe everything from the Gulf War multinational coalition to the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority that oversaw the transition of western New Guinea from Dutch colonial rule. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B12"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F12"&gt;[FN12]&lt;/a&gt; In 1992, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali defined several forms of peace operations in his Agenda for Peace, including preventive diplomacy, peace making, and peacekeeping. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B13"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F13"&gt;[FN13]&lt;/a&gt; In addition, he defined and addressed a related concept that he called "post-conflict peace-building." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B14"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F14"&gt;[FN14]&lt;/a&gt; It is this last category of peacekeeping operations that is the focus of this paper.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber7"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  According to Boutros-Ghali, post-conflict peace building is "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B15"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F15"&gt;[FN15]&lt;/a&gt; The U.S. Army defines a similar, but more expansive, *7 operation that it calls "nation assistance." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B16"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F16"&gt;[FN16]&lt;/a&gt; According to the Army, "(t)he goals of nation assistance are to promote long-term stability, to develop sound and responsive democratic institutions, to develop supportive infrastructures, to promote strong free- market economies, and to provide an environment that allows for orderly political change and economic progress." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B17"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F17"&gt;[FN17]&lt;/a&gt; In this article, I will use the term "nation building" to encompass the governmental goals expressed in both peace building and nation assistance.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Democracy: Just as there are many definitions of peacekeeping, there are also many definitions of democracy. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B18"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F18"&gt;[FN18]&lt;/a&gt; A "democratically elected" government is all that many people require for democracy. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B19"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F19"&gt;[FN19]&lt;/a&gt; For them, the modern view of democracy is satisfied once elections are held. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B20"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F20"&gt;[FN20]&lt;/a&gt; However, further inquiry into the subject will often elicit other requirements for true democracy--requirements such as the rule of law, protection of individual and human rights, protection of minority rights, separation of governmental powers, checks and balances of power, and protection of private property rights. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B21"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F21"&gt;[FN21]&lt;/a&gt; As Anthony *8 Lake recognized in a 1993 address to the School of Advanced International Studies: "Our strategy must view &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber8"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;democracy broadly--it must envision a system that includes not only elections but also such features as an independent judiciary and protections of human rights." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B22"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F22"&gt;[FN22]&lt;/a&gt; In his first Annual Report, Secretary General Kofi Annan includes many of the same elements when he defines what he calls "good governance":&lt;br /&gt;    (G)ood governance comprises the rule of law, effective state institutions, transparency and accountability in the managementof public affairs, respect for human rights, and the meaningful participation of all citizens in the political processes of their countries and in decisions affecting their lives. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B23"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F23"&gt;[FN23]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Clearly, something more than elections are required before a country can be said to have a democratic government--rather than merely having a democratically-elected government.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  It is "constitutional democracy" that has the power to bring lasting peace and stability, as opposed to the "elective despotism" that can come from mere free and fair elections. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B24"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F24"&gt;[FN24]&lt;/a&gt; The importance of the distinction between elective democracy and constitutional democracy cannot be overstated. "(T)he former stress(es) the process by which people freely choose their representatives, who, in turn, enact whatever laws they deem necessary on behalf of the people; while the latter, suspicious of the process, set(s) limits on what the people, through their representatives, may do." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B25"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F25"&gt;[FN25]&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber9"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;The term democracy, as used in this paper, refers to a constitutional democracy that is designed "not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B26"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F26"&gt;[FN26]&lt;/a&gt; It is a democracy based on fundamental human rights, *9 sound governmental structures that control the powers of those who govern, and the rule of law. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B27"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F27"&gt;[FN27]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;II. The Evidence for Democracies and Free-Market Economies&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  The focus on the importance of constitutional democracies and free-market economies is more than American arrogance about the superiority of our system of government. Ours is not the only democratic, free-market nation, nor is our Constitution or exact form of government capable of being exported wholesale to every nation in the world. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B28"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F28"&gt;[FN28]&lt;/a&gt; The evidence for democracies and free- market economies is based on the growing realization, supported by empirical research, that democracies foster peace, that free-market economies bring prosperity, and that both encourage individual freedom and the protection of human rights.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;A. The Democratic Peace&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  As then Secretary General Boutros-Ghali remarked in his 1992 Agenda for Peace: "There is an obvious connection between *10 democratic practices-- &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber10"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;such as the rule of law and transparency in decision-making--and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable political order." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B29"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F29"&gt;[FN29]&lt;/a&gt; By this statement, Boutros-Ghali not only accepted the proposition that democracy is a means for securing lasting peace, he also observed that true democracy is based on the rule of law and not merely on free and fair elections.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Along with the growing recognition that democracy brings domestic peace and stability, there is an expanding consensus that democracies also bring international peace. As one author points out, "(I)n the modern international system, democracies have almost never fought each other." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B30"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F30"&gt;[FN30]&lt;/a&gt; In a paper on a "new paradigm" for peace, John Norton Moore champions the dual roles of democracy and deterrence and lays out the case for the democratic peace. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B31"&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F31"&gt;[FN31]&lt;/a&gt; As Moore indicates, there are many theories on why nations go to war or remain at peace; however, only "one factor has a startlingly strong real- world correlation with war." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B32"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F32"&gt;[FN32]&lt;/a&gt; Independent works by several authors "have all concluded that democracies rarely, if ever, wage war against one another." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B33"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F33"&gt;[FN33]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  One has only to look at recent history to see the peaceful power of democracy and free market economies. Countries that had been sworn enemies for years have ceased to fight and begun to cooperate after they made the transition to democracy and free market economies. This phenomenon can be seen in the West &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber11"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;with the relations between France and Germany, &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B34"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F34"&gt;[FN34]&lt;/a&gt; and in the East between South Korea and Japan. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B35"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F35"&gt;[FN35]&lt;/a&gt; Wars are, however, *11 just one form of "non-peaceful" behavior. By other measures as well, democracies tend to resolve their differences by peaceful means. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B36"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F36"&gt;[FN36]&lt;/a&gt; Democracies are more adept at negotiation and compromise because they are built on these very foundations. A democratic ruler is a person who understands the need to consider all sides of an issue, to negotiate, to work together toward a common goal, and to compromise. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B37"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F37"&gt;[FN37]&lt;/a&gt; "In contrast, totalitarian and non- democratic systems are more likely to see specialists in violence and ruthless leaders take charge." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B38"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F38"&gt;[FN38]&lt;/a&gt; A survey of countries that support terrorism will show a similar correlation between democracies and terrorism: in general, democracies do not support terrorist activities. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B39"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F39"&gt;[FN39]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;B. Protection of Individual and Human Rights&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  In the past few years, the international community has increasingly turned to democratization, international law, and international institutions to foster and protect human rights. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B40"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F40"&gt;[FN40]&lt;/a&gt; As Boutros Boutros-Ghali put it, "The process of democratization cannot be separated, in my view, from the protection of human rights. More precisely, democracy is the political framework in *12 which human rights can best be safeguarded." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B41"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F41"&gt;[FN41]&lt;/a&gt; In peacekeeping operations, where the United Nations or other international coalitions are &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber12"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;present, the pressure to "do something" about human rights violations is particularly strong. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B42"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F42"&gt;[FN42]&lt;/a&gt; However, any temporary action taken during a peacekeeping operation can only improve the situation during the time that the peacekeepers are present. To effect long-term improvements, fundamental changes in domestic laws and governmental structures are necessary.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  At the same time that scholars of international law and international relations were forming a consensus regarding the democratic peace, the research and evidence continued to point toward democracies as the best guarantors of human rights. Soon after Bruce Russet published his seminal work on the democratic peace, &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B43"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F43"&gt;[FN43]&lt;/a&gt; a new book by R.J. Rummel laid out alarming evidence on "genocide and government mass murder," which Rummel calls "democide." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B44"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F44"&gt;[FN44]&lt;/a&gt; Rummel's results "clearly and decisively show that democracies commit less democide than other regimes. These results also well illustrate the principle underlying all (his) findings on war, collective violence, and democide: The less freedom people have, the greater the violence; the more freedom, the less the violence." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B45"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F45"&gt;[FN45]&lt;/a&gt; As Rummel so aptly points out, "(T)otalitarian communist governments slaughter their people by the tens of millions; in contrast, many democracies can barely bring themselves to execute even serial murderers." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B46"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F46"&gt;[FN46]&lt;/a&gt; After eight years of painstaking, gruesome research, Rummel sums up his conclusions quite succinctly:&lt;br /&gt;    (P)reliminary research seemed to suggest, that there was a positive &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber13"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;solution to all this killing and a clear course of political action and policy to end it. And the *13 results verify this. The problem is Power. The solution is democracy. The course of action is to foster freedom. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B47"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F47"&gt;[FN47]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Again, we can look to recent history and current events to validate Rummel's conclusions. In Iraq the population is allowed to starve and is denied medical care &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B48"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F48"&gt;[FN48]&lt;/a&gt; because Saddam Hussein is more concerned about stopping weapons inspections than feeding his people. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B49"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F49"&gt;[FN49]&lt;/a&gt; In Cambodia, Rummel calculates that approximately two million Cambodians were killed, &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B50"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F50"&gt;[FN50]&lt;/a&gt; and tales of patients in their hospital beds being turned out into the streets, as well as other humanitarian atrocities by the Khmer Rouge are well known. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B51"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F51"&gt;[FN51]&lt;/a&gt; As I write, North Koreans continue to starve because the North Korean government refuses to freely open its borders and face the end of the Cold War. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B52"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F52"&gt;[FN52]&lt;/a&gt; Some estimates put the North Korean famine death toll in the tens of thousands, &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B53"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F53"&gt;[FN53]&lt;/a&gt;and recent visits to North Korea confirm that food shortages have existed long enough to produce a generation of young adults that is shorter than the older generation. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B54"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F54"&gt;[FN54]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Clearly, a government that is willing to starve or murder millions of its citizens, to conduct political purges, or to torture political prisoners is not going to be concerned about other, less *14 basic human rights. Democide is the ultimate abrogation of human rights norms.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber14"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;C. Economic Growth&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  In his 1992 book entitled Constitutional Environments and Economic Growth, Gerald Scully compares economic growth and economic efficiency with political freedom in 115 countries. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B55"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F55"&gt;[FN55]&lt;/a&gt; His study shows that "(p)olitically open societies, subscribing to the rule of law, private property, and the market allocation of resources, grow at three times the rate and are two and one-half times as efficient economically in transforming inputs into national output as societies in which these rights largely are proscribed." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B56"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F56"&gt;[FN56]&lt;/a&gt; Scully's findings underscore the significance of the choice of governmental systems to the economic prosperity of a country and validate what the world had already learned from watching the economic collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellites. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B57"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F57"&gt;[FN57]&lt;/a&gt; "Hope of an increased standard of living through a paternalistic, authoritarian control of man and his resources by the government has turned to despair." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B58"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F58"&gt;[FN58]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  The old notion that economic growth flows from an adequate labor force and sufficient capital breaks down in the face of Scully's research. As Scully indicates, the historically accepted model of economic growth "posits a very simple relationship between the growth rate of per capita national income and the growth rate of the capital-labor ratio." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B59"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F59"&gt;[FN59]&lt;/a&gt; However, nothing in this capital-labor model "considers the institutional framework in which capital &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber15"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;(physical and human) is accumulated, invention or innovation is made, or inputs are converted to output (the efficiency of the transformation function)." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B60"&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F60"&gt;[FN60]&lt;/a&gt; Accordingly, "raising (the capital-labor) ratio in Tanzania or the Soviet Union in theory has the same effect on per capita incomes as in the United States." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B61"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F61"&gt;[FN61]&lt;/a&gt; Reality belies the accuracy of this model.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  *15 Without adding the complication of civil war and United Nations intervention, Scully's theory can easily be validated by looking at Germany and Korea. Both nations were divided at the end of World War II. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B62"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F62"&gt;[FN62]&lt;/a&gt; Korea remained divided after the Korean War. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B63"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F63"&gt;[FN63]&lt;/a&gt; In both countries, the two halves started out on fairly even footing. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B64"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F64"&gt;[FN64]&lt;/a&gt; The case of Germany is well known: West Germany rose to become the economic powerhouse of Europe, while the East German economy sputtered &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B65"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F65"&gt;[FN65]&lt;/a&gt; and its environment was decimated. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B66"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F66"&gt;[FN66]&lt;/a&gt; While some of the differences can be attributed to the economic assistance provided to West Germany under the Marshall Plan, &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B67"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F67"&gt;[FN67]&lt;/a&gt; East Germany and other Warsaw Pact countries also received economic assistance and subsidized oil from the Soviets. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B68"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F68"&gt;[FN68]&lt;/a&gt; In any event, post World War II economic assistance cannot account for the huge disparity in the economic conditions of the two Germanies when the Berlin Wall fell.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  In the two Koreas, despite similar life expectancies and literacy rates, in 1991 (the last year for which figures are available) &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B69"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F69"&gt;[FN69]&lt;/a&gt; North Korea's per capita GNP was estimated at $1,038, &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B70"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F70"&gt;[FN70]&lt;/a&gt; while 1996 figures show South &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber16"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;Korea's per capita GNP to be $10,800. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B71"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F71"&gt;[FN71]&lt;/a&gt; In addition to the differences indicated by per capita GNP, some analysts estimate that between 1991 and *16 1996, North Korea's economy shrank by as much as 30 percent. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B72"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F72"&gt;[FN72]&lt;/a&gt; South Korea's road to democracy and a free market economy has been much rougher than that in West Germany, and the country continues to make needed reforms. Even so, the differences between North and South are striking. North Korea's repeated famines are well documented and have culminated in an unprecedented invitation for several international relief organizations to operate in Pyongyang. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B73"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F73"&gt;[FN73]&lt;/a&gt; According to one Washington Post foreign correspondent, who traveled to North Korea with a U.S. congressional representative,&lt;br /&gt;    North Korea's predicament largely has been portrayed as a massive food shortage brought on by twin natural disasters--destructive floods last year followed by this year's drought and record-high summer temperatures. But what was revealed on this trip is that the food crisis is just part of an overall breakdown of the country's state-controlled and centrally planned system. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B74"&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F74"&gt;[FN74]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  What the Korean and German experiences and Scully's research should be telling the United Nations and the world is that during nation-building operations, the economic condition of a nation can be dramatically affected by guiding the nation toward a constitutional democracy and a free-market economy. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B75"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F75"&gt;[FN75]&lt;/a&gt; Alternatively, the United Nations can continue the pattern &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber17"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;of holding elections and then encouraging loans and foreign aid to improve economic conditions. The democratic, free-market method has shown that it can produce dramatic results; the *17 elections and aid method often produces only temporary peace at an enormous cost. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B76"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F76"&gt;[FN76]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  If we turn our attention to recent U.N. operations in Haiti and Cambodia, to name just two, the world community sought to improve the condition of the citizens through free elections and an infusion of foreign aid and foreign capital. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B77"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F77"&gt;[FN77]&lt;/a&gt; However, without proper government structures that are based on the rule of law, a large portion of the aid and capital have literally gone to waste or encouraged further government corruption. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B78"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F78"&gt;[FN78]&lt;/a&gt; Worse even than aid going to waste is the distortion of the economy and squandering of the abilities of a nation that can be brought on by too much aid. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B79"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F79"&gt;[FN79]&lt;/a&gt; In these situations, the citizenry and the government focus their efforts on getting aid grants rather than on improving the conditions in the country and running the government. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B80"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F80"&gt;[FN80]&lt;/a&gt; One writer had this to say about the distortions caused by the large amounts of foreign aid provided to Haiti over the years:&lt;br /&gt;    (T)he succession of governments in the post World-War II era only thought of foreign aid and subsidies, of projects originating from the outside . . . . In short, there was never any effort to think up ways of mobilizing local *18 resources. . . . Recently, however, it appears likely &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber18"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;that the international political climate will reduce considerably the funds available to countries such as Haiti, and that sooner or later Haiti will have to attempt to live within its means. At that point Haiti, by necessity, will have to rely on local abilities, and we will finally have to ask, what is Haiti? It will have to be debated as external aid will cross the line and become a contribution and not a substitution. The problem is that in the interim, we are witnessing a systematic destruction of the means to create an authentically local policy. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B81"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F81"&gt;[FN81]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  While the international community sees situations such as the one in Haiti in terms of a need to "do something" to end the suffering and as an occasion to send in humanitarian aid to relieve the misery and poverty, there is evidence in Haiti at least, that monetary aid to relieve poverty is not the only focus of the poor. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B82"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F82"&gt;[FN82]&lt;/a&gt; Perhaps they know, more so than the international community, that what they really need are the conditions that will give them a chance to better themselves and that this betterment has the greatest likelihood of occurring in a country with a stable government that protects human rights and respects private property. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B83"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F83"&gt;[FN83]&lt;/a&gt; According to one first- hand observer,&lt;br /&gt;    Contrary to what one would expect from a situation in which all the elementary needs of eliminating poverty are unsatisfied, amelioration of material conditions has almost never been mentioned. Instead, the need for &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber19"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;justice, the end of . . . the problems caused by a lack of security have largely dominated popular demands. In the presence of an inhuman spectacle of misery and its *19 urgent material needs, one tends to forget that the primary needs of people are liberty, justice, and security. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B84"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F84"&gt;[FN84]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Other researchers are also highlighting the same economic phenomenon that Scully illuminates, thereby strengthening the argument that there is more to spurring economic growth than providing economic and humanitarian aid and an infusion of capital. In an important study in 1995, Freedom House supplemented its annual survey of political rights and civil liberties with a survey that focused on economic freedom. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B85"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F85"&gt;[FN85]&lt;/a&gt; The findings are striking.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  The 1995 Survey's most important finding is that modern economists have ignored a crucial variable in their search for the answer to why some societies are prosperous and some chronically poor. . . . (W)hereas only twenty-seven of those nations sampled, with just 17 percent of the world's population, merited a "free" rating, these twenty-seven nations produced 81 percent of total world output. By contrast, the twenty nations rated "not free" contain more than a third of the world's people yet produce only 5 percent of total output. The Survey thus joins a handful of recent studies in showing that economic freedom is the surest path to growth and development. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B86"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F86"&gt;[FN86]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  When you add in the additional Freedom House finding that "(w)ith few exceptions, countries the Survey rated economically 'free' during 1995 also &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber20"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;earned a 'free' rating on political rights and civil liberties," the correlation between democratic freedom and economic development becomes unmistakable. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B87"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F87"&gt;[FN87]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  With evidence this strong, it is wasteful and irrational for the United Nations and the world to continue to hide the truth about freedom and democracy under a bushel basket of political neutrality and humanitarian aid. If the goals of U.N. nation-*20 building operations can best be met by helping to transform a nation into a democratically and economically free country that is governed by the rule of law, it is time to openly accept this fact and explicitly aim for a democratic outcome.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;III. The Misplaced Reliance on Free and Fair Elections in Nation-Building&lt;br /&gt;Operations&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;A. The United Nations Handbook on Elections&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  To understand why United Nations dependence on free and fair elections is inadequate, one must look at the way the United Nations conducts and monitors elections. At the same time, a look at the methods the United Nations has developed and used to monitor and conduct elections also shows that the United Nations is not adverse to substantial "interference" in the internal workings of a nation once it has been invited in to perform a specific task. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B88"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F88"&gt;[FN88]&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber21"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;This observation should raise the question of why similarly "intrusive" measures seem to be off-limits when it comes to building and strengthening an agreed upon governmental structure.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  In 1994 the United Nations Centre for Human Rights published a handbook on election monitoring. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B89"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F89"&gt;[FN89]&lt;/a&gt; Consistent with the U.N. neutrality doctrine, the U.N. handbook indicates that the&lt;br /&gt;    United Nations human rights standards relating to elections are broad in nature and thus may be achieved through a wide variety of political systems. United Nations electoral assistance does not seek to impose any given political model. Rather, it is based upon a realization that there is no single political system or electoral methodology which is appropriate for all peoples and States. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B90"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F90"&gt;[FN90]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  *21 The U.N. handbook on elections goes on to state that there are many examples that "provide useful guidance for the construction of democratic institutions that both respond to domestic concerns and conform to international human rights norms." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B91"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F91"&gt;[FN91]&lt;/a&gt; However, what the U.N. handbook gives, it then takes away by again emphasizing that each State is in the best position to shape its own system, based on the "particular needs, aspirations and historical realities of the people involved, taken within the framework of international standards." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B92"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F92"&gt;[FN92]&lt;/a&gt; While there can be no quarrel with the concept that each nation must shape its own system, it is unfortunate that the &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber22"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;United Nations feels that it is unable to come out and state that each nation should shape its system within the bounds of a constitutional democracy that is designed to protect human rights, to control the newly elected government, and to insure that later elections will indeed take place. When U.N. operations are undertaken in accordance with pre-agreed principles for constitutional democracy, as they were in Namibia and Cambodia, there is clearly no need for the United Nations to remain neutral toward any form of government after the elections.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  One wonders how the U.N. monitors would respond to a state's attempt to set up a government that contemplates holding only one election for all time. Certainly, such a plan would meet strong and vocal resistance were it to be stated out in the open. One would hope that if a state openly professed its desire to form such a government, the United Nations would decline to intervene and monitor elections. Even the U.N. handbook on elections states that each nation should be free to shape its own government is constrained by the condition that the government be formed "within the framework of international standards." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B93"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F93"&gt;[FN93]&lt;/a&gt; Presumably, these standards would include those in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B94"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F94"&gt;[FN94]&lt;/a&gt; Unfortunately, the United Nations method of monitoring elections can set up a de *22 facto, "one- election" government, with nary a complaint--or at least no complaint until the second election is not held. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B95"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F95"&gt;[FN95]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber23"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  The limits of U.N. aspirations for monitored elections can be seen not only in the above quoted language, but also in the methods that the U.N. handbook on elections advocates for implementing free and fair elections. The handbook contains an admirable list of requirements for holding free and fair elections, &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B96"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F96"&gt;[FN96]&lt;/a&gt; but then goes on to counsel temporary measures for meeting these requirements. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B97"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F97"&gt;[FN97]&lt;/a&gt; According to the handbook, "(O)f particular importance for periods of elections are freedom of expression, of information, of assembly, of association, and of movement, as well as general freedom from intimidation." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B98"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F98"&gt;[FN98]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  The human rights protections and procedures that the commission is willing to require for a free and fair election mirror many protections that are essential for constitutional democracy and that are provided for in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B99"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F99"&gt;[FN99]&lt;/a&gt; However, the United Nations is not willing to require the necessary legal or constitutional reforms that would help insure the continued protection of human rights and the occurrence of the next election. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B100"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F100"&gt;[FN100]&lt;/a&gt; The U.N. handbook on elections makes the U.N. position crystal clear by stating that "laws in force which might have the effect of discouraging political participation should be repealed or suspended." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B101"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F101"&gt;[FN101]&lt;/a&gt; In a later section entitled "States of Emergency," the U.N. handbook on elections advises that "(s)tates preparing for elections should carefully review such (emergency) laws with a view to their repeal or &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber24"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;suspension during the campaign *23 period." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B102"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F102"&gt;[FN102]&lt;/a&gt; Indeed, when the U.N. monitored the elections in Cambodia under their mandate from the 1991 Paris Accords, &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B103"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F103"&gt;[FN103]&lt;/a&gt; they followed their prescribed pattern of merely suspending laws that were in conflict with the standards for free and fair elections or of setting up temporary measures for fostering free elections--with predictable results after the U.N. election monitors left Cambodia. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B104"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F104"&gt;[FN104]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  To give the United Nations credit, the U.N. handbook on elections does recognize,&lt;br /&gt;    (G)uarantees for the fundamental right of periodic free and fair elections with universal, equal and non-discriminatory suffrage and secret balloting, and for the right to be elected and to have access to the public service on equal terms, should be enshrined in the Constitution or other high organic law of the State. The legal authority for the rights of free expression, opinion, information, assembly and association should also rest in the highest law of the land. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B105"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F105"&gt;[FN105]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Unfortunately, the handbook does not make this the cornerstone of its election-monitoring and nation-building program, nor has the United Nations worked toward devising methods to implement these requirements--even when the requirements are included in the peacekeeping framework agreement.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Some will make the argument that nations will be much less likely to request United Nations election-monitoring assistance if the United Nations does not &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber25"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;remain neutral toward forms of government. While this is certainly true in the general case, in peacekeeping and nation-building operations, the situation is markedly different from the case of a nation that voluntarily requests United Nations assistance because it has unilaterally decided to hold its first free and fair election. A nation that has already reached that crossroad on its own will be more likely to accept U.N. assistance in voluntarily altering its laws to accommodate the present and future elections. Any additional *24 safeguards and guarantees of sovereign integrity can be worked out as part of the framework agreement leading up to any election-monitoring operation. If the framework agreement, and its attendant conditions, is not satisfactory for either the nation or for the United Nations, either party will then be in a position to call off the operation before it begins.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Just as a nation may decide to decline U.N. assistance if it is seen as an unacceptable intrusion on that nation's sovereignty, the United Nations could also decline to use its limited resources to monitor elections unless a nation is willing to enact the reforms that will protect human rights and make constitutional democracy and future elections possible. In 1988 the United Nations refused to deploy troops to Angola until the Angolan parties "revealed a tangible commitment to peace and to honoring their undertakings to each other under their peace agreement." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B106"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F106"&gt;[FN106]&lt;/a&gt; There is no reason why the United Nations should not condition peacekeeping and election-monitoring missions on a &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber26"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;requirement that the nation agree to form a government that will embrace the rule of law, protect fundamental human rights, and insure future elections.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  I am not suggesting that a nation seeking peacekeeping and election assistance should give the United Nations carte blanche to write its constitution. However, I am advocating for the United Nations and the world community to insist that a nation agree to some basic constitutional and human rights fundamentals before the world community expends its valuable human and financial resources for peacekeeping and nation building. A nation should also be willing to agree to a reasonable amount of continued U.N. monitoring of its constitutional transition--with appropriate enforcement mechanisms included in the framework agreement.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  The concept of having a nation agree to a basic constitutional structure and human rights fundamentals before the United Nations will intervene is neither unique nor unworkable. The U.N. peacekeeping operations in Namibia and Cambodia were preceded by agreements on basic constitutional principles, &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B107"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F107"&gt;[FN107]&lt;/a&gt; and the NATO intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina *25 was preceded by a draft constitution. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B108"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F108"&gt;[FN108]&lt;/a&gt; What is needed, however, is the international resolve and U.N. enforcement mechanisms to see these measures through by providing postelection assistance and monitoring of the constitutional transition.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;B. The Popular View of "Democratic Self Determination"&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber27"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  Unfortunately, the U.N. handbook on elections is not the only authority that seems to have a single-minded focus on free and fair elections. Throughout the literature and speeches on international law and international relations, one finds reference to "freely elected democracies" or hears speakers extolling the virtues of elections--without any mention of the democratic principles or the rule of law that true democracies require. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B109"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F109"&gt;[FN109]&lt;/a&gt; Remarks such as the following are not uncommon: "Democracy has been easier to achieve than the protection of human rights, perhaps because the implementation of democracy is technically more easily accomplished (e.g., a popularly elected government) . . . ." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B110"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F110"&gt;[FN110]&lt;/a&gt; In a 1992 panel discussion hosted by the American Society of International Law, several international law scholars discussed the role of elections in international law, the emerging norm of self determination through elections, and the basic requirements for free and fair elections. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B111"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F111"&gt;[FN111]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  The panel noted a trend of breaking through the sovereignty barrier and taking steps to promote elected governments as the *26 accepted international norm. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B112"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F112"&gt;[FN112]&lt;/a&gt; There were tangential references to "whether elections are synonymous with 'democracy,"' but the democracy issue was left behind in a wake of requirements for free and fair elections and discussions of what the world community should do to promote such elections. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B113"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F113"&gt;[FN113]&lt;/a&gt; Gregory Fox described a relatively new phenomenon in the law of international &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber28"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;recognition, where nations were increasingly "conditioning (the) recognition of new states upon a commitment to electoral democracy." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B114"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F114"&gt;[FN114]&lt;/a&gt; Unfortunately, Fox did not see an equal commitment to democracy as he saw to elections. As he noted, most of the international agreements and U.N. covenants that discuss the right to elections and political participation do not tie elections to democracy and often do not use the term democracy at all. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B115"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F115"&gt;[FN115]&lt;/a&gt; In fact he saw a "commitment to elections regardless of possibly unpleasant outcomes," such as the election of a government that was opposed to further elections. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B116"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F116"&gt;[FN116]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  This emphasis on electoral self-determination can be traced to the end of colonialism and to the U.N.-approved method for assisting former colonies &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B117"&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F117"&gt;[FN117]&lt;/a&gt; "to develop self-government . . . according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B118"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F118"&gt;[FN118]&lt;/a&gt; Since 1956 the United Nations has monitored approximately thirty elections in former colonies or other "non-self-governing territories." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B119"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F119"&gt;[FN119]&lt;/a&gt; The U.N. practice of monitoring elections can be traced back to its first use in the 1948 elections in South Korea--elections which led to a nation marked by years of military rule, coups, violent suppression of student demonstrations, and other human rights abuses. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B120"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F120"&gt;[FN120]&lt;/a&gt; One can only wonder what the result would have been in South Korea if the United Nations had not departed so soon after that first election and had remained to assist the nation's transition to democracy. The &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber29"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;Korean War may have been avoided, and the transition to democracy may have occurred much more quickly, with far less *27 human suffering. The record of postelection governments in many former colonies is much the same. Elections have brought new regimes into power, but have done nothing to limit the power of the new regime over its own people. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B121"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F121"&gt;[FN121]&lt;/a&gt; The results have played out in country after country. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B122"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F122"&gt;[FN122]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  It is time to find new ways of thinking about nation-building operations. The current method of placing almost total reliance on free and fair elections--as an end in themselves--has shaped U.N. nation-building interventions and consequently shaped the outcome of those interventions as well. Elections are only a beginning. It is time to view elections as a means to a greater end--an end characterized by constitutional democracy and the rule of law. Only by doing so can we hope to foster the greater goals of the United Nations Charter "(t)o maintain international peace and security" and encourage "respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B123"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F123"&gt;[FN123]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;IV. Neutrality: An Impediment to Nation Building&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  The United Nations has been monitoring elections since 1948,  &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B124"&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F124"&gt;[FN124]&lt;/a&gt; with most monitoring occurring in former colonial countries. The electoral transition in these former colonies has given international legitimacy to the use of election monitoring as a means "to develop self- &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber30"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;government" for those countries. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B125"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F125"&gt;[FN125]&lt;/a&gt; These colonial transitions, as well as the other U.N. monitored elections, have also given international legitimacy to elections as a way to measure a nation's will and give effect to one of the fundamental purposes of the United Nations, "To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self- determination of peoples . . . ." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B126"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F126"&gt;[FN126]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  *28 It is now time for the United Nations to work to complete the purposes outlined in Article 1(2) and "take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B127"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F127"&gt;[FN127]&lt;/a&gt; History clearly shows that democracies strengthen universal peace. By clinging to an outdated mandate for complete neutrality toward different forms of government, the United Nations is impeding its ability to meet its purposes of strengthening universal peace, of solving economic problems, and of advancing fundamental freedoms and respect for human rights. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B128"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F128"&gt;[FN128]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  In a 1995 follow-up to his Agenda for Peace, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali spoke of "advanc(ing) international consensus on the crucial importance of economic and social development as the most secure basis for lasting peace." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B129"&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F129"&gt;[FN129]&lt;/a&gt; In a section on intrastate conflicts, Boutros-Ghali highlights "the collapse of state institutions" as a central feature of intrastate conflicts. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B130"&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F130"&gt;[FN130]&lt;/a&gt; He then goes on to point out that in these intrastate conflicts "international intervention must extend beyond military and humanitarian tasks &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber31"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;and must include the promotion of national reconciliation and the re- establishment of effective government." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B131"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F131"&gt;[FN131]&lt;/a&gt; Unfortunately, he then severely limits the ability of the United Nations to effect lasting and needed changes by stating that the United Nations cannot "impose a new political structure or new state institutions. It can only help the hostile factions to help themselves and begin to live together again." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B132"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F132"&gt;[FN132]&lt;/a&gt; While the United Nations cannot "impose" a new political structure, it can refuse to expend its resources to assist unless the State is willing to agree to a new political structure that comports with constitutional democracy. As one commentator so aptly expressed it,&lt;br /&gt;    *29 U.N. electoral missions have tended to emphasize the formal acceptability of, and/or rituals associated with, political campaigning, balloting and validation of political control. This approach promotes an impoverished conception of democratic change to people who may have placed very high hopes on the benefits of such a change. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B133"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F133"&gt;[FN133]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Some authors take this argument a step further and assert that elections without constitutionalism create the breeding ground for ethnic division and violence because political leaders use ethnic divisions to rally support and gain votes. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B134"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F134"&gt;[FN134]&lt;/a&gt; Without a need for consensus and with no constitutional protections for basic human rights and equal protection of the societal minorities, majoritarian power leads to totalitarian abuses. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B135"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F135"&gt;[FN135]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber32"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  Unfortunately, neutrality toward the form of "new political structure" a nation chooses to adopt often forces the United Nations and the monitored nation to accept a temporary solution. For nations that have blatantly violated human rights norms or otherwise disintegrated to the point that U.N. intervention becomes necessary, neutral election monitoring is a woefully inadequate "solution." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B136"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F136"&gt;[FN136]&lt;/a&gt; The United Nations must assist such a nation to form a working and viable constitutional democracy that will encourage peaceful stability and protect human rights. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B137"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F137"&gt;[FN137]&lt;/a&gt; To do any less squanders U.N. resources and places the nation's population back into peril. In effect, without an emphasis on constitutional democracy, U.N.-monitored elections may do nothing more than sanction a new type of *30 majoritarian tyranny or set the nation up for its next violent coup. This is not an appropriate role for the United Nations and not an outcome to which United Nations member nations should commit their valuable and limited resources.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  The evidence for the transforming power of constitutional democracies is clear: they are more peaceful, more protective of human rights, and more economically prosperous. As Moore recognized,&lt;br /&gt;    (P)eacekeeping, collective security, and humanitarian operations undertaken by the United Nations are likely to be concentrated in those totalitarian and failed government settings in which government structures may be the largest single factor in producing the problem. As such, continuation of the &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber33"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;"traditional" sovereignty-bound concept of non-intervention with respect to government structures in these settings of U.N. action may be to powerfully contribute to the long-run irrelevance of many such actions. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B138"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F138"&gt;[FN138]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;V. The Case of Cambodia: Back To Where We Started&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Twentieth Century history is replete with examples of the value of the transition to democracy and free-market economies. The foremost case study in support of the ability of constitutionalism to transform a country can be seen through the democracy-building measures undertaken in Japan and West Germany after World War II. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B139"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F139"&gt;[FN139]&lt;/a&gt; As a result of the democratic transformation, these two once-aggressive and abusive countries have become some of our strongest partners in peace; their economic success is well known, and their human rights records are admirable. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B140"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F140"&gt;[FN140]&lt;/a&gt; In the past decade, the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of communism have led numerous nations voluntarily down the path to constitutional democracy. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B141"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F141"&gt;[FN141]&lt;/a&gt; *31 Although the path is neither easy nor short, it is a trip that more and more nations consider to be worth the effort. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B142"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F142"&gt;[FN142]&lt;/a&gt; The reasons, as stated above, are clear: democracy brings peace, prosperity, protection of human rights, and a multitude of other benefits. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B143"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F143"&gt;[FN143]&lt;/a&gt; Against this backdrop, it is doubly puzzling that the world community is not demanding more democratic nation building during U.N. operations. There is no more blatant example of the &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber34"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;need for a new and openly embraced focus on democratic nation building than the recent events in Cambodia.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;A. History&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  The Cambodian nation has a long and at times, great history. However, beginning in the fifteenth century, Cambodia, then called Kampuchea, became the object of almost constant fighting and shifts in power between the native Khmer Kingdom, Siam, and Vietnam. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B144"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F144"&gt;[FN144]&lt;/a&gt; In the 1800s, France established a protectorate over Cambodia, offering freedom from the Thai government and insulation from Vietnamese advances. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B145"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F145"&gt;[FN145]&lt;/a&gt; The French retained the monarchy in Cambodia, trained the civil service, built roads, ports, and other public facilities, and exported rice and rubber from the area. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B146"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F146"&gt;[FN146]&lt;/a&gt; During World War II, the French administrators cooperated with the invading Japanese forces until near the end of the war. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B147"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F147"&gt;[FN147]&lt;/a&gt; At that point, the French were expelled from Cambodia, and the Japanese installed Norodom Sihanouk as the king. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B148"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F148"&gt;[FN148]&lt;/a&gt; Soon after the war, despite American dissatisfaction with a return to French colonial rule in Indochina, France regained control of Indochina and Cambodia, which it held until 1953. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B149"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F149"&gt;[FN149]&lt;/a&gt; At that time, Cambodia was granted independence under the rule of King Sihanouk, who soon thereafter abdicated the throne to his father and took the title Prince Sihanouk. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B150"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F150"&gt;[FN150]&lt;/a&gt; For years Sihanouk struggled to *32 maintain Cambodia's &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber35"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;neutrality in the face of blatant violations of its territory by North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B151"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F151"&gt;[FN151]&lt;/a&gt; He acquiesced to their presence, but granted the United States the right of "hot pursuit" against them. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B152"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F152"&gt;[FN152]&lt;/a&gt; In 1969 the United States started a secret bombing campaign against North Vietnamese and Vietcong sanctuaries. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B153"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F153"&gt;[FN153]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  The bombings were quickly followed by a succession of horribles. Prince Sihanouk was overthrown and U.S. and South Vietnamese forces fought against North Vietnamese forces throughout the border regions of Cambodia, turning it into a battlefield for the Vietnam War. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B154"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F154"&gt;[FN154]&lt;/a&gt; The 1973 withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Vietnam set the stage for the 1975 reign of terror and resultant democide of two million Cambodians by the Khmer Rouge. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B155"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F155"&gt;[FN155]&lt;/a&gt; Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1978, thereby plunging the country into a new war for more than a decade. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B156"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F156"&gt;[FN156]&lt;/a&gt; Despite urgings by ASEAN &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B157"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F157"&gt;[FN157]&lt;/a&gt; and a U.N. International Conference on Kampuchea in 1981, little progress was made toward a settlement until 1987 when Indonesia began working with the various factions. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B158"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F158"&gt;[FN158]&lt;/a&gt; In 1989 the Paris Conference on Cambodia was held, with a view toward ending the civil war in Cambodia now that the Vietnamese appeared ready to pull out. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B159"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F159"&gt;[FN159]&lt;/a&gt; The Conference reached a stalemate over the issue of an *33 interim government for Cambodia during its transition. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B160"&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F160"&gt;[FN160]&lt;/a&gt; At this point, the United Nations again became involved and basically agreed to run the Cambodian elections and many other aspects of the &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber36"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;Cambodian government during the transition. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B161"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F161"&gt;[FN161]&lt;/a&gt; Cambodian sovereignty was to be exercised by a twelve member Supreme National Council (SNC) until the elections. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B162"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F162"&gt;[FN162]&lt;/a&gt; The Paris Peace Accords were signed in 1991, &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B163"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F163"&gt;[FN163]&lt;/a&gt; and the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was established to oversee the withdrawal of forces, to monitor the elections, and to improve human rights conditions in Cambodia. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B164"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F164"&gt;[FN164]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;B. The Paris Accords&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  The Paris Accords provided "(p)rinciples for a new constitution for Cambodia" &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B165"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F165"&gt;[FN165]&lt;/a&gt; that were ostensibly based on the 1982 constitutional principles for Namibia; &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B166"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F166"&gt;[FN166]&lt;/a&gt; however, the Cambodian principles laid out only the barest of constitutional frameworks. It required that the yet to be drafted constitution would be the supreme law of the land, and that the constitution would&lt;br /&gt;    contain a declaration of fundamental rights, including the rights to life, personal liberty, security, freedom of movement, freedom of religion, assembly and association including political parties and trade unions, due process and equality before the law, protection from arbitrary deprivation of property . . . ; and freedom from racial, ethnic, religious or sexual discrimination. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B167"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F167"&gt;[FN167]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  According to the principles, the constitution must also conform to &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber37"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;international human rights standards and must provide access to the courts to enforce the above rights. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B168"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F168"&gt;[FN168]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  *34 The only mention of government structure in the principles is found in the requirement for "a system of liberal democracy, on the basis of pluralism" and in the requirements for periodic and genuine elections and an independent judiciary. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B169"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F169"&gt;[FN169]&lt;/a&gt; The constitutional principles are contained in six short paragraphs that cover perhaps a half page and are devoted to human rights and electoral democracy. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B170"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F170"&gt;[FN170]&lt;/a&gt; By contrast, nearly two pages of the Paris Agreement are dedicated to the preservation of the "sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and inviolability, neutrality and national unity of Cambodia," &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B171"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F171"&gt;[FN171]&lt;/a&gt; and another full page is dedicated to foreign aid--or as it is called in the Paris Accords, the "rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B172"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F172"&gt;[FN172]&lt;/a&gt; These are surely classic examples of putting the cart before the horse: sovereignty and territorial integrity is of little consequence to a country that is in constant violent internal turmoil, and rehabilitation and reconstruction is virtually impossible in a country that lacks peaceful political stability.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;C. The 1993 Elections&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  The time before the May 1993 elections was marked by "politically inspired violence and abuses of administrative power," and "UNTAC found itself in daily &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber38"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;squabbles with the SOC over such matters as police excesses, voter intimidation, the rights of opposition parties to fair media access, and the confiscation of campaign materials and media equipment by customs agents." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B173"&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F173"&gt;[FN173]&lt;/a&gt; UNTAC took several measures to control the political violence and establish the conditions for elections.At one point, UNTAC established a "UNTAC Special Prosecutor's Office with powers to arrest and detain suspects and to prosecute cases before Cambodian . . . courts." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B174"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F174"&gt;[FN174]&lt;/a&gt; In a unique move, UNTAC also set up and ran the only free radio station in the country. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B175"&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F175"&gt;[FN175]&lt;/a&gt; "Several studies conclude that the 1993 elections probably could *35 not have taken place or succeeded without the flow of information provided largely by 'Radio UNTAC."' &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B176"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F176"&gt;[FN176]&lt;/a&gt; UNTAC also drafted the electoral laws, registered the voters, issued directives and used its own forces to control political violence, and at times provided transportation to candidates when the Cambodian government refused to grant equal access to air transportation. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B177"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F177"&gt;[FN177]&lt;/a&gt; Unfortunately, consistent with the U.N. policies and procedures outlined in the elections handbook, these measures were temporary and lasted only as long as UNTAC lasted.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  The elections were held from 23 to 28 May 1993. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B178"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F178"&gt;[FN178]&lt;/a&gt; The constitution was adopted on 24 September, and UNTAC's mandate ended in late September. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B179"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F179"&gt;[FN179]&lt;/a&gt; By the end of 1993, most UNTAC personnel had departed the country. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B180"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F180"&gt;[FN180]&lt;/a&gt; The United Nations continued to maintain a human rights &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber39"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;oversight mission in Phnom Phen, &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B181"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F181"&gt;[FN181]&lt;/a&gt; and there are some Cambodian Non- Governmental Organizations (NGOs) who are receiving U.S. and other monetary assistance for democracy building efforts. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B182"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F182"&gt;[FN182]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;D. The 1993 Constitution&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  As mentioned above, the 1993 Constitution actually began as a list of  "Principles for a New Constitution for Cambodia" in Annex 5 of the Paris Accords. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B183"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F183"&gt;[FN183]&lt;/a&gt; While these principles were *36 "drawn from a 1982 proposal of the five-state 'Contact Group' that prepared recommendations for Namibia's transition to independence," &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B184"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F184"&gt;[FN184]&lt;/a&gt; they were infused with vague guarantees of a "liberal democracy" and dominated by electoral provisions. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B185"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F185"&gt;[FN185]&lt;/a&gt; The Namibian principles, in contrast, provided for "a system of government with three branches" and then went on to outline the independent nature of the branches and the requirement that the "Constitution will determine the organization and powers of all levels of government." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B186"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F186"&gt;[FN186]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Some authors contend that the Cambodian constitutional principles set up "the political foundation of a government able to protect human freedoms" because the principles "go beyond recognizing free elections as the sole process for choosing a government after internal strife, and beyond committing the elected regime to guaranteeing the human rights of its people, by identifying the path--labeled 'liberal democracy, on the basis of pluralism'--it is to &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber40"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;follow." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B187"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F187"&gt;[FN187]&lt;/a&gt; However, a close reading of the paragraph dealing with this "liberal democracy, on the basis of pluralism" &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B188"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F188"&gt;[FN188]&lt;/a&gt; shows that the "pluralism" referred to is electoral *37 pluralism and the "liberal democracy" is an electoral democracy, not necessarily a constitutional democracy--as that term is described earlier in this article. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B189"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F189"&gt;[FN189]&lt;/a&gt; The remainder of the paragraph on liberal democracy contains requirements for universal voting rights, secret ballots, and a "full and fair opportunity to organize and participate in the electoral process." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B190"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F190"&gt;[FN190]&lt;/a&gt; The only specific mention in all of Annex 5 to governmental structure is the requirement for "(a)n independent judiciary (to) be established, (and) empowered to enforce the rights provided under the constitution." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B191"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F191"&gt;[FN191]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  The remaining constitutional principles are also a shadow of the Namibian principles. While both sets of principles call for a "declaration of fundamental rights," the Cambodian version omits freedom of speech and press. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B192"&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F192"&gt;[FN192]&lt;/a&gt; While this provision can probably be read into the requirement that any declaration be consistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it is curious that in a list of rights that is nearly identical to Namibia's list, freedom of expression was excluded from the Cambodian principles. Both principles go on to stipulate that *38 "(a)ggrieved individuals will be entitled to have the courts adjudicate and enforce these rights." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B193"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F193"&gt;[FN193]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Cambodia began its constitutional transition with a set of principles &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber41"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;that were missing several important constitutional protections. Cambodia then compounded its problems when it drafted its 1993 constitution by deviating significantly from the text and the spirit of the constitutional principles laid down in the Paris Accords. A full review of the Cambodian Constitution is beyond the scope of this paper; however, a brief history of past Cambodian constitutions and a look at a few provisions and omissions in the current constitution should serve to illustrate the point. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B194"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F194"&gt;[FN194]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Cambodia has had several governments and constitutions in the past few decades that have "run the gamut from constitutional monarchy, to presidential regime, to radical Marxism-Leninism, to Soviet-style Communist Party rule, to the new 'liberal democratic' constitutional monarchy." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B195"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F195"&gt;[FN195]&lt;/a&gt; As with so many other communist constitutions, the problem with past Cambodian constitutions was not with their particular provisions or omissions, the problems arose in how the constitutions were applied, or more to the point-- ignored. Marks calls these constitutions "ornamental appendages of political regimes;" &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B196"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F196"&gt;[FN196]&lt;/a&gt; Chandler chose the more concise but equally descriptive phrase "decorative constitutions." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B197"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F197"&gt;[FN197]&lt;/a&gt; With a long history of these decorative constitutions, Cambodia's transition to constitutionalism and the rule of law would not be an easy one. Added to this impediment was Cambodia's recent history of human rights atrocities and Pol Pot's purge of almost every educated citizen in the nation, including most citizens with any legal &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber42"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;training. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B198"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F198"&gt;[FN198]&lt;/a&gt; As I write this article, Cambodia's government *39 is once again in violent turmoil following a July 1997 partial coup, &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B199"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F199"&gt;[FN199]&lt;/a&gt; and the July 1998 elections have done little to restore stability. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B200"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F200"&gt;[FN200]&lt;/a&gt; Consequently, any analysis of the Cambodian Constitution may be rather moot, but I hope still worthwhile for the lessons it may reveal for other nations.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Cambodia's new constitution sets up a constitutional monarchy. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B201"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F201"&gt;[FN201]&lt;/a&gt; While there can be no general quarrel with the ability of a democracy to also accommodate a monarchy, the proof of democracy in such a system is in the constitutional details and in the day-to-day operation of the system. The Cambodian Constitution begins well enough by stating that the "King of Cambodia shall reign but shall not govern." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B202"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F202"&gt;[FN202]&lt;/a&gt; However, the constitution goes on to make the king the "Supreme Commander of the Royal Khmer Armed Forces" and the "Chairman of the Supreme (C)ouncil of (N)ational Defense;" &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B203"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F203"&gt;[FN203]&lt;/a&gt; gives him the authority to sign and ratify treaties and to declare war, after a vote of approval by the National Assembly; &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B204"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F204"&gt;[FN204]&lt;/a&gt; and the power to "make a proclamation . . . putting the country in a state of emergency after agreement with the Prime Minister and the President of the Assembly." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B205"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F205"&gt;[FN205]&lt;/a&gt; While the current king, King Sihanouk, has tended to be a unifying force, a peacemaker, and a general supporter of human rights, there is no guarantee that future kings will not expand their role within the broad context of the powers granted in the Constitution. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B206"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F206"&gt;[FN206]&lt;/a&gt; In a country ruled *40 by military &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber43"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;power for much of its recent history, a king who is also Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces could be power enough for any ambitious monarch to wield while he is the "Head of State for life." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B207"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F207"&gt;[FN207]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Other than a reference to the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B208"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F208"&gt;[FN208]&lt;/a&gt; the constitution does very little to advance the cause of human rights. In the same article containing the Universal Declaration reference, the constitution goes on to state that "(e)very Khmer citizen shall be equal before the law." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B209"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F209"&gt;[FN209]&lt;/a&gt; The wording is important because it leaves the Assembly free to define "citizen" in a way that excludes Cambodians of Vietnamese descent, who have been targets of mass murder and widespread discrimination in the past. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B210"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F210"&gt;[FN210]&lt;/a&gt; This reference to "citizens" permeates the constitution in both its human rights articles and in the articles dealing with political participation. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B211"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F211"&gt;[FN211]&lt;/a&gt; There is evidence from the constitutional deliberations that the term citizen was "intended to justify discrimination." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B212"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F212"&gt;[FN212]&lt;/a&gt; Basic rights for citizens are also couched in guarded language. The right to freedom of expression is limited by an admonition that the right cannot be exercised "to affect the good traditions of the society," &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B213"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F213"&gt;[FN213]&lt;/a&gt; and the media is dealt with by a clause indicating that "(t)he regime of the media shall be determined by law." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B214"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F214"&gt;[FN214]&lt;/a&gt; The constitution is also notably lacking in many basic criminal due process rights. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B215"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F215"&gt;[FN215]&lt;/a&gt; Any hope that the Constitutional Council (Cambodia's &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber44"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;constitutional court) will be the protector of individual rights is extinguished by the requirement that only allows citizens to "appeal against the Constitutionality of the laws as through their representatives or the President of the Assembly." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B216"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F216"&gt;[FN216]&lt;/a&gt; There is no provision for a citizen to bring a direct constitutional appeal. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B217"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F217"&gt;[FN217]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  *41 After a comprehensive comparison of the new constitution with the prior communist constitution, Marks had this comment:&lt;br /&gt;    Clearly the drafters did not choose to draw from the language or normative richness of relevant international standards. In fact, it is a sad commentary on the whole process that most of the rights and duties are expressed in wording similar to that of the SOC (communist) Constitution of 1989. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B218"&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F218"&gt;[FN218]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  The Paris Accord principles for the new constitution stated that "Cambodia's tragic recent history requires special measures to assure protection of human rights." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B219"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F219"&gt;[FN219]&lt;/a&gt; Other than the addition of a reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is not necessarily supported by other enumerated rights in the 1993 constitution, it appears that the Cambodian drafters felt that the old human rights protections were "special" enough. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B220"&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F220"&gt;[FN220]&lt;/a&gt; In addition, the Paris Accord principles for "universal" political participation seem to be jeopardized by the use of the term "citizens." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B221"&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F221"&gt;[FN221]&lt;/a&gt; Finally, the promise of an independent judiciary to enforce the &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber45"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;rights provided under the constitution is an empty promise when the constitutional procedures require the consent of the Assembly to challenge any of the Assembly's laws. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B222"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F222"&gt;[FN222]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  There is no reason why the United Nations should have been left powerless to insure that the Cambodian Constitution lived up to the promises made to the world and to the Cambodian people in the Paris Accords. The world community has spent almost two billion dollars and peacekeepers have lost their lives trying to live up to their side of the bargain. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B223"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F223"&gt;[FN223]&lt;/a&gt; If the United Nations failed to enforce the constitutional principles contained in the Paris Accords, it is because the United Nations chose to set itself up for failure by not providing for an effective enforcement mechanism or remedy. In South Africa, the South African Constitutional Court recently found the new South African Constitution to be unconstitutional because it did not *42 conform to its pre-agreed constitutional principles. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B224"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F224"&gt;[FN224]&lt;/a&gt; The court sent it back to the drafters for revision. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B225"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F225"&gt;[FN225]&lt;/a&gt; In the Dayton Peace Agreement for Bosnia- Herzegovina, the draft constitution provided for the impartiality and independence of the Bosnian Constitutional Court by requiring that the President of the European Court of Human Rights select three of the nine court members. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B226"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F226"&gt;[FN226]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  There is no reason why the Paris Accords could not have provided for a similarly constituted provisional tribunal, or for an established international &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber46"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;tribunal, to review the draft Cambodian Constitution to insure that it conformed to the pre-agreed constitutional principles. Any shortcomings could have been referred back to the Cambodian Constitutional Assembly for revision. The United Nations is willing to take concrete and often intrusive action to guarantee free and fair elections. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B227"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F227"&gt;[FN227]&lt;/a&gt; It should not shy away from equally concrete measures to guarantee that a nation lives up to its promise to adopt a constitution that protects human rights and establishes a constitutional democracy. To do anything less is a reckless waste of scarce U.N. resources and a pointless endangerment of dedicated peacekeepers.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  To be sure, UNTAC faced many daunting challenges, exacerbated by Cambodia's long history of civil war and heinous human rights violations, and by all accounts, UNTAC did a commendable job with the mission they were given. Furthermore, I am not suggesting that a simple insistence on a constitution that conformed to an improved version of the Paris Accord principles would have solved all of the problems that UNTAC faced, nor solved all the political problems in Cambodia. However, holding elections under suspended laws, with UNTAC exercising prosecutorial authority and running the only free radio station in the country--in a country with Cambodia's history--and then departing shortly after the elections were held *43 and the "new" constitution was ratified, is either a sure recipe for failure or evidence that hope really does spring eternal. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B228"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F228"&gt;[FN228]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber47"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  UNTAC's sole focus on setting up the conditions for and holding free and fair elections left Cambodia stranded with little chance of building a stable peace. Permitting Cambodia to adopt a constitution that did not meet even the guarantees of its already minimal framework principles, and then immediately ending UNTAC's mandate, left Cambodia stranded at the very start of a difficult transition--and stranded without the proper constitutional tools to effect needed changes. Elections are not a transition; they are merely a beginning. Until the world community aims at the proper target, it cannot hit the mark. Until that target is constitutional democracy--instead of mere elections and empty "decorative constitutions"--we are wasting precious resources.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;E. The Current Situation in Cambodia&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Despite free and fair elections, a written constitution, $1.9 billion spent on UNTAC, and millions more in foreign aid, Cambodia is now back in a state of violent turmoil after a partial coup in July 1997 where Hun Sen, one of Cambodia's co-prime ministers, ousted Prince Ranhariddh, the other co-prime minister, and began a purge of Ranhariddh's supporters. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B229"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F229"&gt;[FN229]&lt;/a&gt; Even before the coup, Cambodia was making little progress toward improving its human rights record or enforcing the rights guaranteed by the new constitution. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B230"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F230"&gt;[FN230]&lt;/a&gt; Even after the July 1998 elections, the country continues in a state of unrest "as members *44 of the political elite egoistically bicker over the results, &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber48"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;while the 11 million peasants endure staggering hardships." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B231"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F231"&gt;[FN231]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Significantly, the Cambodian Interior Ministry was still drafting the new election law in 1996, despite the fact that the new law was scheduled to have been drafted and reviewed by December 1995. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B232"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F232"&gt;[FN232]&lt;/a&gt; In addition, like much of the constitutional drafting in 1993, the "(m)inistry deliberations and work (were) not open to public oversight and participation." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B233"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F233"&gt;[FN233]&lt;/a&gt; By early 1996, the human rights front was fairing no better:&lt;br /&gt;    According to human rights NGOs, the United Nations Center for Human Rights  (UNCHR) office in Phnom Penh, and USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development) documents, Cambodian military and police forces continued to violate human rights frequently during the past 2 years. These sources reported numerous cases of extortion, beatings, robberies, and other violations by soldiers and police. . . . (Also), (1) few Cambodians had received due process or fair trials in the past 2 years; (2) prosecutors and judges lacked basic training and skills for properly investigating, preparing, presenting, and deciding cases; and (3) trained public defenders remained scarce. . . . In late 1994, NGOs reported that they found a secret government prison where prisoners were tortured and denied basic human needs. According to the Department of State, this prison was closed in 1994. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B234"&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F234"&gt;[FN234]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Other impediments to effective constitutional government existed before the &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber49"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;coup as well. "The government closed some newspapers and prosecuted several members of the press, enacted restrictions on press freedoms, and tightly controlled broadcast licenses. Several members of the press were beaten or killed and their attackers set free." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B235"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F235"&gt;[FN235]&lt;/a&gt; Corruption and scandal plagued the government. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B236"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F236"&gt;[FN236]&lt;/a&gt; One of the largest scandals was caused in 1994 after it was discovered that the two co-prime *45 ministers had authorized the military to be the only lawful exporters of Cambodia's rare and valuable timber. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B237"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F237"&gt;[FN237]&lt;/a&gt; The timber scandal not only benefited the rulers at the expense of the nation, &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B238"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F238"&gt;[FN238]&lt;/a&gt; but it also allowed the military to finance itself, free from the control of the legislature. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B239"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F239"&gt;[FN239]&lt;/a&gt; A year after adopting the constitution, the Assembly had only passed two measures, both dealing with the budget, and had been in session fewer than twenty days. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B240"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F240"&gt;[FN240]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  It is interesting to note that many of the problems mentioned above are caused by Cambodia's lack of democratic experience and habits, and a corresponding dearth of laws and regulations in the very areas that UNTAC took over during the peacekeeping and election-monitoring phases of its operation. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B241"&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F241"&gt;[FN241]&lt;/a&gt; It should not be surprising that the Cambodian government could not accomplish these basic governmental tasks after UNTAC's departure when they could not accomplish them during UNTAC's stay. One commentator noted:&lt;br /&gt;    A final lesson, clearly evident in UNTAC's case, is the absolute importance &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber50"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;for multi component operations to be followed by coherent packages of post- transition assistance. . . . "You don't go from 22,000 personnel to effectively zero," as one diplomat observed, "without some negative impact." Still, a long-run international presence beyond a certain level is risky. It can stifle self-reliance and incur resentments against UN-style "neocolonialism." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B242"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F242"&gt;[FN242]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  This quotation shows the basic conflict in nation-building operations between helping too little and helping too much. Unfortunately, in UNTAC's case, they may have helped too much, for too short a time. Once again, the pattern of U.N. *46 assistance can be traced back to the narrow focus on the importance of holding just one free and fair election &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B243"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F243"&gt;[FN243]&lt;/a&gt;--as if that one election is the panacea that will cure the nation's problems and bring it peace, stability, human rights, and prosperity.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Incredibly, even after the July 1997 coup, the world focus on improving conditions in Cambodia continued to be on the importance of holding elections in 1998. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B244"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F244"&gt;[FN244]&lt;/a&gt; In September 1997, when the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs briefed the Senate subcommittee regarding the situation in Cambodia, he stated the administration's position that "(u)ntil there is a restoration of the Paris Peace Accords, and free and fair elections are held, the United States will not conduct business as usual with (Cambodia)." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B245"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F245"&gt;[FN245]&lt;/a&gt; He then went on to list the "core principles" of the &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber51"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;U.S. policy toward Cambodia. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B246"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F246"&gt;[FN246]&lt;/a&gt; The list was focused almost exclusively on the need for elections and for full political participation. The United States was not the only entity that focused on the need for elections in Cambodia. "The ASEAN Ministers' statement stressed the importance of holding free and fair elections in Cambodia . . . and reaffirmed the necessity for all political parties in Cambodia to participate fully in the elections." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B247"&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F247"&gt;[FN247]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Unfortunately, this current world faith in the ability of mere elections to once again "solve" the problems in Cambodia is *47 driven by the 1991 Paris Accords, which, in turn, were driven by the U.N. focus on neutrality and free and fair elections. Thus, we see how the United Nations single-minded policy of free and fair elections dictates the world's response, despite the policy's failure in the past.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  To be sure, the problems in Cambodia run deep--there is no single cause, nor single cure. However, many actions that were taken to assist in free and fair elections as a means to transform Cambodia were inadequate and shortsighted. Regrettably, these actions were also entirely consistent with the U.N. policy of neutrality and with the guidelines in the U.N. handbook on elections discussed earlier. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B248"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F248"&gt;[FN248]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Free and fair elections have become the only answer to the problem, and the U.N. policy, structure, and expertise all focus on the elections principle. As &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber52"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;Moore explained in his article about paradigms, "(w)ays of thinking about a problem become dominant as they seem to offer the best explanation at any point in time for understanding or dealing with the problem." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B249"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F249"&gt;[FN249]&lt;/a&gt; Or to put it another way, "(p)eople who are only good with hammers see every problem as a nail." &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B250"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F250"&gt;[FN250]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;VI. Conclusions&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  There is no doubt that any transition to democracy can be complicated and difficult, and the task of drafting a new constitution is not to be undertaken lightly. Many scholars of constitutionalism and democratic transitions have endeavored to illuminate these complex subjects. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B251"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F251"&gt;[FN251]&lt;/a&gt; The point of this article is not to compete with these scholars. Rather, it is to put the nation- building goal of transitioning to a constitutional democracy out in the open. Much of the world has also recognized that constitutional democracies and free- market economies are the best form of government to protect human *48 rights and achieve lasting peace and stability. &lt;a name="Document1zzFN_B252"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_F252"&gt;[FN252]&lt;/a&gt; The next step is the recognition that it is senseless for the United Nations and the world community to remain neutral toward forms of government, particularly during peacekeeping and nation-building operations, just as they have realized that it is senseless to be neutral toward a state that commits human rights violations against its citizens within its own borders.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber53"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  While there are many formidable challenges in setting up a new democracy, the world will continue to learn from experience. However, regardless of the difficulties, the evidence for democracies is clear, and the need for U.N. "neutralism" diminishes daily. It is time to (1) focus on the constitutional principles contained in any peacekeeping and nation building framework agreement, (2) develop measures to enforce compliance with those principles in the draft constitution, and (3) develop programs to assist the government to comply with its new constitution after it comes into effect. All indicators point toward the need to adopt a new goal for peacekeeping and nation building. A goal to set up nations that are obliged to control themselves after they pass the landmark event of that first free and fair election. A goal that the United Nations and the world should not be neutral toward.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  In peacekeeping operations--the one area where democracy is perhaps the most needed--misplaced reliance on neutrality and elections hampers the world's ability to transform nonpeaceful nations into peaceful and prosperous constitutional democracies. Although many peacekeeping efforts point discreetly in the direction of democracy; although former Secretary General Boutros-Ghali can write about the need for the democratic trappings of government; although the research and literature indicate that democracies offer the best hope of achieving peace, stability, and the protection of human rights; the United &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber54"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;Nations cannot seem to bring itself to openly adopt a democratic goal for nation building. Simple and open recognition of the value and goal of constitutional democracy is the first step toward turning U.N. peacekeeping into true nation building. The transition to democracy in a war-torn country may not be smooth *49 and may not be easy, but it is essential that we try. Until constitutional democracy is openly stated as a permissible and preferred goal for nation-building operations, the harder work of bringing forth the transitions will remain stalled in obscurity.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_Fd1"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_Bd1"&gt;[FNd1]&lt;/a&gt;. Judge Advocate General's Corps, United States Army. Presently assigned as Assistant Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Pacific Command, Camp Smith, Hawaii. Formerly assigned as an LL.M. candidate at the University of Virginia School of Law, 1997-1998; the Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, Aberdeen Proving Ground, 1995-1997; Senior Defense Counsel, Seoul, Korea, 1992-1994; Associate Professor, Department of Law, United States Military Academy, 1989-1992; Trial Counsel, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1985-1989.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  The opinions and conclusions in this paper are solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the Judge Advocate General, the Department of the Army, or any other government agency.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F1"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B1"&gt;[FN1]&lt;/a&gt;. The Federalist No. 51, at 356 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber55"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;Wright ed., 1974).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F2"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B2"&gt;[FN2]&lt;/a&gt;. The pace and scope of operations undertaken just after the end of the Cold War may have been a short-lived phenomenon. Cf. Report of the Secretary- General on the Work of the Organization, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., Supp. No. 1, para. 108, U.N. Doc. A/52/1 (1997) (hereinafter SG Annual Report--1997) (suggesting that possibilities for peacekeeping and post-conflict peace- building operations by the United Nations may have been exaggerated because of initial post-Cold-War euphoria).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F3"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B3"&gt;[FN3]&lt;/a&gt;. See, e.g., id. paras. 112, 114 (stating that the U.N. missions in the Balkans and Liberia are to monitor the cease fire and pave the way for elections).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F4"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B4"&gt;[FN4]&lt;/a&gt;. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 1, at 356.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F5"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B5"&gt;[FN5]&lt;/a&gt;. See SG Annual Report--1997, supra note 2, para. 22. According to the report, "good governance comprises the rule of law, effective state institutions, transparency and accountability in the management of public affairs, respect for human rights, and the meaningful participation of all citizens in the political processes of their countries and in decisions &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber56"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;affecting their lives." Id.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F6"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B6"&gt;[FN6]&lt;/a&gt;. See, e.g., Henry Wiseman, Peacekeeping in the International Political Context: Historical Analysis and Future Directions, in The United Nations and Peacekeeping: Results, Limitations and Prospects: The Lessons of 40 years of Experience 32, 50-51 (Indar Jit Rikhye &amp;amp; Kjell Skjelsbaek eds., 1990) (suggesting nongovernmental institutions could initiate discussions on ideas for new methods of peacekeeping, and eventually, with governmental support, the institutions could plan for deliberations on the future of peacekeeping efforts); Yasushi Akashi, The Use of Force in a United Nations Peace-Keeping Operation: Lessons Learnt from the Safe Areas Mandate, &lt;a href="http://international.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=%20%20%20%201.0&amp;amp;vr=2.0&amp;amp;DocName=19FDMILJ312&amp;amp;FindType=Y&amp;amp;ReferencePositionType=S&amp;amp;ReferencePosition=320"&gt;19 Fordham Int'l L.J. 312, 320-21 (1995)&lt;/a&gt; (arguing U.N. intervention should occur when the will of the parties in conflict is to reach agreement, and if a decision to intervene is made, the parameters of the intervention should be explained to all parties before the intervention is deployed); Commander Roger D. Scott, Getting Back to the Real United Nations: Global Peace Norms and Creeping Interventionism, &lt;a href="http://international.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=%20%20%20%201.0&amp;amp;vr=2.0&amp;amp;DocName=154MILLR27&amp;amp;FindType=Y"&gt;154 Mil. L. Rev. 27, 32-33 (1997)&lt;/a&gt; (emphasizing the underlying principle of the U.N. Charter is that states should resort to the use of military force as a defense only and should therefore resolve disputes by peaceful means);Shashi Tharoor, The Changing Face of Peace-Keeping and Peace-Enforcement, &lt;a href="http://international.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=%20%20%20%201.0&amp;amp;vr=2.0&amp;amp;DocName=19FDMILJ408&amp;amp;FindType=Y&amp;amp;ReferencePositionType=S&amp;amp;ReferencePosition=426"&gt;19 Fordham Int'l L.J. 408, 426 (1995)&lt;/a&gt; (concluding in order for peacekeeping to &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber57"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;remain effective, it must not be used in inappropriate situations or undermined by equating peacekeeping with war-making); Anne Orford, Locating the International: Military and Monetary Interventions After the Cold War, &lt;a href="http://international.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=%20%20%20%201.0&amp;amp;vr=2.0&amp;amp;DocName=38HARVINTLLJ443&amp;amp;FindType=Y"&gt;38 Harv. Int'l L.J. 443, 443-44 (1997)&lt;/a&gt; (questioning the justifications for international economic and military intervention since the end of the Cold War).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F7"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B7"&gt;[FN7]&lt;/a&gt;. See SG Annual Report--1997, supra note 2, para. 38 (indicating the U.N. has received 80 requests for electoral assistance in the past five years).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F8"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B8"&gt;[FN8]&lt;/a&gt;. See &lt;a href="http://international.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=%20%20%20%201.0&amp;amp;vr=2.0&amp;amp;DocName=24DENJILP253&amp;amp;FindType=Y"&gt;John Linarelli, Peace-Building, 24 Denv. J. Int'l L. &amp;amp; Pol'y 253, 260 (1996)&lt;/a&gt; (stating that the United Nations follows the World Bank model of recommending, but not requiring a democratic government).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F9"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B9"&gt;[FN9]&lt;/a&gt;. See Daniel J. Blessington, From Dayton to Sarajevo: Enforcing Election Law in Post War Bosnia and Herzegovina, &lt;a href="http://international.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=%20%20%20%201.0&amp;amp;vr=2.0&amp;amp;DocName=13AMUJINTLLPOLY553&amp;amp;FindType=Y"&gt;13 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 553&lt;/a&gt;, 604 (1998).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F10"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B10"&gt;[FN10]&lt;/a&gt;. Cf. United Nations: Report of the Secretary-General on an Agenda for Peace--Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess. para. 60, U.N. Doc. A/47/277 (1992) (hereinafter Agenda for Peace--1992) &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber58"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;(suggesting the Cold War was an obstacle to the use of Chapter VIII of the Charter, which is devoted to regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with matters relating to maintenance of international peace and security).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F11"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B11"&gt;[FN11]&lt;/a&gt;. See Tharoor, supra note 6, at 415 (referring to the British doctrine of "Wider Peace-Keeping" and the U.S. Army Field Manual on peacekeeping). For years, the United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations declined to define the term peacekeeping "on the grounds that to define peace-keeping was to impose a strait-jacket on a concept whose flexibility made it the most pragmatic instrument at the disposal of the world organization." Id. at 414.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F12"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B12"&gt;[FN12]&lt;/a&gt;. See generally UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s (William J. Durch ed., 1993) (history of various U.N. peacekeeping operations).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F13"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B13"&gt;[FN13]&lt;/a&gt;. See Agenda for Peace--1992, supra note 10, para. 20.&lt;br /&gt;  The terms preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping are integrally related and . . . are defined as follows:&lt;br /&gt;  Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber59"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Peacemaking is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.&lt;br /&gt;  Peace-keeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.&lt;br /&gt;Id.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F14"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B14"&gt;[FN14]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. para. 21.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F15"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B15"&gt;[FN15]&lt;/a&gt;. Id.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F16"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B16"&gt;[FN16]&lt;/a&gt;. See Dep't of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations 13-6 (June 14, 1993) (interpreting its term "nation assistance" as essentially equivalent to the United Nations "peace building" operations).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F17"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B17"&gt;[FN17]&lt;/a&gt;. Id.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F18"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B18"&gt;[FN18]&lt;/a&gt;. See generally Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber60"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;Foreign Aff., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 22.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F19"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B19"&gt;[FN19]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. at 24.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F20"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B20"&gt;[FN20]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. (quoting Samuel P. Huntington: "Elections, open, free and fair, are the essence of democracy, the inescapable sine qua non."). Zakaria argues that democracy is distinct from constitutional liberalism and that while we are seeing an increase in democratically elected governments these governments are often "illiberal democracies" rather than liberal democracies founded in constitutionalism. See id. at 23-24.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F21"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B21"&gt;[FN21]&lt;/a&gt;. From reading some of the international relations literature, one begins to wonder why the term "democracy" has picked up such a bad reputation. Some authors go out of their way to avoid calling a democracy a democracy. Kishore Mahbubani berates the world community for trying to push democracy on nations in the Far East. He argues instead for "good governance." According to Mahbubani, the elements of good governance include "a society marked by the rule of law," "principles of equality under the law," freedom from "arbitrary justice," a "modern legal system with due process, an independent judiciary, and a modern penal and civil code." See Kishore Mahbubani, An Asia-Pacific Consensus, Foreign Aff., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 149, 157; see also A.E. Dick &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber61"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;Howard, The Road from Runnymede: Magna Carta and constitutionalism in America 379-82 (1968) (discussing constitutionalism).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F22"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B22"&gt;[FN22]&lt;/a&gt;. Anthony Lake, From Containment to Enlargement, 4 U.S. Dep't of State Dispatch 658, 660 (1993)(addressing the John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F23"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B23"&gt;[FN23]&lt;/a&gt;. SG Annual Report--1997, supra note 2, para. 22; see also Mahbubani, supra note 21, at 157 (adopting the phrase "good governance").&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F24"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B24"&gt;[FN24]&lt;/a&gt;. See The Federalist No. 48, at 345 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1974) (quoting from Notes on the State of Virginia by Thomas Jefferson).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F25"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B25"&gt;[FN25]&lt;/a&gt;. Stephen P. Marks, The New Cambodian Constitution: From Civil War to a Fragile Democracy, &lt;a href="http://international.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=%20%20%20%201.0&amp;amp;vr=2.0&amp;amp;DocName=26CLMHRLR45&amp;amp;FindType=Y&amp;amp;ReferencePositionType=S&amp;amp;ReferencePosition=105"&gt;26 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 45, 105 (1994)&lt;/a&gt; (emphasis in original).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F26"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B26"&gt;[FN26]&lt;/a&gt;. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 1, at 357-58.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F27"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B27"&gt;[FN27]&lt;/a&gt;. As Justice Jackson so eloquently noted, "(l)iberty is not the mere &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber62"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;absence of restraint, it is not a spontaneous product of majority rule, it is not achieved merely by lifting underprivileged classes to power, nor is it the inevitable by-product of technological expansion. It is achieved only by a rule of law." Robert H. Jackson, The Supreme Court in the American System of Government 76 (1955).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F28"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B28"&gt;[FN28]&lt;/a&gt;. Perhaps the ugly connotations internationally attached to the word democracy come from the efforts by some to force a particular form of democracy on every nation, as if democracy were something that could be applied with a rubber stamp. I agree with the sentiment expressed by another author on this subject:&lt;br /&gt;When, like so many others before me, I stress the imperative of democratization, I do not mean that some states should imitate others slavishly, nor do I expect them to borrow political systems that are alien to them, much less to gratify certain Western States--in fact, just the opposite. Let us state, forcefully, that democracy is the private domain of no one. It can and ought to be assimilated by all cultures. It can take many forms in order to accommodate local realities more effectively. Democracy is not a model to copy from certain states, but a goal to be achieved by all peoples!&lt;br /&gt;Christina M. Cerna, Universal Democracy: An International Legal Right or the Pipe Dream of the West?, &lt;a href="http://international.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=%20%20%20%201.0&amp;amp;vr=2.0&amp;amp;DocName=27NYUJINTLLPOL289&amp;amp;FindType=Y"&gt;27 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. &amp;amp; Pol. 289, 291-92&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber63"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://international.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=%20%20%20%201.0&amp;amp;vr=2.0&amp;amp;DocName=27NYUJINTLLPOL289&amp;amp;FindType=Y"&gt;(1994)&lt;/a&gt; (quoting U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Human Rights: The Common Language of Humanity, in United Nations: World Conference on Human Rights, The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993)).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F29"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B29"&gt;[FN29]&lt;/a&gt;. Agenda for Peace--1992, supra note 10, para. 59.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F30"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B30"&gt;[FN30]&lt;/a&gt;. Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post- Cold War World 4 (1993).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F31"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B31"&gt;[FN31]&lt;/a&gt;. See generally John Norton Moore, Toward a New Paradigm: Enhanced Effectiveness in United Nations Peacekeeping, Collective Security, and War Avoidance, 37 Va. J. Int'l Law 811 (1997).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F32"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B32"&gt;[FN32]&lt;/a&gt;. Id. at 822.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F33"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B33"&gt;[FN33]&lt;/a&gt;. Id. See also &lt;a href="http://international.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=%20%20%20%201.0&amp;amp;vr=2.0&amp;amp;DocName=86JIL46&amp;amp;FindType=Y"&gt;Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 Am. J. Int'l L. 46, 88-90 (1992)&lt;/a&gt;. But see Zakaria, supra note 18, at 35 (arguing that "without a background in constitutional liberalism, the introduction of democracy (i.e. elections) in divided societies has actually fomented nationalism, ethnic conflict, and even war.").&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber64"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F34"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B34"&gt;[FN34]&lt;/a&gt;. See F. Roy Willis, France, Germany, and the New Europe 1945-1967, at 309-311, 328-336, 353-356 (1968).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F35"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B35"&gt;[FN35]&lt;/a&gt;. While there can be some argument about whether South Korea has become a true democracy, the nation has been making advances toward free markets and democracy since their first elections in 1948, with dramatic progress since 1988. South Korean cooperation with Japan has developed since the mid-sixties, despite a long and brutal occupation of Korea by the Japanese from 1910 to 1945. See Brian Bridges, Japan and Korea in the 1990s, at 90-108, 118-127 (1993).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F36"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B36"&gt;[FN36]&lt;/a&gt;. See, e.g., Lori Fisler Damrosch, Constitutional Control Over War Powers: A Common Core of Accountability in Democratic Societies?, &lt;a href="http://international.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=%20%20%20%201.0&amp;amp;vr=2.0&amp;amp;DocName=50UMIALR181&amp;amp;FindType=Y&amp;amp;ReferencePositionType=S&amp;amp;ReferencePosition=189"&gt;50 U. Miami L. Rev. 181, 189 (1995)&lt;/a&gt; (restating the firmly established proposition that democracies virtually never go to war with each other); Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Lawmaking, &lt;a href="http://international.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=%20%20%20%201.0&amp;amp;vr=2.0&amp;amp;DocName=84MILR352&amp;amp;FindType=Y&amp;amp;ReferencePositionType=S&amp;amp;ReferencePosition=353"&gt;84 Mich. L. Rev. 352, 353 (1985)&lt;/a&gt; (urging that a central feature of democracy is tolerance); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International Organizations, &lt;a href="http://international.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=%20%20%20%201.0&amp;amp;vr=2.0&amp;amp;DocName=17NWJINTLLBUS398&amp;amp;FindType=Y"&gt;17 Nw. J. Int'l L. &amp;amp; Bus. 398, 459 (1996-1997)&lt;/a&gt; (noting that peace is more likely among democracies); Louis B. Sohn, The New Dimensions of United Nations Peacemaking, &lt;a href="http://international.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=%20%20%20%201.0&amp;amp;vr=2.0&amp;amp;DocName=26GAJICL123&amp;amp;FindType=Y"&gt;26 Ga. J. Int'l &amp;amp; Comp. L. 123, 125 (1996)&lt;/a&gt; (suggesting the United Nations &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber65"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;charter stands as proof that nations, in the essence of democracy, face their differences and find common ground).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F37"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B37"&gt;[FN37]&lt;/a&gt;. See Moore, supra note 31, at 848-49. Moore argues that democratic leaders are more likely to have a "commitment to voluntary agreement and an aversion to extreme violence." Id. at 848.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F38"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B38"&gt;[FN38]&lt;/a&gt;. Id. at 849. As other authors have noted, "(T)he greatest threats to human liberty and happiness in this century have been caused not by disorder but by brutally strong, centralized states, like Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and Maoist China. The Third World is littered with the bloody handiwork of strong states." Zakaria, supra note 18, at 32.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F39"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B39"&gt;[FN39]&lt;/a&gt;. See Lake, supra note 22, at 661.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F40"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B40"&gt;[FN40]&lt;/a&gt;. See Cerna, supra note 28, at 291.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F41"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B41"&gt;[FN41]&lt;/a&gt;. Id. (quoting Boutros-Ghali).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F42"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B42"&gt;[FN42]&lt;/a&gt;. See e.g., B.G. Ramcharan, Reforming the United Nations to Secure Human Rights, in Preferred Futures for the United Nations 193 (Saul H. &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber66"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;Mendlovitz &amp;amp; Burns H. Weston eds., 1995).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F43"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B43"&gt;[FN43]&lt;/a&gt;. See Russett, supra note 30.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F44"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B44"&gt;[FN44]&lt;/a&gt;. R.J. Rummel, Death by Government at xv (1994).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F45"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B45"&gt;[FN45]&lt;/a&gt;. Id. at xv-xvi.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F46"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B46"&gt;[FN46]&lt;/a&gt;. Id. at 2 (emphasis in original).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F47"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B47"&gt;[FN47]&lt;/a&gt;. Id. at xxi.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F48"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B48"&gt;[FN48]&lt;/a&gt;. See Bill Richardson, Message to Iraq, Wash. Post, Nov. 30, 1997, at C7.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F49"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B49"&gt;[FN49]&lt;/a&gt;. See John M. Goshko, U.N. Urges Iraq to End Standoff, Wash. Post, Jan. 15, 1998, at A25.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F50"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B50"&gt;[FN50]&lt;/a&gt;. See Rummel, supra note 44, at 4 tbl.1.2.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F51"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B51"&gt;[FN51]&lt;/a&gt;. See Dith Pran, The World: A Reminiscence: the Killing Fields; Could &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber67"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;the Vietnamese Withdrawal Bring Back Cambodia's Nightmare?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1989, at D1 (describing how "the Khmer Rouge also emptied the cities, even moving patients out of hospitals, leaving some to die along the roads with plasma bottles still attached to their arms."); see also Mona Charen, The Khmer Rouge Record Demands We Act Now, Chi. Trib., Oct. 3, 1989, at C19 (stating, "(L)ike Nazis in a synagogue, the Khmer Rouge set about systematically destroying a civilization."); Wilbur G. Landrey, Signing Cambodia Peace Treaty Was the Easy Part, St. Petersburg Times, at A2 (discussing the practice of "sending men, women, children and hospital patients to work and survive . . . in Cambodia's fields and forests.").&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F52"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B52"&gt;[FN52]&lt;/a&gt;. See Keith B. Richburg, Beyond a Wall of Secrecy, Devastation; Rare Closeup Reveals a North Korea That No Longer Functions, Wash. Post, Oct. 19, 1997, at A1.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F53"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B53"&gt;[FN53]&lt;/a&gt;. See Marcus Noland, Why North Korea Will Muddle Through, Foreign Aff., July-Aug. 1997, at 105, 110.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F54"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B54"&gt;[FN54]&lt;/a&gt;. See Kevin Sullivan, Survival Instinct: Don't Bet the Collective on North Korea's Imminent Collapse, Wash. Post, Mar. 9, 1997, at C1.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber68"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F55"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B55"&gt;[FN55]&lt;/a&gt;. Gerald W. Scully, Constitutional Environments and Economic Growth 12 (1992).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F56"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B56"&gt;[FN56]&lt;/a&gt;. Id.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F57"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B57"&gt;[FN57]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. at 212-215 (reasoning that certain human characteristics needed for a prosperous economy must be protected by the political setting of that society).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F58"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B58"&gt;[FN58]&lt;/a&gt;. Id. at 8.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F59"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B59"&gt;[FN59]&lt;/a&gt;. Id. at 9.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F60"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B60"&gt;[FN60]&lt;/a&gt;. Id.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F61"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B61"&gt;[FN61]&lt;/a&gt;. Id. at 10.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F62"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B62"&gt;[FN62]&lt;/a&gt;. See Henry Ashby Turner, Jr., The Two Germanies Since 1945, at 30  (1987); Bong-youn Choy, Korea: A History 204 (1971).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F63"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B63"&gt;[FN63]&lt;/a&gt;. See Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Background Notes: &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber69"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;North Korea 6 (1996) (hereinafter Background Notes: North Korea). The report states that after WWII North and South Korea went to war and upon signing an armistice in 1953 remained divided. Despite continuing reunification efforts, North and South Korea are still divided. See id.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F64"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B64"&gt;[FN64]&lt;/a&gt;. See Choy, supra note 62, at 206; Turner, supra note 62, at 23  (addressing Germany's poor economic condition after WWII, not distinguishing between East and West).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F65"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B65"&gt;[FN65]&lt;/a&gt;. See Turner, supra note 62, at 185-188 (describing the general economic lag of East Germany compared to the economy of West Germany); 20 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica 124 (15th ed. 1997) (hereinafter Britannica) (emphasizing that West Germany's economy is the fourth largest in the world).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F66"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B66"&gt;[FN66]&lt;/a&gt;. See Britannica, supra note 65, at 53.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F67"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B67"&gt;[FN67]&lt;/a&gt;. See Turner, supra note 62, at 70.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F68"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B68"&gt;[FN68]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. at 111, 184.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F69"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B69"&gt;[FN69]&lt;/a&gt;. See Background Notes: North Korea, supra note 63, at 1; Bureau of &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber70"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Background Notes: South Korea 1 (1997) (hereinafter Background Notes: South Korea).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F70"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B70"&gt;[FN70]&lt;/a&gt;. See Background Notes: North Korea, supra note 63, at 1.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F71"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B71"&gt;[FN71]&lt;/a&gt;. See Background Notes: South Korea, supra note 69, at 1.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F72"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B72"&gt;[FN72]&lt;/a&gt;. See Noland, supra note 53, at 107.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F73"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B73"&gt;[FN73]&lt;/a&gt;. See Richburg, supra note 52, at A1 (observing the overall decline of North Korea's economy and the devastating famine in that country).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F74"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B74"&gt;[FN74]&lt;/a&gt;. Id.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F75"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B75"&gt;[FN75]&lt;/a&gt;. The methods for "guiding" a nation toward a free-market economy are well beyond the scope of this paper, and like democracies, free-market economies also do not come in a one-size-fits-all formula. At the general level, as one author puts it, "the conventional wisdom has it that there are two ways to reform a centrally planned economy--the successful, Asian, gradual approach, and the unsuccessful, European, 'big bang' approach." Noland, supra note 53, at 111. My point is that regardless of the approach, the fact remains &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber71"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;that transition should be encouraged because free-market economies have vast potential to improve the living conditions and overall wealth of a nation. But cf. Orford, supra note 6, at 455-56 (arguing that international monetary intervention by the IMF and others may have caused much of the turmoil in the former Yugoslavia and contributed to the breakdown into violence).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F76"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B76"&gt;[FN76]&lt;/a&gt;. I am not advocating for the end to all foreign aid. Rather, I am advocating for an intelligent foreign aid policy that will encourage free markets and constitutional democracy rather than foreign aid that serves only as a temporary band-aid for the nation's ills.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F77"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B77"&gt;[FN77]&lt;/a&gt;. See World Survey of Economic Freedom 1995-1996, at 140 (Richard E. Messick ed., 1996) (hereinafter World Survey) (referring to the 1993 U.N.- monitored elections for the Cambodian national assembly).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F78"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B78"&gt;[FN78]&lt;/a&gt;. See &lt;a href="http://international.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=%20%20%20%201.0&amp;amp;vr=2.0&amp;amp;DocName=28VANDJTRANSNATLL45&amp;amp;FindType=Y"&gt;Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Patrimonicide: The International Economic Crime of Indigenous Spoliation, 28 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 45, 65 (1995)&lt;/a&gt;; cf. Marguerite Laurent, Forces Against the Development of an Independent Judiciary in Haiti, Nat'l B. Ass'n Mag., Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 13 (inferring that the injection of foreign aid into Haiti will only result in further corruption among the wealthy elite who control the government).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber72"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F79"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B79"&gt;[FN79]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. (arguing that "(f)oreign missions and their non-governmental organizations and the humanitarian services sector" stunt the development of the economy and democracy in Haiti).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F80"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B80"&gt;[FN80]&lt;/a&gt;. See World Survey, supra note 77, at 140 (suggesting that Cambodia's dependency on foreign aid has led to corruption and "diminished" optimism toward pursuing a free economy); see, e.g., Laurent, supra note 78, at 13 (postulating that foreign missions and their non-governmental organizations and the humanitarian services sector may have been an efficient alternative, the "white knights" during Duvalier's reign; however, at the moment they are competing with the fledgling development of democracy and self-determination in Haiti).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F81"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B81"&gt;[FN81]&lt;/a&gt;. Georges Anglade, Rules, Risks, and Rifts in the Transition to Democracy in Haiti, &lt;a href="http://international.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=%20%20%20%201.0&amp;amp;vr=2.0&amp;amp;DocName=20FDMILJ1176&amp;amp;FindType=Y&amp;amp;ReferencePositionType=S&amp;amp;ReferencePosition=1212"&gt;20 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1176, 1212 (1997)&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F82"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B82"&gt;[FN82]&lt;/a&gt;. See Laurent, supra note 78, at 12 (arguing that "(s)ince 1986, Haitians have shown a willingness and commitment to continue the struggle against Neo-Duvalierism and for equitable and peaceful coexistence.").&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber73"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F83"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B83"&gt;[FN83]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. Again, this is not to say that the international community should stop sending in humanitarian aid to relieve suffering. It is more a call for an examination of the ultimate goals of the aid, a critical look at the effects of the aid, and an analysis of where the aid can best be put to use to improve the conditions of the population in the long term.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F84"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B84"&gt;[FN84]&lt;/a&gt;. Anglade, supra note 81, at 1190.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F85"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B85"&gt;[FN85]&lt;/a&gt;. See World Survey, supra note 77, at 5 ("spotlighting those countries where citizens are denied the freedom to buy, sell, trade and otherwise pursue economic opportunities" and advocating their need for economic freedom).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F86"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B86"&gt;[FN86]&lt;/a&gt;. Id. at 9.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F87"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B87"&gt;[FN87]&lt;/a&gt;. Id. at 10.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F88"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B88"&gt;[FN88]&lt;/a&gt;. See Ibrahima Fall, Forward to U.N. Centre for Human Rights, Human Rights and Elections: A Handbook on Legal, Technical and Human Rights Aspects of Elections at v (1994) (hereinafter U.N. Elections Handbook) (presenting U.N. procedures and criteria for conducting and monitoring elections).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber74"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F89"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B89"&gt;[FN89]&lt;/a&gt;. See U.N. Elections Handbook, supra note 88.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F90"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B90"&gt;[FN90]&lt;/a&gt;. Id. para. 17.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F91"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B91"&gt;[FN91]&lt;/a&gt;. Id.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F92"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B92"&gt;[FN92]&lt;/a&gt;. Id.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F93"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B93"&gt;[FN93]&lt;/a&gt;. Id.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F94"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B94"&gt;[FN94]&lt;/a&gt;. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(III)A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 127, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (hereinafter Declaration of Human Rights) (recognizing that the will of the people requires periodic elections, not just one election for all time).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F95"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B95"&gt;[FN95]&lt;/a&gt;. See U.N. Elections Handbook, supra note 88, para. 72 (stating that no specific schedule of periodicity is required).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F96"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B96"&gt;[FN96]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. paras. 115-17.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F97"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B97"&gt;[FN97]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. para. 116.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber75"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F98"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B98"&gt;[FN98]&lt;/a&gt;. Id. para. 26 (emphasis added). The handbook goes on to extol the virtues of an independent judiciary, of principles of non-discrimination, and of other fundamental human rights. See id. para. 31.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F99"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B99"&gt;[FN99]&lt;/a&gt;. Compare Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 94, arts. 7-22, with U.N. Elections Handbook, supra note 88, para. 31.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F100"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B100"&gt;[FN100]&lt;/a&gt;. Cf. &lt;a href="http://international.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=%20%20%20%201.0&amp;amp;vr=2.0&amp;amp;DocName=16MICHJINTLL1177&amp;amp;FindType=Y&amp;amp;ReferencePositionType=S&amp;amp;ReferencePosition=1233"&gt;Nhan T. Vu, The Holding of Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia: The Achievement of the United Nations' Impossible Mission, 16 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1177, 1233-34 (1995)&lt;/a&gt; (noting that even when election results were announced in Cambodia, human rights abuses continued).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F101"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B101"&gt;[FN101]&lt;/a&gt;. U.N. Elections Handbook, supra note 88,para. 32 (emphasis added).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F102"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B102"&gt;[FN102]&lt;/a&gt;. Id. para. 52 (emphasis added).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F103"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B103"&gt;[FN103]&lt;/a&gt;. See Final Act of the Paris Conference on Cambodia, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 24, U.N. Doc. A/46/608 (1991) (hereinafter Paris Accords).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber76"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F104"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B104"&gt;[FN104]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. at 25.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F105"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B105"&gt;[FN105]&lt;/a&gt;. U.N. Elections Handbook, supra note 88, paras. 129-30.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F106"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B106"&gt;[FN106]&lt;/a&gt;. Tharoor, supra note 6, at 416.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F107"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B107"&gt;[FN107]&lt;/a&gt;. See The United Nations Plan for Elections in Namibia, U.N. S.C. Res. 435, 37th Sess., at 18-19, U.N. Doc. S/15287 (1978) (hereinafter Namibian Principles).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F108"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B108"&gt;[FN108]&lt;/a&gt;. Draft Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, &lt;a href="http://international.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=%20%20%20%201.0&amp;amp;vr=2.0&amp;amp;DocName=35INTLLEGALMAT75&amp;amp;FindType=Y&amp;amp;ReferencePositionType=S&amp;amp;ReferencePosition=117"&gt;35 I.L.M. 117&lt;/a&gt;  (1996). The draft constitution itself was never adopted and contains many arguably unwise compromises. One wonders if the negotiators at Dayton would have been better served by convincing the parties to adopt a draft constitutional framework consisting of a list of agreed human rights protections and governmental requirements, such as the principles adopted for Namibia. Duly elected delegates to a constitutional convention could have worked out the details at a later date.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F109"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B109"&gt;[FN109]&lt;/a&gt;. Elizabeth F. Defeis, Elections and Democracy: Armenia, A Case Study, &lt;a href="http://international.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=%20%20%20%201.0&amp;amp;vr=2.0&amp;amp;DocName=20LYLAICLA455&amp;amp;FindType=Y&amp;amp;ReferencePositionType=S&amp;amp;ReferencePosition=455"&gt;20 Loy. L.A. Int'l &amp;amp; Comp. L.J. 455, 455-56&lt;/a&gt; (1998) (noting that some &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber77"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;democratically elected governments still infringe on constitutionally protected rights, or improperly usurp power in violation of constitutional limits).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F110"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B110"&gt;[FN110]&lt;/a&gt;. Alex Y. Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of Values, &lt;a href="http://international.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=%20%20%20%201.0&amp;amp;vr=2.0&amp;amp;DocName=30CORNELLINTLLJ429&amp;amp;FindType=Y&amp;amp;ReferencePositionType=S&amp;amp;ReferencePosition=451"&gt;30 Cornell Int'l L.J. 429, 451 (1997)&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F111"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B111"&gt;[FN111]&lt;/a&gt;. See National Sovereignty Revisited: Perspectives on the Emerging Norm of Democracy in International Law, &lt;a href="http://international.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=%20%20%20%201.0&amp;amp;vr=2.0&amp;amp;DB=100201&amp;amp;FindType=Y&amp;amp;SerialNum=0103015331"&gt;86 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 249&lt;/a&gt;, 249 (1992) (hereinafter Emerging Norm of Democracy) (discussing the "emergence of political participation as an accepted international norm."). Panel participants included Gregory H. Fox, Karen Engle, Claudio Grossman, Thomas Carothers, and others. See id. at 249-271.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F112"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B112"&gt;[FN112]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. at 258.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F113"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B113"&gt;[FN113]&lt;/a&gt;. Id. at 250.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F114"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B114"&gt;[FN114]&lt;/a&gt;. Id.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F115"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B115"&gt;[FN115]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. (citing Algeria, former Soviet Georgia, and Haiti as examples).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber78"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F116"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B116"&gt;[FN116]&lt;/a&gt;. Id.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F117"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B117"&gt;[FN117]&lt;/a&gt;. See Franck, supra note 33, at 52-56.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F118"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B118"&gt;[FN118]&lt;/a&gt;. U.N. Charter art. 73.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F119"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B119"&gt;[FN119]&lt;/a&gt;. Emerging Norm of Democracy, supra note 111, at 251.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F120"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B120"&gt;[FN120]&lt;/a&gt;. See Background Notes: South Korea, supra note 69, at 3-4.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F121"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B121"&gt;[FN121]&lt;/a&gt;. See Emerging Norm of Democracy, supra note 111, at 264 (citing India, Pakistan, Guatemala, and South Korea as examples).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F122"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B122"&gt;[FN122]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. at 263-65 (noting that portions of Asia, such as China, North Korea, Vietnam, Myanmar, Indonesia, Singapore and Pakistan present a mixed picture).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F123"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B123"&gt;[FN123]&lt;/a&gt;. U.N. Charter art. 1, paras. 1, 3.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F124"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B124"&gt;[FN124]&lt;/a&gt;. See U.N. Elections Handbook, supra note 88, para. 7 (recounting &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber79"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;that "United Nations activity in the field of elections began with the official observation of the Korean elections of 1948.").&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F125"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B125"&gt;[FN125]&lt;/a&gt;. U.N. Charter art. 73; see also Franck, supra note 33, at 50-51.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F126"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B126"&gt;[FN126]&lt;/a&gt;. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F127"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B127"&gt;[FN127]&lt;/a&gt;. Id.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F128"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B128"&gt;[FN128]&lt;/a&gt;. See U.N. Charter art. 1, paras. 2-3. As I have stated earlier, neutrality in nation building is a separate issue from neutrality during peacekeeping operations. See United Nations and Peacekeeping, supra note 6, at 42-44. (arguing that one of the fundamental features of a successful peacekeeping mission is the neutrality of those enforcing the peace).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F129"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B129"&gt;[FN129]&lt;/a&gt;. Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary- General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations para. 3, U.N. Doc. A/50/60 (1995).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F130"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B130"&gt;[FN130]&lt;/a&gt;. Id. paras. 12-13.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber80"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F131"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B131"&gt;[FN131]&lt;/a&gt;. Id. para. 13.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F132"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B132"&gt;[FN132]&lt;/a&gt;. Id. para. 14.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F133"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B133"&gt;[FN133]&lt;/a&gt;. Ibrahim J. Gassama, Safeguarding the Democratic Entitlement: A Proposal for United Nations Involvement in National Politics, &lt;a href="http://international.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=%20%20%20%201.0&amp;amp;vr=2.0&amp;amp;DocName=30CORNELLINTLLJ287&amp;amp;FindType=Y&amp;amp;ReferencePositionType=S&amp;amp;ReferencePosition=290"&gt;30 Cornell Int'l L.J. 287, 290 (1997)&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F134"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B134"&gt;[FN134]&lt;/a&gt;. See Zakaria, supra note 18, at 38. "Political scientists Jack Synder and Edward Mansfield contend, using an impressive data set, that over the last 200 years democratizing states went to war significantly more often than either stable autocracies or liberal democracies. In countries not grounded in constitutional liberalism, the rise of democracy often brings with it hyper-nationalism and war-mongering." Id.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F135"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B135"&gt;[FN135]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. (pointing to "Napoleon III's France, Wilhelmine Germany, and Taisho Japan . . . Armenia and Azerbaijan and Milosevic's Serbia" as examples).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F136"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B136"&gt;[FN136]&lt;/a&gt;. See Moore, supra note 31, at 887. "While it may be attractive to hope for non-involvement in the face of outrageous behavior, in such settings &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber81"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;it is likely that only involvement can carry out the mission." Id.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F137"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B137"&gt;[FN137]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. at 860.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F138"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B138"&gt;[FN138]&lt;/a&gt;. Moore, supra note 31, at 877.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F139"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B139"&gt;[FN139]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. at 877-78. "It is also relevant to note that the best outcome of any war in the 20th Century was the outcome of World War II, characterized by direct action to install democratic governments in the former Axis States." Id.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F140"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B140"&gt;[FN140]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. at 878.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F141"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B141"&gt;[FN141]&lt;/a&gt;. See Tina Rosenberg, Overcoming the Legacies of Dictatorship, Foreign Aff., May-June 1995, at 134, 134-35.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F142"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B142"&gt;[FN142]&lt;/a&gt;. See id.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F143"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B143"&gt;[FN143]&lt;/a&gt;. See Moore, supra note 31, at 877-78.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F144"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B144"&gt;[FN144]&lt;/a&gt;. See David P. Chandler, A History of Cambodia 80-81, 94 &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber82"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;(1983) (noting the political instability and frequent fighting in Cambodia during that period).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F145"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B145"&gt;[FN145]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. at 139-41 (detailing France's involvement in Cambodia's history).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F146"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B146"&gt;[FN146]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. at 160-61.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F147"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B147"&gt;[FN147]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. at 166.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F148"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B148"&gt;[FN148]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. at 171.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F149"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B149"&gt;[FN149]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. at 173, 175-90.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F150"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B150"&gt;[FN150]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. at 190.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F151"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B151"&gt;[FN151]&lt;/a&gt;. See Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History 589-90 (1983) (discussing the turmoil of Vietnam and Cambodia's attempts to remain neutral).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F152"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B152"&gt;[FN152]&lt;/a&gt;. Id. at 590.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber83"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F153"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B153"&gt;[FN153]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. at 604; James A. Schear, Riding the Tiger: The United Nations and Cambodia's Struggle for Peace, in U.N. Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s 135, 136 (William J. Durch ed., 1996).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F154"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B154"&gt;[FN154]&lt;/a&gt;. See Karnow, supra note 151, at 44-45.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F155"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B155"&gt;[FN155]&lt;/a&gt;. See id.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F156"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B156"&gt;[FN156]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. at 45.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F157"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B157"&gt;[FN157]&lt;/a&gt;. ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) was formed in 1967 by the countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand to promote political and economic cooperation in the region. A united Vietnam was granted membership in 1995. Other nations have also joined. See Nobuo Kiriyama, Institutional Evolution in Economic Integration: A Contribution to Comparative Institutional Analysis for International Economic Organization, &lt;a href="http://international.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=%20%20%20%201.0&amp;amp;vr=2.0&amp;amp;DocName=19UPJIBL53&amp;amp;FindType=Y&amp;amp;ReferencePositionType=S&amp;amp;ReferencePosition=55"&gt;19 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 53, 55&lt;/a&gt; (1998); see also ASEAN Home Page (visited Oct. 6, 1998) &lt;&gt; for more information about ASEAN.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F158"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B158"&gt;[FN158]&lt;/a&gt;. See &lt;a href="http://international.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=%20%20%20%201.0&amp;amp;vr=2.0&amp;amp;DocName=87JIL1&amp;amp;FindType=Y"&gt;Steven R. Ratner, The Cambodia Settlement Agreements, 87 Am.&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber84"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://international.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=%20%20%20%201.0&amp;amp;vr=2.0&amp;amp;DocName=87JIL1&amp;amp;FindType=Y"&gt;J. Int'l L. 1, 4 (1993)&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F159"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B159"&gt;[FN159]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. at 5; Tracy Dahlby, China Opposes ASEAN's Plan on Cambodia, Wash. Post, July 16, 1981, at A28.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F160"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B160"&gt;[FN160]&lt;/a&gt;. See Ratner, supra note 158, at 6.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F161"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B161"&gt;[FN161]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. at 12-14.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F162"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B162"&gt;[FN162]&lt;/a&gt;. See Schear, supra note 153, at 139. The 12 members would include six from the SOC and two each from the other three factions. See id.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F163"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B163"&gt;[FN163]&lt;/a&gt;. See Paris Accords, supra note 103, at 7.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F164"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B164"&gt;[FN164]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. at 5-6.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F165"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B165"&gt;[FN165]&lt;/a&gt;. Id. at 46.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F166"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B166"&gt;[FN166]&lt;/a&gt;. See Marks, supra note 25, at 56.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F167"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B167"&gt;[FN167]&lt;/a&gt;. Paris Accords, supra note 103, at 46-47.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber85"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F168"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B168"&gt;[FN168]&lt;/a&gt;. See id.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F169"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B169"&gt;[FN169]&lt;/a&gt;. Id. at 47.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F170"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B170"&gt;[FN170]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. at 46-47.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F171"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B171"&gt;[FN171]&lt;/a&gt;. Id. at 48.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F172"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B172"&gt;[FN172]&lt;/a&gt;. Id. at 55. Before elections were held or a constitution was drafted, the international community raised $880 million for Cambodia's rehabilitation. See Schear, supra note 153, at 149.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F173"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B173"&gt;[FN173]&lt;/a&gt;. Schear, supra note 153, at 167.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F174"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B174"&gt;[FN174]&lt;/a&gt;. Id.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F175"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B175"&gt;[FN175]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. at 169.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F176"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B176"&gt;[FN176]&lt;/a&gt;. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-96-15BR, Briefing Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Committee on International Relations, &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber86"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;Cambodia: Limited Progress on Free Elections, Human Rights, Mine Clearing 14 (1996) (hereinafter GAO Report on Cambodia).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F177"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B177"&gt;[FN177]&lt;/a&gt;. See Schear, supra note 153, at 162-63, 167-69.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F178"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B178"&gt;[FN178]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. at 169.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F179"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B179"&gt;[FN179]&lt;/a&gt;. See A Global Agenda: Issues Before the 49th General Assembly of the United Nations 104 (John Tessitore &amp;amp; Susan Woolfson eds., 1994).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F180"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B180"&gt;[FN180]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. at 104-05.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F181"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B181"&gt;[FN181]&lt;/a&gt;. See GAO Report on Cambodia, supra note 176, at 19 (noting that at one point after UNTAC left, "Cambodia's co-Prime Ministers attempted to close the UNCHR office . . . in response to its criticism of human rights abuses, but backed down under international (including U.S. government) pressure.").&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F182"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B182"&gt;[FN182]&lt;/a&gt;. See Statement on the Situation in Cambodia: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Subcomm. on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 105th Cong. (1997), available in Westlaw, 1997 WL 541213 (statement made by Stanley O. Roth, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber87"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;Affairs) (hereinafter Situation in Cambodia).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F183"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B183"&gt;[FN183]&lt;/a&gt;. Marks, supra note 25, at 56.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F184"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B184"&gt;[FN184]&lt;/a&gt;. Id. Stephen Marks was the "head of human rights education, training and information for the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia." Id. at 45 n.*.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F185"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B185"&gt;[FN185]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. at 57.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F186"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B186"&gt;[FN186]&lt;/a&gt;. Namibian Principles, supra note 107, at 20.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F187"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B187"&gt;[FN187]&lt;/a&gt;. Ratner, supra note 158, at 27.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F188"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B188"&gt;[FN188]&lt;/a&gt;. Paris Accords, supra note 103, at 47. The entire text of Annex 5 follows:&lt;br /&gt;Principles for a new constitution for Cambodia&lt;br /&gt;  1. The constitution will be the supreme law of the land. It may be amended only by a designated process involving legislative approval, popular referendum, or both.&lt;br /&gt;  2. Cambodia's tragic recent history requires special measures to assure &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber88"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;protection of human rights. Therefore, the constitution will contain a declaration of fundamental rights, including the rights to life, personal liberty, security, freedom of movement, freedom of religion, assembly and association including political parties and trade unions, due process and equality before the law, protection from arbitrary deprivation of property or deprivation of private property without just compensation, and freedom from racial, ethnic, religious or sexual discrimination. It will prohibit the retroactive application of criminal law. The declaration will be consistent with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant international instruments. Aggrieved individuals will be entitled to have the courts adjudicate and enforce these rights.&lt;br /&gt;  3. The constitution will declare Cambodia's status as a sovereign, independent and neutral State, and the national unity of the Cambodian people.&lt;br /&gt;  4. The constitution will state that Cambodia will follow a system of liberal democracy, on the basis of pluralism. It will provide for periodic and genuine elections. It will provide for the right to vote and to be elected by universal and equal suffrage. It will provide for voting by secret ballot, with a requirement that electoral procedures provide a full and fair opportunity to organize and participate in the electoral process.&lt;br /&gt;  5. An independent judiciary will be established, empowered to enforce the &lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber89"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;rights provided under the constitution.&lt;br /&gt;  6. The constitution will be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the members of the constituent assembly.&lt;br /&gt;Id. at 46-47.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F189"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B189"&gt;[FN189]&lt;/a&gt;. See Marks, supra note 25, at 57.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F190"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B190"&gt;[FN190]&lt;/a&gt;. Paris Accords, supra note 103, at 47.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F191"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B191"&gt;[FN191]&lt;/a&gt;. Id.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F192"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B192"&gt;[FN192]&lt;/a&gt;. Compare Namibian Principles, supra note 107, at 20, with Paris Accords, supra note 103, at 46.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F193"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B193"&gt;[FN193]&lt;/a&gt;. Paris Accords, supra note 103, at 46; Namibian Principles, supra note 107, at 20.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F194"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B194"&gt;[FN194]&lt;/a&gt;. For an excellent and extensive review of the constitutional assembly's work and of Cambodian constitutional provisions as they compare to the principles and to prior Cambodian constitutions, see generally Marks, supra note 25.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber90"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F195"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B195"&gt;[FN195]&lt;/a&gt;. Id., at 51.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F196"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B196"&gt;[FN196]&lt;/a&gt;. Id.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F197"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B197"&gt;[FN197]&lt;/a&gt;. Id. (quoting David P. Chandler, Presentation to the Constitutional Seminar, Phnom Penh, Cambodia (Apr. 1, 1993)).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F198"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B198"&gt;[FN198]&lt;/a&gt;. See Dolores A. Donovan, The Cambodian Legal System: An Overview, in Rebuilding Cambodia: Human Resources, Human Rights, and Law 69, 74, 87 (Frederick Z. Brown ed., 1993).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F199"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B199"&gt;[FN199]&lt;/a&gt;. See Tyler Marshall, U.S. Decries Cambodian Takeover; Execution Reported, L.A. Times, July 9, 1997, at A4 (describing the takeover and the ensuing violence); see also Calling a Coup a Coup, The Wash. Post, July 9, 1997, at A22 (noting that U.S. officials "declin(ed) to label it a coup-- because then the law would require a cutoff of aid.").&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F200"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B200"&gt;[FN200]&lt;/a&gt;. See Monitors Agree Strongman Won Cambodian Election, Dallas Morning News, Aug. 6, 1998, at A9; Lance Raspbridge, Political Squabbling Threatens Cambodia, Dallas Morning News, Oct. 3, 1998, at A33.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber91"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F201"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B201"&gt;[FN201]&lt;/a&gt;. See &lt;a href="http://international.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=%20%20%20%201.0&amp;amp;vr=2.0&amp;amp;DocName=26NYUJINTLLPOL837&amp;amp;FindType=Y"&gt;Sonia K. Han, Building a Peace that Lasts: The United Nations and Post-Civil War Peace-Building, 26 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. &amp;amp; Pol. 837, 850 (1994)&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F202"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B202"&gt;[FN202]&lt;/a&gt;. Cambodian Const. ch. 2, art. 7.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F203"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B203"&gt;[FN203]&lt;/a&gt;. Id. ch. 2, arts. 23-24.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F204"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B204"&gt;[FN204]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. ch. 2, arts. 24, 26.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F205"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B205"&gt;[FN205]&lt;/a&gt;. Id. ch. 2, art. 22.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F206"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B206"&gt;[FN206]&lt;/a&gt;. Cf. &lt;a href="http://international.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=%20%20%20%201.0&amp;amp;vr=2.0&amp;amp;DocName=84CALIFLREV817&amp;amp;FindType=Y&amp;amp;ReferencePositionType=S&amp;amp;ReferencePosition=825"&gt;Jennifer S. Bermen, No Place Like Home: Anti-Vietnamese Discrimination and Nationality in Cambodia, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 817, 825 (1996)&lt;/a&gt; (citing Sihanouk's desire for a peaceful repatriation of ethnic Vietnamese in 1989); Karnow, supra note 151, at 44, 589 (noting attempts to prevent conflicts throughout Sihanouk's reign).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F207"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B207"&gt;[FN207]&lt;/a&gt;. Cambodian Const. ch. 2, art. 7.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber92"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F208"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B208"&gt;[FN208]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. ch. 3, art. 31.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F209"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B209"&gt;[FN209]&lt;/a&gt;. Id.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F210"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B210"&gt;[FN210]&lt;/a&gt;. See Marks, supra note 25, at 70-73.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F211"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B211"&gt;[FN211]&lt;/a&gt;. See Cambodian Const. ch. 3.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F212"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B212"&gt;[FN212]&lt;/a&gt;. Marks, supra note 25, at 72.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F213"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B213"&gt;[FN213]&lt;/a&gt;. Cambodian Const. ch. 3, art. 41.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F214"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B214"&gt;[FN214]&lt;/a&gt;. Id.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F215"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B215"&gt;[FN215]&lt;/a&gt;. See Marks, supra note 25, at 79.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F216"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B216"&gt;[FN216]&lt;/a&gt;. Cambodian Const. ch. 10, art. 122(2).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F217"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B217"&gt;[FN217]&lt;/a&gt;. See generally Cambodian Const. (lacking a provision for direct appeal by a citizen).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber93"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F218"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B218"&gt;[FN218]&lt;/a&gt;. Marks, supra note 25, at 75.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F219"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B219"&gt;[FN219]&lt;/a&gt;. Paris Accords, supra note 103, at 46.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F220"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B220"&gt;[FN220]&lt;/a&gt;. See id.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F221"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B221"&gt;[FN221]&lt;/a&gt;. Id. at 14; see also Marks, supra note 25, at 70-73.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F222"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B222"&gt;[FN222]&lt;/a&gt;. See Cambodian Const. ch. 10, art. 122.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F223"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B223"&gt;[FN223]&lt;/a&gt;. See Jeff Trimble et al., Into the Valleys of Death, U.S. News &amp;amp; World Rep., June 21, 1993, at 45-46.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F224"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B224"&gt;[FN224]&lt;/a&gt;. See &lt;a href="http://international.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=%20%20%20%201.0&amp;amp;vr=2.0&amp;amp;DocName=65FDMLR1295&amp;amp;FindType=Y&amp;amp;ReferencePositionType=S&amp;amp;ReferencePosition=1295"&gt;Frederick Schauer, Constitutional Invocations, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1295, 1295 n.1 (1997)&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F225"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B225"&gt;[FN225]&lt;/a&gt;. See id.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F226"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B226"&gt;[FN226]&lt;/a&gt;. See Bosnia &amp;amp; Herzegovina &lt;a href="http://international.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=%20%20%20%201.0&amp;amp;vr=2.0&amp;amp;DB=1000009&amp;amp;DocName=INCNART6S1&amp;amp;FindType=L"&gt;Const. art VI, §  1(a)&lt;/a&gt;, reprinted in  &lt;a href="http://international.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=%20%20%20%201.0&amp;amp;vr=2.0&amp;amp;DocName=35INTLLEGALMAT75&amp;amp;FindType=Y&amp;amp;ReferencePositionType=S&amp;amp;ReferencePosition=117"&gt;35 I.L.M. 117, 123&lt;/a&gt; (1996).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber94"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F227"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B227"&gt;[FN227]&lt;/a&gt;. See U.N. Elections Handbook, supra note 88, paras. 115-17.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F228"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B228"&gt;[FN228]&lt;/a&gt;. See GAO Report on Cambodia, supra note 176, at 14 (concluding that the 1993 elections probably could not have taken place or succeeded without the flow of information provided largely by "Radio UNTAC"). "The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), established to implement the accords, . . . concluded its mandate in late 1993 with the formation of a duly elected government in Cambodia." Id. at 1.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F229"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B229"&gt;[FN229]&lt;/a&gt;. See Schear, supra note 153, at 151. "(T)he operation would draw staff members from over 100 countries. Its costs would run to an estimated $1.9 billion." Id. See also Marshall, supra note 199, at A4 (describing the takeover and the ensuing violence); Calling a Coup a Coup, supra note 199, at A22 (noting that U.S. officials "declin(ed) to label it a coup--because then the law would require a cutoff of aid.").&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F230"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B230"&gt;[FN230]&lt;/a&gt;. See GAO Report on Cambodia, supra note 176, at 2.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F231"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B231"&gt;[FN231]&lt;/a&gt;. Raspbridge, supra note 200, at A33.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F232"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B232"&gt;[FN232]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. at 11.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber95"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F233"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B233"&gt;[FN233]&lt;/a&gt;. Id. at 13.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F234"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B234"&gt;[FN234]&lt;/a&gt;. Id. at 17.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F235"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B235"&gt;[FN235]&lt;/a&gt;. Id. at 19.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F236"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B236"&gt;[FN236]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. at 17.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F237"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B237"&gt;[FN237]&lt;/a&gt;. See Henry Kamm, Despite U.N.'s Effort, Cambodia Is Chaotic, N.Y. Times, July 4, 1994, at A1 (describing the scandal which heightened a crisis of confidence in the government and caused alarm to ambassadors from countries that provide economic aid).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F238"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B238"&gt;[FN238]&lt;/a&gt;. See id.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F239"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B239"&gt;[FN239]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. "Giving the military the right to sell timber independently also violates the budget law." Id.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F240"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B240"&gt;[FN240]&lt;/a&gt;. See id.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzSDUNumber96"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F241"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B241"&gt;[FN241]&lt;/a&gt;. See Marks, supra note 25, at 48-49 (describing Cambodia's undemocratic political history and human rights violations).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F242"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B242"&gt;[FN242]&lt;/a&gt;. Schear, supra note 153, at 175-76 (footnotes omitted).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F243"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B243"&gt;[FN243]&lt;/a&gt;. See Kamm, supra note 237, at A1; see also Emerging Norm of Democracy, supra note 110, at 264 (criticizing the tendency of democracy advocates to focus too narrowly on the importance of elections).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F244"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B244"&gt;[FN244]&lt;/a&gt;. See Situation in Cambodia, supra note 182.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F245"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B245"&gt;[FN245]&lt;/a&gt;. Id.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="Document1zzFN_F246"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6041305650038531172#Document1zzFN_B246"&gt;[FN246]&lt;/a&gt;. See id. The full list is:&lt;br /&gt;1. The violence that overturned the results of the 1993 elections is unacceptable; fighting must stop immediately.&lt;br /&gt;2. All politica
